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Introduction
Nowhere are the tensions and infirmities in the current framework
of corporate governance1 more apparent than in control transac-
tions. As the legal landscape defining the contours of control trans-
actions increasingly favors management discretion, sophisticated
institutional shareholders feel increasingly estranged from corpo-
rate governance machinery. Before this corporate governance
structure collapses to society's detriment, this Article proposes leg-
islative reform aimed at corporate governance's structural soft spot:
control-change transactions. It explores ways to harness the valua-
ble input of sophisticated, expert, and increasingly active institu-
tional shareholders when the conflict between management and
shareholders is most acute: during control-change transactions.
This Article's proposal seeks to assure that management and share-
holders work as a team to determine whether a takeover should oc-
cur in the first instance and, in the event of a takeover, to assure that
shareholders' voices are heard regarding both the takeover's form
and substance and the corporation's future governance structure.
Contests for control of publicly held corporations can take many
forms, including proxy contests, tender offers, stock for stock ex-
changes, open-market purchases, and privately negotiated transac-
tions. Takeovers of public companies constitute a major facet of
American business activity, and have become a primary method of
corporate expansion and diversification. In recent years, scarcely a
week has passed during which at least one major takeover bid has
not been announced. 2
The eight-year period from 1982 to 1989 saw more than 200
merger or acquisition transactions valued at one-billion dollars or
1. According to defensive takeover specialist Martin Lipton, "the present system of
corporate governance is an anachronism [and] is not suitable for the present era.... We
need a new system of corporate governance. We need to strike a balance." Lipton, A
Proposal For a New System of Corporate Governance: Quinquennial Election of Directors, in INSTI-
TUTIONAL INVESTORS, PASSIVE FIDUCIARIES To ACTIVIsT OWNERS 61, 64-65 (Practising
Law Institute 1990) (proposing board terms of five-year duration).
Corporate governance is today's hot topic. The stakes are large. Indeed,
I believe that the health and vitality of our entire economy is at risk. We
have lost our place as the World's leading financial power. In many basic
industries we are no longer competitive in World markets. If we do not
solve the problems and reverse the trends, we will bequeath a declining stan-
dard of living to our future generations.
Id at 63; see also Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institu-
tional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Lipton & Rosenblum, A New System of Corpo-
rate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (1991).
2. MERGERS & AcouiSrriONS, 1990 Almanac, at 12 (May/June 1991) [hereinafter
1990 Almanac].
more.3 In 1989 alone, there were nearly 3800 mergers or acquisi-
tions representing a value of approximately 254 billion dollars.4
Although these figures represent a downturn in activity from 1988,
when 500 more transactions occurred, the dollar volume in 1989
was the second highest in history.5 The volume of transactions fell
three percent in 1990 to around 3600 completions, but significantly,
the value of those completed transactions fell 35% to 160 billion
dollars. 6
Fueling the entire takeover market has been a virtually unlimited
flow of capital to finance corporate acquisitions. The development
of the controversial "junk bond" market allowed corporate ac-
quirors to raise hundreds of millions and even tens of billions of
dollars to purchase publicly held corporations. 7 Although some of
the takeover fever may have subsided with the problems in the junk
bond market,8 substantial financing remains available. The most
significant change in the market for corporate control may be that in
the 1990s strategic deals are replacing the unbridled merger mania
of the 1980s. 9  Indeed, although the value of takeover activity
3. MERGERS & AcQuIsrrIoNs, 1989 Almanac, at 57 (May/June 1990) [hereinafter
1989 Alamanac]. In 1990, 37 deals were closed valued at over $1 billion each. 1990
Almanac, supra note 2, at 6.
4. 1990 Almanac, supra note 2, at 5. These statistics include only those transac-
tions that exceeded one million dollars and involved American companies. Id
5. 1989 Almanac, supra note 3, at 8. The trend appears to have continued into
1990. See Stock Market Loses Vital Corporate Crutch, Wall St. J., July 23, 1990, at C1, col. 1.
6. 1990 Almanac, supra note 2, at 5-6.
7. For background on the role ofjunk bonds in catalyzing the takeover frenzy, see
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 99-M CONG., 2D SESS., CORPORATE MERGERS AND
HIGH YIELD [JUNK] BONDS: RECENT MARKET TRENDS AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
(Comm. Print 1986).
The use ofjunk bonds in huge takeover transactions, however, has led to highly lever-
aged companies. Although the market for corporate control and the tax laws have en-
couraged the use of massive amounts of debt, the increased use of debt by publicly held
corporations has led to increasing concerns over the dangers of unrestrained leverage,
giving rise to an immense body of literature and prompting attention by Congress. Fol-
lowing the 1989 takeover of RJR Nabisco, Congress expressed an interest in the issues
surrounding highly leveraged takeover transactions, and held numerous hearings on the
matter in which several members of Congress suggested that interest payments on debt
in highly leveraged takeover transactions should no longer be deductible. To date, how-
ever, no legislation has been enacted.
The junk bond market faded in 1990 as a source of acquisition financing. 1990 Alma-
nac, supra note 2, at 11 (stating that in 1990, junk bonds faded "[a]lmost out of sight").
In fact, in 1990 only one deal was identified involving junk bonds. Id In contrast, over
$15 billion ofjunk bond financing was used for acquisition financing in 1989. Id.
8. See Barlett, Now that 'Junk Bonds" and Hostile Takeovers Are Pass Who Will Keep
Management on Its Toes?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1990, § 3 (Business), at 1; cf. Mitchell,Junk
Bonds Ride a Long Comeback Trail, Wall St. J.,July 2, 1990, at C1, col. 3 (stating that after a
sharp decline, the junk bond market is beginning to show signs of recovery).
9. See Rosenberg, Merger Mania Is Giving Way to Strategic Deals, Minneapolis Star
Tribune, July 5, 1990, at 7B, col. 1; Smith, The Corporate Raider of the '90s: Big Business,
Wall St.J., Dec. 4, 1990, at C1, col. I (stating that "corporate takeovers are back. Only
this time, its big, deep-pocketed corporations that are doing the buying, not the 1980s-
style raiders and leveraged buy-out funds."). Experts expect an increasing number of
big takeovers by large corporations. See id. at C20, col. 6.
[VOL. 59:14251428
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slowed forty-seven percent in 1990 to roughly $200 billion,10 per-
haps "the age of the strategic merger has arrived."1 1
The debate over the effects of corporate takeovers is equally con-
troversial. Logical arguments have been advanced on both sides of
the issue. Proponents of increased takeover activity argue that take-
overs serve several important social and economic functions, includ-
ing transferring resources to their most valued uses, replacing
ineffective management with more efficient personnel, and allowing
shareholders to receive a premium for their shares over the market
price. 12 On the other hand, defenders of the defensive activities of
target companies assert that hostile takeovers allow companies to be
purchased at prices that substantially undervalue corporate assets
and divert resources from long-term projects that may not show a
profit for several years to short-term projects that only temporarily
increase the corporation's stock price.' 3 Furthermore, antitakeover
10. After Merger Mania of the '80s, Takeover Market Slowed in '90, Minneapolis Star Trib-
une, Dec. 27, 1990, at ID (figures include deals announced during the year). Takeovers
peaked in late 1988 with the record $24.53 billion debt-financed takeover of RJR
Nabisco Inc. by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. Inc. Id. at 7D.
11. The Era of the Strategic Merger, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1990, at 175. In
1990, the 11 largest deals were completed by strategic buyers. Id.
12. Beryl Sprinkel, Chairman of President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers
noted: "The available evidence shows that [hostile takeovers] increase national wealth.
These transactions improve efficiency, transfer scarce resources to higher valued uses,
and stimulate effective corporate management." The Issue in Corporate Takeovers, Wall St.
J., July 20, 1987, at 30, col. 4 (exerpted from the Chairman's Senate testimony on the
Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987).
For a discussion of Senator Proxmire's Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act of
1987, see SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, TENDER OFFER Dis-
CLOSURE AND FAIRNESS ACT OF 1987, S. REP. No. 265, and S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Proxmire Bill]. The 1987 Proxmire Bill directs the Gov-
ernment Accounting Office (GAO) to report by 1989 on the impact of state takeover
laws on shareholder and employee welfare. Senator D'Amato's conclusion merits ex-
tended quotation:
From the available evidence, it appears that the market for corporate control
has worked and is working well .... Both economic theory and the great
weight of the available empirical evidence clearly demonstrate that takeovers
have provided net benefits to the American economy. Admittedly, some
forms of takeover activity, hostile, friendly or management buyouts, result in
temporary social and economic dislocations. However, these dislocations
are no less severe than unilateral actions taken by corporate managements
that are totally divorced from takeover activity. Actions such as plant clos-
ings and relocations, headquarter relocations and job loss due to general
economic conditions cause far more social and economic dislocation than
corporate takeover activity .... [Ilt is clear that the federal government is
less capable of distinguishing between beneficial and detrimental takeover
activity than are the private parties who have better financial information
and a substantial financial incentive to be right in making the judgments.
S. REP. No. 265, supra, at 159-60.
13. For a brief distillation of current antitakeover sentiment, see the legislative find-
ings and intent of the recent Washington State antitakeover law:
(4) Hostile or unfriendly attempts to gain control of or influence other-
wise publicly held corporations can cause corporate management to dissi-
pate a corporation's assets in an effort to resist the takeover by selling or
weapons are believed to protect such nonshareholders as bondhold-
ers and employees.' 4
As the volume of takeover activity has increased over the years,' 5
the entire takeover arena has evolved. Corporate acquirors have de-
veloped new and more aggressive techniques to make any corpora-
tion a potential acquisition target, 16 and target corporations have
responded with innovative defensive tactics, the most potent of
which has been the shareholder rights plan, or "poison pill."' 7
distributing cash or assets, redeeming stock, or taking other steps to increase
the short-term gain to shareholders and to dissipate energies required for
strategic planning, market development, capital investment decisions, as-
sessment of technologies, and evaluation of competitive challenges that can
damage the long-term interests of shareholders and the economic health of
the state by reducing or eliminating the ability to finance investments in re-
search and development, new products, facilities and equipment, and by un-
dermining the planning process for those purposes;
(5) Hostile or unfriendly attempts to gain control of or influence other-
wise publicly held corporations are often highly leveraged pursuant to fi-
nancing arrangements which assume that an acquirer will promptly obtain
access to an acquired corporation's cash or assets and use them, or the pro-
ceeds of their sale, to repay acquisition indebtedness;
(6) Hostile or unfriendly attempts to gain control of or influence other-
wise publicly held corporations can harm the economy of the state by weak-
ening corporate performance, and causing unemployment, plant closings,
reduced charitable donations, declining population base, and reduced [fees,
taxes, and income].
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23B.19.010 (Supp. 1991) (Legislative Findings-Intent).
14. See Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stake-
holders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435.
15. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
16. The primary method has been the aggregation of substantial "junk" debt, per-
mitting suitors to acquire large corporations, like RJR Nabisco. Use of unfinanced
tender offers to put a corporation "into play" is another technique employed by suitors.
17. "Poison pills" are antitakeover mechanisms triggered when a hostile raider
amasses a target's stock to gain control of the target corporation. See Note, An Examina-
tion of a Board of Directors' Duty to Redeem the Rights Issued Pursuant to a Stockholder Rights
Plan, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 537, 539-44 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Duty to Redeem Rights
Plans]. Poison pills are thought to be the most potent type of firm-specific antitakeover
devices. See id. at 539. In keeping with current takeover parlance, the term "poison pill"
or "pill" is used extensively throughout this Article. Where appropriate, the more cum-
bersome yet less disparaging term "shareholder rights plan" or "poison pill rights plan"
is substituted. For a description of various poison pills and their equivalents, see id. at
539; Note, Defensive Tactics to Hostile Tender Offers-An Examination of Their Legitimacy and
Effectiveness, 11 J. CORP. L. 651 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Defensive Tactics] (discussing
various antitakeover mechanisms); Chittur, Wall Street's Teddybear: The "Poison Pill" as a
Takeover Defense, 11 J. CORP. L. 25 (1985).
One of the more concise explorations of poison pills notes that poison pills grant
shareholders
a warrant or other right, usually transferable itself, the operation of which
typically is triggered by any significant transfers or concentrations of con-
trolling stock or voting power. This warrant or right may enable the holder
to do any one or more of the following things: to buy stock in the acquirer at
low prices ("flip overs," e.g., at fifty percent of market value); to sell target
stock to the target itself at high prices ("flip ins," e.g., at 200 percent of mar-
ket value); to exchange stock of the target with a high-value package of the
target ("back ends"); or to convert a special preferred stock of the target for
a high-value package of cash and securities of the target. Such pills had be-
come the antitakeover weapon of choice.., and are now being further re-
fined and expanded because of their simplicity and effectiveness. Clearly
most pills serve no conceivable corporate financing purpose.
Kozyris, Corporate Takeovers at the Jurisdictional Crossroads: Preserving State Authority Over
Shareholder Rights
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These defensive techniques have significantly increased the leverage
of the board of directors in dealing with corporate bidders.
Probably the most significant development in the takeover arena
in the past decade, however, has been the adoption by state legisla-
tures of protectionist statutes. These provisions, often designed to
aid the local target of a prominent takeover overture,18 have an im-
pact reaching far beyond the initial target and lasting well beyond
the battle that brought the legislation into being. The increasing
potency and proliferation of such legislation have created a layer of
corporate insulation that is slowly blanketing the whole country. 19
It is difficult today to find a publicly held company that is not
shielded by a poison pill or antitakeover statute, or both.20 Indeed,
the recent proliferation of these corporate-imposed 21 and state-
sponsored 22 protectionist measures magnifies the need for critical
analysis and possible reform.23 Although corporate managers and
Internal Affairs While Protecting the Transferability of Interstate Stock Through Federal Law, 36
UCLA L. REV. 1109, 1156-57 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
18. See infra notes 488-90 and accompanying text.
19. For an overview of state protectionist measures, see Appendix.
20. Roughly 85% of all companies have some form of protection against unwanted
takeover bids. Parker, Companies Not Ringed with Defensive Armor, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT
AGE, Sept. 17, 1990, at 21 (noting that some forms of governance protections remain
"surprisingly rare," including supermajority amendments and lock-in provisions).
21. The trend toward pill adoption has recently escalated. A study by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), an independent nonprofit research group,
found that as of mid-June 1989, 43% of the nation's largest public corporations have
adopted poison pills; this compares to a 1986 Fortune 500 showing of less than 30%.
See Almost Half of Larger U.S. Companies Have Poison Pill Plans, Study Reports, 21 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA), at 1630 (Nov. 3, 1989). The IRRC released its updated study on No-
vember 26, 1990, finding that the percentage of large American companies with poison
pills increased from 43% in June 1989, to 51% in August 1990. Majority of Large U.S.
Corporations Have Adopted Poison Pills, IRRC Finds, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1659
(Nov. 30, 1990). "If the recent trends continue, virtually all major corporations will be
transformed into fortresses in the near future." Kozyris, supra note 17, at 1125 n.59.
The vast majority of these pills were adopted without shareholder approval. See Andre,
Tender Offers for Corporate Contro" A Critical Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 12 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 865, 869 (1987).
22. State sponsorship of poison pills may take one of two forms: (1) State antitake-
over legislation whose practical impact is substantially similar to poison pills; or (2) state
antitakeover legislation which specifically authorizes corporations to adopt poison pills.
For purposes of this Article, "state sponsored poison pills" refers to the former type.
Generally, state legislation mirrors corporate-level defenses. See Oesterle, The Rise and
Fall of Street Sweep Takeovers, 1989 DUKE L.J. 202, 233. Only six states have yet to adopt
some form of antitakeover legislation. See Appendix at S.
23. That legislative remedies for these broad problems are preferred over case law
solutions cannot be gainsaid. First, although case law may provide some guidance as to
the dimensions of the business judgment rule, its necessarily fact-specific approach is ill-
suited to address broad takeover issues. Indeed, courts themselves are ill-equipped to
balance the business and economic issues paramount in the takeover arena. Second, as
a balanced legislative response precludes case law remedies only as regards fundamental
parameters, case law is still necessary to fill in the skeletal framework with case-by-case
considerations. See generally 1 R. BALOTI &J. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF COR-
PORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS lxviii-lxix (Supp. 1989) (discussing the ten-
dency of the Deleware courts to place limits on the liberal Delaware statutes).
legislators justifiably may have sought to curb the abuses of the
raider-driven takeover fever,24 their response has failed to achieve a
balance between shareholder and nonshareholder interests. 25
The reservoir of recent commentary on current state antitakeover
legislation is enormous.2 6 This wealth of scholarship appears inevi-
table given the profound economic and social impact of takeovers
and antitakeover devices. 27 This commentary touches on a multi-
tude of conflicting goals: society's interest in maximizing fairness,
24. The impact tender offers have on society has been likened to such crises as the
national debt and defense spending. See Sommer, Hostile Tender Offer Is Critical Issue for
Congress, Legal Times, Jan. 21, 1985, at 19; see, e.g., Veasey, Delaware's Takeover Law: A
Statute Was Needed To Stop Abuses, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, § 3, at 2, col. 3; see also Nuss-
baum & Dobrzynski, The Battle for Corporate Control, Bus. WK., May 18, 1987, at 102; Wil-
liams, It's Time for a Takeover Moratorium, FORTUNE, July 22, 1985, at 133-34. Compare
Goldman, Delaware Anti-Takeover Legislation Is Needed, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 8, 1988, at 31, col. 1
(noting that many states enacted takeover statutes in an effort to delay tender offers long
enough to allow the necessary information to reach the shareholders in order for the
shareholders to make informed decisions about the tender offer) with Mendelsohn &
Berg, Anti-Takeover Bill Would Shift Balance of Power, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 8, 1988, at 38, col. 1
(arguing that, in fact, the Delaware antitakeover statute will shift power from the share-
holders to management in tender offer situations).
25. Given both the ubiquity of these legislative and board-derived poison pills and
the current trend toward their adoption, three questions face corporations, legislators
and courts: (1) by what process should poison pills be adopted; (2) by what process
should corporations further shield themselves with state antitakeover legislation; and (3)
when must an attractive tender offer be accepted despite the presence of a poison pill
which would otherwise foreclose a takeover? This Article and proposed Model Act prof-
fer solutions for these fundamental questions.
26. See Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (1988)
[hereinafter Booth I]; Booth, State Takeover Statutes Revisited, 88 MICH. L. REV. 120 (1989)
[hereinafter Booth II]; Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for
Corporate Charters, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 365; Coates, NOTE: State Takeover Statutes and Corpo-
rate Theory: The Revival ofAn Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806 (1989); Coffee, Shareholders
Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV 1 (1986); Coffee, supra
note 14;Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. Rzv.
846 (1989) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon I]; Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams
Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862 (1989) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon II]; Macey, State Anti-
Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 467; Romano, The Political
Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987); see also Johnson, The Delaware
Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1990);
Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 473 (1987) [hereinafter Pinto I]; Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate
Control: State Takeover Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699 (1988) [here-
inafter Pinto II]; Note, Stakeholder Versus Stockholder: The Director's Proper Constituency in a
Contest for Corporate Control, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 475 (1989).
27. Few corporate events have an impact as broad and intense on society as take-
overs. Many of the more widely recognized commentaries probe the major economic
concerns of takeover activity and antitakeover devices. See Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitat-
ing Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Coffee, Regulating the Market for
Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Manage-
ment in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter Easter-
brook & Fischel I]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698
(1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel II]; Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:
The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981) [hereinafter
Gilson I]; Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35
STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982) [hereinafter Gilson II]; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Board-
room, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979) [hereinafter Lipton I] (arguing that the discretion granted
directors in the nontakeover context should be extended to takeover bids, thus urging
that stakeholder interests be considered); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom:
An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAw. 1017 (1981) [hereinafter Lipton II]; Lipton, Take-
over Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U.
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economic efficiency, and long-term corporate growth; shareholders'
interest in wealth maximization; corporations' and other nonshare-
holders' interest in continued economic viability; and directors' in-
terest both in freely deciding their corporation's future and in
fulfilling their duties to shareholders and nonshareholders without
incurring liability.
As yet, however, no scholar has proposed new or model legisla-
tion designed to resolve the concerns inherent in the current market
for corporate control. 28 This Article attempts to fill this void and
proposes legislation providing directors with enhanced guidance
and certainty by balancing shareholders' and management's input at
those times when management's inherent conflict of interest with
L. REv. 1231 (1980) [hereinafter Lipton III]; Upton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Upton IV]; Oesterle, Target
Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity
Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53 (1985); Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction,
2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 229 (1986).
28. For scholars who have suggested specific statutory proposals, see Lowenstein,
Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249
(1983) (proposing to amend the Williams Act: takeover bids must remain open for six
months; target corporations cannot undertake a "structural change" upon becoming a
target); McCord, Limiting Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers: A Model Act for the Protection of
Shareholder Dedsionmaking, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 489 (1984) (setting forth a Model Act
that seeks to limit defensive tactics by: (1) restricting management's ability to secure
changes in the corporate charter that discourage tender offers; (2) prohibiting extraordi-
nary transactions by a corporation amid tender offers; (3) imposing strict lability on di-
rectors for making misleading statements regarding tender offers; and (4) revising
antitrust laws); Ferrara & Carroll, A Proposal for Legislation to Provide for Balanced State and
Federal Regulation of Tender Offers, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 953 (Practis-
ing Law Institute 1988) (proposing to amend the Williams Act so that its underlying
policies have the force of law, thereby preempting state statutes that intrude on the
Williams Act's balanced regime, including control share and business combination stat-
utes).
Scholars recommending legislative change without proposing specific statutory lan-
guage are more numerous. See Johnson & Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of
Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315 (1987) (recommending that statutes be amended
to afford independent directors authority to reject offers); Loewenstein, Toward An Auc-
tion Market for Corporate Control and the Demise of the Business Judgment Rule, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 65 (1989) (recommending both the adoption of a more bidder-oriented review
standard and the amendment of the Williams Act to increase the open period for tender
offers to 60 days); see also Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal for Reform, 36
HASTINGS L.J. 377 (1985); Note, Shareholder Rights Plans-Do They Render Shareholders De-
fenseless Against Their Own Management?, 12 DEL.J. CORP. L. 991 (1987) [hereinafter Note,
Shareholder Rights Plans] (recommending the requirement of shareholder approval for
rights plans); Note, State Takeover Statutes and a Proposal to Amend the Williams Act, 49 OHIO
ST. LJ. 1129 (1989) [hereinafter Note, State Takeover Statutes] (recommending an amend-
ment to the Williams Act to prohibit certain control share act provisions). Compare Brad-
ley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1377 (1986) (proposing
requirement that repurchase offers for self-tenders seek at least the number of shares
sought by the raider and that the terms of such offers do not impede the suitor from
tendering its holdings to target) with Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A
Comment on Two Models, 96 YALE L.J. 295 (1986) (criticizing Bradley & Rosenzweig's
assumptions).
shareholders is most acute-during a battle for control of the corpo-
ration. In addition, the proposed legislation encourages sharehold-
ers to inform management of an optimal course of action for
significant decisions affecting the company's potential for
acquisition.
Accordingly, Part I traces the evolution of the market for corpo-
rate control, identifies the current corporate and legislative impedi-
ments to shareholder involvement in this arena and the dearth of
current shareholder protection reform proposals for state legisla-
tion. Part II analyzes the identity and role of shareholders in the
modem corporation. Part III explores the legal and economic justi-
fications for enhancing shareholder input. Part IV delineates a para-
digm for reform. Responsive to this new paradigm, Part V proposes
a Model Act with Comments. These Comments summarize the jus-
tifications for enhancing shareholder input and permit the Model
Act to stand alone.
L The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control
A. The Shifting Role of the Board of Directors
The corporate board historically has played, and still plays, a pri-
mary role in most significant corporate events. Significant corpo-
rate transactions, such as mergers or sales of assets, typically require
board recommendation before they are considered by the share-
holders. 29 This requirement gives the board the ability to short-cir-
cuit fundamental changes, or, from a different perspective, protects
the shareholders from the burdens of important decisions until their
duly elected representatives have carefully considered the matter
and have decided such a change is in the best interests of the corpo-
ration and its shareholders. Similarly, changes in the corporate
charter are typically initiated by the directors. In addition, corpo-
rate management, sometimes through a nominating committee, al-
most always chooses whether individual directors should continue
in office and who will replace them.
One significant transaction, a tender offer,30 need not involve the
29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (Supp. 1991) (requiring approval by share-
holders for mergers); id. § 271 (dealing with the sale of assets).
30. No consensus exists as to the definition of a tender offer. Courts usually con-
sider eight factors proposed by the SEC in determining the existence of a tender offer:
(1) Active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares
of an issuer; (2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's
stock; (3) offer to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market
price; (4) terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable; (5) offer contin-
gent on the tender of a fixed number of shares, often subject to a fixed maxi-
mum number to be purchased; (6) offer open only for a limited period of
time; (7) offeree subjected to pressure to sell his stock; [and (8)] public an-
nouncements of a purchasing program concerning the target company pre-
cede or accompany rapid accumulation of a large amount of target
company's securities.
SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd on other grounds,
682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983)). For further analysis of
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current management or board. Shareholders are given the opportu-
nity to sell their shares directly to an offeror, thereby relinquishing
their interest in the corporation. No vote is taken; no board ap-
proval is necessary.31 The transaction is fundamentally financial
rather than corporate. Yet, if the offer is for a controlling number of
shares, ultimate corporate control may shift.3 2 Therefore, the ease
by which a tender offer may shift the fundamental ownership of a
company embodies the whole concept of a market for corporate
control.3 3
Before the 1968 enactment of the Williams Act,3 4 tender offers
tender offers, see Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 28, at 1381 nn.12-14 and sources
cited therein.
31. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1990). Although Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Rule 14d-9 applies to recommendations made by the target company, Rule 14e-2 pro-
vides that the target company must, within ten business days from the dissemination of
the tender offer, make a statement to its shareholders declaring that it (1) recommends
acceptance of the offer, (2) recommends rejection of the offer, (3) is remaining neutral,
or (4) is unable to take a position. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1990). Thus, Rule 14e-2
requires the target's Board of Directors to consider and respond to all tender offers,
although its response may be noncommittal.
32. In enacting antitakeover legislation effective November 2, 1989, Ohio's General
Assembly stressed its concern for the role of tender offers in transfers of control of Ohio
corporations:
(1) Existing Ohio corporate law was designed to deal with traditional
methods of transfer of control of Ohio corporations. The tender offer has
evolved as an alternative device to acquire control of a public corporation
that has been in widespread use in the past several decades.... Numerous
Ohio corporations have been the subject of tender offers and accumulations
of significant blocks of securities.
(2) The accumulation of a large block of a corporation's voting shares...
has not been subject to the normal corporate approval mechanisms involved
in other typical types of acquisition transactions such as mergers, consolida-
tions, combinations, and majority share acquisitions. Such accumulations,
however, can result in shifts of effective corporate control and hence, from a
business and financial perspective, directly or indirectly, can result in signifi-
cant changes in a variety of basic corporate circumstances identical or sub-
stantially similar to those arising as a result of the above-mentioned
transactions. For instance, a change in corporate control accompanying a
large accumulation of shares will very often result in a fundamental change
in the ongoing business of the corporation and a concomitant fundamental
change in the nature of the shareholders' investment in it. Thus the poten-
tial that such changes in corporate circumstances will occur gives rise to ba-
sic issues concerning the internal affairs of the corporation typical of those
arising in mergers, consolidations, combinations, and majority share acquisi-
tions. The form of the transaction in which such issues arise should not alter
the basic corporate mechanisms by which such issues are presented and re-
solved.
(3) Tender offers almost always involve a change in corporate control
and, therefore, give rise to these same basic issues concerning internal cor-
porate affairs.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.832 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
33. See generally Matheson & Norberg, Hostile Share Acquisitions and Corporate Govern-
ante: A Framework for EvaluatingAntitakeover Activities, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 407 (1986) (ex-
amining antitakeover tactics in light of principles of corporate governance).
34. Act of July 29, 1968 (Williams Act), Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968)
14351991]
typically followed this scenario:
The prospective buyer offers a price far enough above the market
to obtain the desired number of shares-usually an amount suffi-
cient to gain operating control of the corporation. As an aid in
carrying out his objective the buyer generally hires a brokerage
house to manage the offer, arranges a loan to pay for the
purchase, buys a few newspaper ads and issues press releases to
shareholders of the "target" company. If the number of shares
tendered by shareholders falls below the number desired, all of
the shares are returned and the acquisition plan is canceled. If the
tender offer brings in more stock than the specified number of
shares bid for, the offeror may at his option, buy only the number
of shares for which he has bid or may buy all of the stock
tendered.3 5
The unregulated cash tender offer had at least three advantages
over other modes of corporate control acquisition. Although proxy
contests and stock-for-stock exchanges required disclosure of cer-
tain pertinent information to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) and target company shareholders,36 cash tender offers
could be made in secrecy.37 Cash tender offers also took less time to
complete, and because they were unregulated, cash tender offers
were administratively less expensive.
The advantages tender offers provided to takeover strategists
were offset, it was argued, by disadvantages to the shareholders of
target companies.3 8 The lack of disclosure requirements forced
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1988). The Williams Act established five
new subsections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and thus took a piecemeal ap-
proach to regulating private and open market purchases and cash tender offers. 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 now reg-
ulates tender offers and all substantial acquisitions. Section 13(d) regulates acquirors of
more than five percent of any class of a publicly-held corporation's equity securities, lId
§ 78m(d). This section requires certain disclosures and applies to open market and pri-
vate purchases as well as to tender offers. Id Section 14(d) requires contemporaneous
disclosure, during any tender offer, of acquisitions of more than five percent of any class
of a publicly held corporation's equity securities. Id. § 78n(d). Section 14(e) prohibits
material misrepresentations and omissions or fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
acts or practices in connection with any tender offer solicitation or opposition. Id.
§ 78n(e). Section 14(f) requires disclosure if changes in connection with any substantial
purchase result in replacement of a majority of the board without stockholder approval.
Id. § 78m(f). Section 13(e), regulating issuer purchase programs, facilitates the dissemi-
nation of important information to shareholders who must decide whether to tender
their shares back to the issuer. Id. § 78m(e).
35. 113 CONG. REC. 855 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
36. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governs proxy solicitation
and requires the solicitor to disclose information to the target company shareholders
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.14a-3, 240.14a-6. A stock-for-stock exchange is a "sale" subject to the registra-
tion and prospectus delivery requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77b, 77e.
37. Before the enactment of the Williams Act in 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat.
454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-n (1988)), the only statutes ad-
dressing securities purchases were the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1842-43 (1988); and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-23
(1988).
38. See Glenn, Rethinking the Regulation of Open Market and Privately Negotiated Stock
Transactions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 8 J. CORP. L. 41, 55-60 (1982).
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shareholders to make hasty decisions, with a dearth of information,
about whether to tender their shares or wait out the offer.39
Congress passed the Williams Act4° because it recognized that un-
regulated cash tender offers often paralleled regulated proxy con-
tests as a mechanism for changing corporate control.4' The
Williams Act was also a congressional response to the perceived in-
equities of unregulated cash tender offers.42 The Act was designed
to protect investors from sudden shifts in control brought on by an
acquiror's swift accumulation of shares. 43 It requires, in the context
of tender offers, full disclosure and equal treatment toward target
shareholders44 similar to that required in proxy contests and stock-
for-stock exchanges. 45 The Act relieves the undue pressure on
shareholders by ensuring investors have more time to make in-
formed and rational decisions. The drafters of the Act, however,
sought to avoid tipping the balance of power in favor of either the
offeror or the target company's management. 46
The passage of the Williams Act seems to have done little to pre-
vent hostile takeovers. The Act interposed a period of delay and
additional expense, but did not otherwise limit the offeror's ability
to proceed. Management continues to be bypassed as shares
change hands in the market for corporate control. Despite the Wil-
liams Act, by the mid-1970s the takeover boom had begun an ex-
tended expansion that would carry through the megamergers of the
late 1980s. 47
Corporate management, however, did not remain passive. Vari-
ous defensive mechanisms have been adopted and are currently em-
ployed. From crude beginnings such as asset sales, defensive
39. Id.
40. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n
(1988)).
41. See SENATE COMMITrEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF CORPO-
RATE Eourry OWNERSHIP AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. REP. No. 550, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
42. See id. at 3-4; HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, DISCLO-
SURE OF CORPORATE EqCurry OWNERSHIP, H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1968) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
43. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 41, at 3-4; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 4.
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d). Senator Williams stressed that
[e]very effort has been made to avoid tipping the balance of regulatory bur-
den in favor of management or in favor of the offeror. The purpose of the
bill is to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of shareholders while
at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to
present their case.
113 CONG. REC. 854-55 (1967) (emphasis added); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 41,
at 3; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 4.
45. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 2811.
46. Id. at 4.
47. See, e.g., 1990 Almanac, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that the "mergers and acquisi-
tion boom of the 1980s" tapered off in the 1990s).
acquisitions, and charter amendments, to the mid-1980s develop-
ment of the poison pill, management resisted unfriendly overtures.
The short-term goal of such defensive tactics is usually to defeat a
particular bid. Many bids are seen as not only threatening manage-
ment, but also harmful to shareholders.48 Bids are purportedly
made at inadequate prices, are designed to dissolve the operating
entity, or seek to pay a premium for minimal control shares and
then squeeze out the remaining shareholders at a much lower
price.49
The long-term objective of antitakeover measures has always been
to reassert the board's position as the primary decisionmaker in fun-
damental corporate transactions.50 The transfer of shares in a
tender offer always threatens the continuity of management's con-
trol. Management seeks to manage the process of these share trans-
fers so as to determine, if not defeat, the transfer of corporate
control.
State legislatures also refused to sit by idly as takeover activity
increased. As favorite local corporations came under attack, legisla-
tures adopted protective provisions. 51 In addition, increasing num-
bers of states put prophylactic statutes in place to provide the board
with the power to guide the takeover process. 5 2 The strength of
these enactments has been growing along with the expanding group
of states that have adopted them. Indeed, by the process of spread-
ing state adoption of antitakeover legislation, a national takeover
law is developing.
B. Current Protectionist Efforts
1. Legislation
The overwhelming majority of public corporations are protected
by state antitakeover legislation. 53 These antitakeover statutes have
been enacted in three waves. First-generation statutes were enacted
in response to the spell of takeover activity in the late 1960s, 54 and
48. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1640-43.
49. See id.
50. See Kanter, Judicial Review of Antitakeover Devices Employed in the Noncoercive Tender
Offer Context: Making Sense of the Unocal Test, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 225, 226 (1989) (stating
that "[t]he ability to enact an antitakeover device, or redeem an existing one, has
granted to the target board a virtual veto power over tender offers" (footnote omitted)).
Kanter further notes that antitakeover devices enable targets "in effect to defeat any
unsolicited tender offer not approved by its board." Id. at 230 (footnote omitted); see
also McBride, Conflicting Claims Remain an Issue in Delaware Cases, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 30, 1989,
at S14.
51. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) (discussed
infra note 489); see also infra note 490 and accompanying text (noting that 16 states en-
acted antitakeover legislation at the request of local corporations); cf Davis, Epilogue:
The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988 Wis. L. Rav. 491, 493-500
(noting that "[t]he fast-track, save-a-particular corporation statute is by no means the
universal case," in his analysis of the Wisconsin antitakeover legislation).
52. See infra notes 53-205 and accompanying text; Appendix (surveying state an-
titakeover weaponry).
53. Johnson, supra note 26, at 909.
54. See Pinto II, supra note 26, at 700-14.
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often paralleled the requirements of the Williams Act.5 5 Second-
generation statutes5 6 were passed in response to the Supreme
Court's rejection of first-generation statutes announced in Edgar v.
MITE Corp.57 Third-generation statutes are those that have been
passed since CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,58 where the
Supreme Court upheld Indiana's second-generation statute. By
June 1, 1991, at least forty-four states had adopted antitakeover stat-
utes of some kind.59
Although current antitakeover statutes take a variety of forms,60
generally they reflect common elements. Primarily, state antitake-
over legislation attempts to vest management with power to re-
spond to tender offers.6 1 Second, this legislation seeks to regulate
hostile acquisitions, through corporate governance, which tradition-
ally has been the province of state law.6 2
Many states have adopted more than one form of antitakeover
statutes. These forms include: (a) business combination statutes; 63
(b) control share statutes;6 (c) fair price statutes;65 (d) disclosure
55. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
56. In general, second-generation statutes cover only takeovers of corporations
chartered in their respective states. Unlike first-generation statutes, many second-gen-
eration statutes impose a nexus requirement beyond incorporation in the enacting state.
For example, they may also require either a significant presence in the statutory forum
or a large proportion of shareholders residing there. Similarly, some third-generation
statutes apply to takeovers directed at corporations which have some other connection
with the statutory forum (such as having substantial corporate facilities within the state
or having a certain percentage of shareholder residents).
57. 457 U.S. 624 (1982); see Coates, supra note 26, at 846 n.241. Despite the MITE
Court's holding that an Illinois antitakeover statute was an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce, 22 states still had some form of first-generation statute at the end
of 1986. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1637 n.8.
58. 481 U.S. 6P (1987).
59. See Appendix at S; see also Coates, supra note 26, at 849 (noting that 42 states had
antitakeover statutes as of September 1, 1989). As ofJune 1, 1991, the only states with-
out any antitakeover legislation are Alabama, California, Montana, Texas, Vermont, and
West Virginia. See Appendix at S. Thus, no less than 44 states currently possess some
variety of antitakeover legislation.
60. See Appendix; see also Veasey, Finkelstein & Shaughnessy, The Delaware Takeover
Law: Some Issues, Strategies and Comparisons, 43 Bus. LAW. 865, 876-80 (1988).
61. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 26, at 468-69 (noting that all state statutes "share the
common feature of serving to consolidate the ability to respond to tender offers in the
hands of the incumbent managers of [target firms]").
62. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1638.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 72-85; Appendix at BCS. Absent prior board
approval, these statutes impose a three- to five-year freeze on certain "business combi-
nations," including "bust-up" liquidations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 86-106; Appendix at CSAS. CSASs sterilize
the voting power of shares acquired in a "control share acquisition" which, in total,
exceeded any of the enumerated control thresholds (e.g., 20%, 331/3%, 50%). See, e.g.,
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West 1988).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 107-21; Appendix at FPS. Fair price statutes
statutes;6 6 legislation expanding managerial discretion, including
(e) directors' duties statutes (sometimes termed constituency stat-
utes)67 and (f) share rights plan endorsement statutes; 68 and (g)
other legislation with antitakeover effects, including antigreenmail
statutes 69 and cashout-redemption rights statutes.70
a. Business Combination Statutes
New York, Delaware and at least twenty-six other states have en-
acted business combination statutes.71 These statutes impose a
moratorium on specified transactions between the target and a
shareholder holding a certain percentage of stock unless the stock
acquisition or the transaction is approved in advance of the stock
acquisition by the target's board of directors. The most common
form of business combination statute sets the delay at five years and
the triggering level at five percent. 72 "Business Combination" is a
comprehensive term encompassing virtually every conceivable sig-
nificant change or transaction. 78
Aimed at "bust-up" takeovers74 and two-tier coercive bids,75 New
York's business combination statute has served as a model act for
several states. 76 The New York law prohibits business combinations
between resident domestic corporations and a twenty-percent
require that certain business combinations be approved by a supermajority vote of tar-
get shareholders unless a fair price is paid. This provision attempts to mitigate the pos-
sibility of shareholder coercion. Twenty-five states have fair price statutes as ofJune 1,
1991. See Appendix at FPS.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 122-36; Appendix at DS. Disclosure statutes
require the offeror to disclose certain relevant information such as the suitor's (1) iden-
tity, (2) source of funds, (3) liquidation plans, (4) interest in target's shares, and (5)
contracts with target. As ofJune 1, 1991, 21 states have disclosure statutes applicable to
business corporations. See Appendix at S, DS.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 137-53; Appendix at DDS. These statutes al-
low or require directors to consider numerous nonshareholder constituencies. Twenty-
nine states have such statutes. See Appendix at DDS.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 154-56; Appendix at SRPES. These statutes
expressly authorize the use of poison pills by a domestic corporation. Twenty-five states
have such statutes. See Appendix at SRPES.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 157-66; Appendix at AGMS. Antigreenmail
statutes restrict a corporation's ability to pay premiums to raiders. Six states have an-
tigreenmail statutes. See Appendix at S, AGMS.
70. Two states (Maine and Pennsylvania) have enacted these statutes, which are
more severe than business combination statutes. Given the purchase of a large block of
target stock, redemption statutes allow target shareholders to cash out of a corporation
at a statutory price. See infra text accompanying notes 167-79.
71. See Appendix at BCS.
72. See Appendix at BCS. Three states (Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania) have
a 20% triggering threshold; 15 states impose a five-year delay. Id.
73. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 912(a)(5) (McKinney 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 203(c)(3) (Supp. 1990).
74. Here, the suitor sells off significant target assets once control is gained. See
Booth I, supra note 26, at 1675.
75. The New York statute prohibits both two-step bids and coercive two-tier bids.
See id. at 1676. With two-tier bids, the bidder announces in advance that, once control
passes, remaining shareholders will be cashed out at a lower price than those who ini-
tially tendered in the first tier, coercing some shareholders to tender for less than they
otherwise would. Id. The New York statute essentially prohibits hostile takeovers
wherein the suitor plans to change significantly the target's business. Id.
76. For example, the Delaware Statute derives in substantial part from the New York
[VOL. 59:14251440
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shareholder for five years unless board approval is obtained in ad-
vance.7 7 Unless the business combination complies with the provi-
sions of the statute, or is subsequently approved by a majority of the
disinterested shareholders after five years have passed since the
stock acquisition date, a complicated "formula price" must be paid
for each share. 78
Delaware's business combination statute is a modified version of
New York's takeover statute.7 9 Because more Fortune 500 firms re-
side in Delaware than in any other state, 0 this statute is influential.
The Delaware statute prohibits any-business combination for three
years between an "interested stockholder" 8' and a Delaware corpo-
ration unless the acquisition of shares that causes the shareholder to
cross the fifteen-percent threshold is approved in advance by the
board of directors.8 2 In addition to gaining prior board approval,
the Delaware statute provides two additional paths a suitor may fol-
low to circumvent the three-year freeze. First, the suitor may over-
ride the freeze if the transaction that renders the suitor interested
results in the suitor owning at least eighty-five percent of the tar-
get's stock.8 3 Second, the suitor may override the freeze if upon the
suitor becoming interested, the business combination is approved
by both the board and two-thirds of the outstanding disinterested
shares.84  The Delaware statute has withstood constitutional
challenges.8 5
Act. Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 203 (Supp. 1990).
77. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 912(a)(10) (requiring that a 20% shareholder be
deemed "interested"); id. § 912(b) (setting five-year freeze absent prior board
approval).
78. See id. § 912(c); Federal Court Rejects Attack on New York's Anti-Takeover Law, 21 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 315 (Feb. 24, 1989); see also Appendix at FPS.
79. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1990). Delaware's statute is manifestly
less restrictive than New York's statute. Indeed, the Delaware statute is one of the
mildest in the nation: it is applicable only to suitors who acquire between 15%o and 85%
of a target's shares. See id. at § 203(a)(2) (noting that 85% share acquisitions disengage
statute); id. § 203(c)(5) (defining "interested stockholder" as 15% share owner); Booth
I, supra note 26, at 1675 n.148.
80. Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute: Of Chills, Pills, Standstills, and Who Gets Iced,
13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 883 (1988). Forty-five percent of the firms listed with the New
York Stock Exchange are Delaware corporations. Id. at 884.
81. "Interested Stockholders" are defined as shareholders that possess 15% or
more of the corporation's voting stock. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(5) (Supp. 1990).
82. See id. § 203(a)(1). Pennsylvania has recently enacted a director-approval statute
empowering directors to reject or "take no action" in the face of a tender offer. 15 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1502(A)(18) (Purdon 1989). In this sense, the Pennsylvania law is
essentially a business combination statute. See Johnson & Millon II, supra note 26, at
1867 n.22.
83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (Supp. 1990).
84. Id. § 203(a)(3).
85. See, e.g., RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 486-
88 (D. Del. 1988); BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 458,473 (D. Del. 1988);
see also Coates, supra note 26, at 850.
b. Control Share Acquisition Statutes
At least twenty-seven states have enacted control share statutes as
ofJune 1, 1991,86 most being modeled after Indiana's constitution-
ally acceptable8 7 control share law.88 Indiana's law is based on the
more restrictive Ohio Control Share Acquisition Statute.8 9 Both
these statutes are second-generation antitakeover legislation,
promulgated in the wake of Edgar v. MITE Corp.,90 in which the
Supreme Court held Illinois' first-generation antitakeover statute to
be an unconstitutional restriction on interstate commerce.9 '
Control share acquisition statutes typically grant shareholders the
right to determine whether bidders' "control shares" 92 garner vot-
ing rights. Indiana's law prohibits the acquiror of twenty percent or
more of a target's shares from voting those shares unless a majority
of disinterested shareholders grant the acquiror voting rights.93 In-
diana's law also requires approval by the noninterested sharehold-
ers before the acquiror's interest exceeds both one-third and one-
86. See Appendix at S and CSAS.
87. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
88. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West Supp. 1987).
89. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1985). Ohio's control share law
differs from Indiana's law in two important ways. First, the Ohio Statute requires ad-
vance shareholder approval for the bidder even to purchase shares that lift its ownership
over the relevant thresholds (20%, 33%, 50%). See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1678
n.157. Second, the Ohio statute focuses on the stock itself (rather than the voting rights
of the stock) in requiring the approval of disinterested shareholders. OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.831 (A), (E) (Baldwin 1989).
90. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
91. Justice White, for the majority, ruled that the Illinois Business Take-Over Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121'/2, para. 137.51-57 (1979) [hereinafter Illinois Act] is unconstitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982). The Illinois Act was found unconstitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause because it imposed burdens on interstate commerce
that were oppressive in light of the local interests the Act purported to further. See id at
640-46.
The Illinois Act applied to tender offers for any corporation for which 10% of the
outstanding shares were held by Illinois residents. Illinois Act, supra, para. 137.52-10
(1979). The Act thus applied to foreign corporations whose internal affairs "Illinois has
no interest in regulating." MITE, 457 U.S. at 645-46.
Illinois' purported interests in protecting local shareholders and in regulating the in-
ternal affairs of Illinois corporations did not outweigh the burdens imposed by the Illi-
nois Act's nationwide reach: "While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate
state objective, the State has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident sharehold-
ers." Id. at 644. Accordingly, second generation statutes generally require that the issu-
ing public corporation have some connection to the home state. See, e.g., ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-1201(11) (stating that the statute applies to all domestic corporations
meeting the specified nexus requirements).
Three justices found the Illinois Act to violate the Supremacy Clause because: (1) the
Illinois Act's "precommencement notification provision frustrates the objectives of the
Williams Act," MITE, 457 U.S. at 635; (2) the Illinois Act's hearing provisions allow
management with 10% ownership "to delay the commencement of an offer by insisting
on a hearing," id. at 637, and therefore "conflict with the Williams Act," id. at 639; and
(3) the Illinois Act is preempted by the Williams Act by allowing Illinois Secretary of
State to "pass on the substantive fairness of a tender offer, [a judgment the Williams Act
reserves for shareholders]." Id. at 639 (citing 137.57.E of the Illinois Act).
92. Control shares typically are defined as voting shares acquired that, together with
all shares previously owned, elevate a raider past one of three (usually 20%, 33%, and
50%) thresholds. See Appendix at CSAS.
93. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (West Supp. 1987).
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half of the target's total voting power.94 Upon filing an "acquiring
person statement" with the target, the acquiror may request a vote
to be held within fifty days. 95 If the acquiror fails to garner adequate
shareholder votes, the target may redeem her shares at fair market
value.96 If the acquiror prevails in the vote and acquires a majority
of the shares, dissenting shareholders may elect to be cashed out at
the highest price per share paid by the acquiror in her control share
acquisition.97
The Supreme Court viewed Indiana's control share acquisition
statute as investor protection to the extent it allows shareholders to
vote collectively, thereby mitigating coercion:
If, for example, shareholders believe that a successful tender offer
will be followed by a purchase of nontendering shares at a de-
pressed price, individual shareholders may tender their shares-
even if they doubt the tender offer is in the corporation's best in-
terest-to protect themselves from being forced to sell their
shares at a depressed price .... [Thus], the shareholders as a
group, acting in the corporation's best interest, could reject the
offer, although individual shareholders might be inclined to ac-
cept it. 98
Control share acquisition statutes may also eliminate a subtler form
of coercion: shareholders often tender to avoid holding shares of
speculative value should the offer succeed. 99 Specifically, collective
shareholder consideration of a tender offer, via the mechanism of a
shareholder vote, purportedly will allow them dispassionately to de-
termine whether the offer represents their corporation's best
interests.100
Post-MITE bills emphasize shareholder protection because ofJus-
tice White's statement in MITE that protection of local shareholders
94. Id. §§ 23-1-42-1, -9.
95. Id § 23-1-42-7.
96. Id, § 23-1-42-10(b) (West Supp. 1987); see Booth I, supra note 26, at 1678-79 &
n.161.
97. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-11 (West Supp. 1987).
98. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 83 (1987) (citations omit-
ted); see Lowenstein, supra note 28, at 307-09.
99. See, e.g., Note, Responding to CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of
America: Should Texas Adopt a Control Share Acquisition Statute?, 40 BAYLOR L. REv. 249,
261 (1988).
100. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1682. "In short, the shareholder vote has the
beauty of allowing shareholders to indicate their desire to sell or hold out without hav-
ing to risk a significant loss that goes with tendering the wrong way." Id. "It is precisely
shareholders' inability to coordinate their response in a straightforward tender offer that
gives the bidder its biggest advantage: Since target shareholders fear that if they hold
out others will tender, all are inclined to tender." Id at 1683 (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).
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is a legitimate state interest. 10 1 Thus, the recent rush by state legis-
lators to enact control share acquisition legislation has occurred not
because of its purported shareholder protection possibilities but
rather because a control share statute is the first type of protection-
ist legislation upheld by the Supreme Court.10 2
Indeed, the fundamental purpose behind the enactment of con-
trol share acquisition statutes is to impose significant delays, if not
insurmountable barriers, on potential offerors. 10 3 By conditioning
voting rights on approval of disinterested shareholders, control
share statutes thwart hostile offerors by raising the costs and dimin-
ishing a raider's likelihood of success. 10 4 For practical purposes a
suitor will be "extremely reluctant to acquire stock above any of the
[statutory] thresholds" lest she become permanently disen-
franchised and unable to vote her stock.' 05 Moreover, because this
legislation typically is applicable without shareholder approval, the
shareholders themselves never have the opportunity to determine
whether control share statutes on balance afford desired share-
holder protection. 106
101. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982); Prentice, The Role of States in
Tender Offers: An Analysis of CTS, 1988 CoLuM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 23.
102. See Note, supra note 99, at 265-66 (noting that Delaware has rejected this form of
antitakeover legislation and recommending that Texas not enact a Control Share Acqui-
sition law). The author also notes that control share statutes "may actually serve to
encourage takeover activity." Id. at 265.
103. "Delay has been characterized as 'the most potent weapon in a tender-offer
fight.'" MITE, 457 U.S. at 637 n.12 (quoting Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation:
Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 238 (1977), and citing
Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAw. 1433, 1437-42 (1977); Wil-
ner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1976)).
104. See Johnson & Millon I, supra note 26, at 852; Appendix at CSA.
105. Andre, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Utility of Vote Buying in the Market for Corporate
Control, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 533, 554 (1990) (footnote omitted).
106. "Whether the control shares statute 'protects shareholders of Indiana corpora-
tions' ... or protects incumbent management seems to me a highly debatable question
... But a law can be both economic folly and constitutional." CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95-97 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
A control share acquisition statute's essential purpose is to endow the target board
with the power to dispose of tender offers. The powers granted directors are manifold:
the power to opt into or out of statutory protection, see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-5
(West 1987); the power to control the timing of the shareholder meeting, see, e.g., id.
§ 23-1-42-7(b) (requiring a meeting to be held within 50 days of a request by the acquir-
ing shareholder); the power to approve unilaterally a merger, thereby bypassing the stat-
ute, see, e.g., id. § 23-1-42-2(d)(5) (stating that an acquisition of shares not deemed a
control share acquisition if pursuant to a plan of merger or plan share exchange). Tra-
ditionally, management is unlikely to lose a voting contest. Judge Posner considered
this ex ante deterrence so powerful he impugned Indiana's statute as a "lethal dose" for
hostile takeovers. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261-63 (7th
Cir. 1986), rev'd in part, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). In the final analysis, the intended benefi-
ciaries of these statutes are nonshareholders thought likely to suffer from hostile bids,
including, among others, dislocated employees, suppliers, and customers. See generally
Johnson & Millon I, supra note 26. For a different view, see Boyer, When It Comes to
Hostile Tender Offers, Just Say No: Commerce Clause and Corporation Law in CTS Corp. v. Dy-
namics Corp. of America, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 539 (1988). Boyer hails control share stat-
utes as empowering shareholders to defeat or accept hostile offers, arguing that the
ultimate effect of control share statutes is to (1) give shareholders a voice, (2) provide a
mechanism for making this voice heard, and (3) expand shareholders' role in corporate
governance. Id.
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c. Fair-Price Statutes
Fair-price statutes typically require a suitor to offer a "fair price"
to all target shareholders unless the offer is approved by a
supermajority of noninterested shareholders. Fair-price statutes are
intended to eliminate the problems of "front-end loaded" two-
tiered offers. Two-tiered offers unfold in two stages: the tender-
offer stage, wherein the suitor attempts to acquire a controlling in-
terest in the target; and the merger stage, wherein minority,
nontendering shareholders are squeezed out-that is, forced to ac-
cept a lower price than the suitor initially offered during the first
stage of the tender offer.' 0 7 To avoid losing their investment at a
lower second-tier price, shareholders otherwise inclined to hold out
are coerced into tendering during the first stage. s08 Fair-price stat-
utes force a suitor to pay a fair price for nontendered shares to en-
sure that nontendering shareholders in the first stage do not receive
a lower price in the second stage.
Most fair-price statutes are based on Maryland's two-tier offer/
cash-out merger model.' 0 9 Maryland's fair-price statute requires
the target board to recommend shareholder approval of the busi-
ness combination." 1 0 The Maryland statute further requires both an
eighty-percent vote of all shareholders and a two-thirds vote of all
noninterested shareholders, or shareholders other than the suitor,
to approve a cash-out merger."' Alternatively, the "interested
shareholder" may satisfy the statute's fairness requirement-by of-
fering to the remaining minority the highest price paid any other
107. See Note, "May We Have the Last Dance?" States Take Aim at Corporate Raiders and
Crash the Predator's Ball 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1059, 1083-84 (1988). During the initial
stage the suitor seeks a controlling interest, which enables her to merge with the target.
Because only the suitor survives the merger, the suitor may force nontendering target
shareholders to exchange their shares for a lower price. Id. at 1085.
108. One author summarized this coercion as follows:
Because the target corporation's shareholders realize that they will receive
less for their shares if they hold the shares until the bidder acquires a con-
trolling interest in the corporation, and because the shareholders can not
assume that fellow shareholders will refrain from tendering their shares,
most of the target corporation's shareholders feel pressure to tender their
shares immediately after the bidder makes the offer. A bidder's announce-
ment of a two-tiered takeover attempt, therefore, creates a stampeding effect
among the shareholders of a target corporation to tender their shares ....
Id at 1085-86 (footnote omitted).
109. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601, 8-301(14) (1985). Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin
have adopted similar legislation. See Appendix at FPS.
110. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-602 (1985).
111. Id.
shareholder before the merger announcement-to avoid this pro-
hibitive vote requirement.1 12 Maryland-type statutes attempt to
eliminate coercive two-tier offers by compelling suitors either to
perform a second-step merger at a fair price roughly equivalent to
the first, or to announce a bid having that same effect wherein all
nontendering shareholders will be cashed out at the same price."13
Although narrowly effective for limiting such coercion, such statutes
arguably fail to prevent "abusive partial bid[s]." 114
Three principal variations on the Maryland theme surface on a
recurring basis in other statutes. First, some statutes confer upon
the board markedly more discretion than the Maryland statute.11 5
For example, whereas the Maryland statute permits the target board
to approve a business combination only before a suitor becomes an
interested shareholder, some statutes allow a target board to ap-
prove a business combination after a suitor becomes an interested
shareholder.116 Second, in contrast to the Maryland law, some stat-
utes restrict or eliminate the ability of a target to opt-out of the leg-
islation's protection. 1 7 Third, some statutes apply to foreign
corporations. 18
Although price formulae vary somewhat, they typically require the
suitor to pay the highest of. (1) the highest price paid for the target-
company shares in a period (between two and five years) before the
proposed business combination; or (2) the market value per share
on the announcement date or determination date (the date when
the suitor became an "interested shareholder") which is then multi-
plied by a value determined by averaging these two methods." 9
Many "fair price" provisions essentially mandate that shareholders
receive either the higher of the price the interested shareholder paid
for any of its stock, the market value, or the price shareholders
would be paid for the stock in the event of liquidation or dissolution
of the corporation. 20 Furthermore, the consideration paid must be
112. Id. § 3-603(b). Thus, "the price paid in the second step will often be higher than
the average price for shares purchased earlier." See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1674.
113. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1674.
114. See id. at 1675.
Bidders remain free under such a regime to purchase a bare controlling in-
terest and to leave the remaining shareholders to stew in their juice....
Thus, the Maryland statute may ultimately induce more undesirable partial
offers although it will undoubtedly discourage some partial offers in which
the bidder harbors an undisclosed plan sooner or later to merge the target
with another company.
Id. (footnote omitted).
115. Many statutes confer more discretion to disinterested directors than interested
directors. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.0901, .0903 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 14-2-232 to -235 (Supp. 1988) (recodified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-
2-1131 to -1133); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1988) (recodified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, §§ 1728, 1770).
116. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-25-7(c) (Supp. 1987).
117. See Appendix at FPS.
118. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.0901, .110 (West Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-9-01 to -05 (Supp. 1990).
119. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(b)(1)(v) (1988).
120. See, e.g., id. § 3-603.
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in the same form as the interested shareholder previously paid to
acquire the major portion of his shares. 12 1
d. Disclosure Statutes
Disclosure statutes are perhaps the least controversial of all an-
titakeover legislation in light of the fact that suitors are already re-
quired to disclose relevant information under the Williams Act. The
key issue is whether these sometimes onerous disclosure require-
ments that extend beyond the coverage of the Williams Act advance
corporate and shareholder interests or excessively deter bids ex ante.
This issue has not been dispositively addressed or resolved. The
Authors feel that where statutes require only disclosure of essential
information not available under federal law, and are narrowly lim-
ited to local companies with local interests, any resulting deter-
rence, on balance, appears justified. As to shareholder benefits
from state level disclosure statutes, the Supreme Court in Edgar v.
MITE Corp. 122 was
unconvinced that the Illinois Act substantially enhances the share-
holders' position. The Illinois Act seeks to protect shareholders
of a company subject to a tender offer by requiring disclosures
regarding the offer, assuring that shareholders have adequate
time to decide whether to tender their shares, and according
shareholders withdrawal, proration, and equal consideration
rights. However, the Williams Act provides these same substan-
tive protections .... [T]he disclosures required by the Illinois Act
which go beyond those mandated by the Williams Act ... may not
substantially enhance the shareholders' ability to make informed
decisions .... [We] conclude that the protections the Illinois Act
affords resident security holders are, for the most part,
speculative. 123
Although some states still have pre-MITE first-generation disclo-
sure statutes in force,' 24 to the extent these conflict with the Wil-
liams Act or unduly burden interstate commerce, their
121. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(b)(3) (stating that "[t]he con-
sideration... is to be in cash or in the same form as the interested stockholder has
previously paid"); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(c)(3)(C) (McKinney 1986); see also M. LIP-
TON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS, § 5.03[1], at 5-26 n.2 (1989).
122. 457 U.S. 624, 644-45 (1982).
123. Id. (citations omitted).
124. Delaware, for example, still has a first-generation disclosure statute which has
never been overturned. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1987); see Booth I, supra note 26,
at 1672 n.121.
constitutionality remains doubtful. 125 In order to avoid these con-
stitutional infirmities, second-generation disclosure statutes attempt
to comply with the Williams Act's disclosure requirements.
In 1984, Minnesota sponsored the first post-MITE disclosure stat-
ute.126 Although Minnesota's seminal disclosure statute more
closely resembles pre-MITE statutes than most other second-gener-
ation antitakeover statutes, 27 it overcomes MITE's barriers by
avoiding preoffer notification requirements128 and by not requiring
a third party to assess the merits of the offer.' 29 Rather, at the time
of the tender offer, the statute requires the suitor both to file a state-
ment with the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce and to pro-
vide to shareholders information relating to the tender offer,
including information relating to any plans to change employment
policies, the location of business activities, charitable contributions
or customer relations. 3 0 Consonant with the requirements of the
Williams Act,131 the statute does not delay the tender offer process
beyond the federal time period. 3 2 Although constitutional,13 3 the
Minnesota statute appears to add little to the Williams Act.1' 4
Most disclosure statutes modify the amount and type of informa-
tion required of the suitor under the Williams Act. These modified
state-level disclosure requirements may be beneficial. For example,
by requiring suitors to file an "impact statement,"' 3 5 directors may
have a better grasp as to when resisting an offer is appropriate.' 36
Furthermore, requiring suitors to furnish target shareholders with
information facilitates informed shareholder decisionmaking.
e. Directors' Duties Statutes
In addition to specific antitakeover rules, states have recently
125. In 1982, the Supreme Court in MITE held Illinois' antitakeover statute uncon-
stitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause because among other things, the Illi-
nois statute required advance notice of tender offers and provided for a fairness review
by a state official. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 639, 643 (1982). Three Justices held that the
statute was preempted by the Williams Act, wherein Congress attempted to foster a
balanced, level playing field which avoided favoring either bidders or target manage-
ment. Id at 639.
Thirty-seven states adopted first-generation antitakeover statutes prior to MITE. See
Romano, supra note 26, at 113.
126. MINN. STAT. § 80B (1984); see Booth I, supra note 26, at 1671-73.
127. Block, Barton, & Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The "Second Generation", 13 SEC.
REG. L.J. 332, 340 (1986).
128. See id. at 343; Booth I, supra note 26, at 1672.
129. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1672. The Minnesota statute permits only the
Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce, not the target corporation, to call a fairness
hearing. See id.
130. MINN. STAT. § 80B.03.
131. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
132. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1672.
133. The Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit found the disclosure and review re-
quirements not facially unconstitutional in Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d
906, 908-09 (8th Cir. 1984).
134. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1672.
135. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-459(10) (West 1987).
136. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1673.
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modified traditional corporate law to expand a board's discretion,13 7
thereby bolstering the board's antitakeover decisions.' 3 8 These
modifications not only further expand the already broad discretion
granted directors by the business-judgment rule but also simultane-
ously limit directors' liability.' 39
Typically, directors' duties statutes explicitly allow directors 40 to
consider nonshareholder interests when contemplating takeover of-
fers and unleashing antitakeover weaponry. 14 ' Many directors' duty
statutes allow directors to virtually "consider the world"'142 when
making control-transaction decisions. The Minnesota statute is il-
lustrative, stating that:
a director may, in considering the best interests of the corpora-
tion, consider the interests of the corporation's employees, cus-
tomers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and
nation, community and societal considerations, and the long-term
as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its share-
holders including the possibility that these interests may be best
served by the continued independence of the corporation.' 43
This legislation "help[s] shield directors from liability by expanding
the criteria that directors may consider in reaching decisions on be-
half of the corporation."'' 44
Although all directors' duties statutes employ similar language,
they exhibit several strands of variation: (1) the breadth of factors
directors may consider;' 45 (2) the contexts in which nonshareholder
interests may be considered; 46 (3) the corporate fiduciaries pro-
tected by the statute; 147 (4) the nonshareholders specifically pro-
tected;' 48  (5) opt-in requirements; 49  (6) mandatory versus
137. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1988); see infra note 138 and accom-
panying text.
138. Kozyris, supra note 17, at 1124.
139. id
140. Some state legislation focuses on the board of directors as a whole or commit-
tees thereof. See Appendix at DDS.
141. Such considerations are mandatory under Arizona and Connecticut law. See ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West
1988).
142. "A number of the state statutes are broad enough to allow a board to consider
all types of interests in evaluating a takeover bid." M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra
note 121, § 5.03[1], at 5-34.
143. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251, subd. 5 (West Supp. 1988).
144. M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 121, § 6.02[5], at 6-121.
145. See Appendix at DDS.
146. Some states limit the application of directors' duties statutes to takeover con-
texts. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1991) (limiting applica-
tion to directors' approval of business combinations); see Appendix at DDS.
147. The Illinois statute, for example, protects both directors and officers of a corpo-
ration. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (1989); see Appendix at DDS.
148. Wyoming's statute, for example, provides specifically for protection of bond-
holders in a takeover context. Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-18-201 to -206 (1989); see Appendix at
DDS.
permissive considerations; 150 and (7) the level of protection ac-
corded to a board's decision.1 51
One scholar asserts that these statutes' "vesting of such extraordi-
narily broad discretion in a board" likely affirms the "just say no"
defense.152 Directors' duties statutes potentially provide directors
with much greater leeway in rejecting tender offers than afforded
under current case law. 153
f Shareholder Rights Plan Endorsement Statutes
In general, these statutes grant directors express authority to
adopt discriminatory shareholder rights plans or poison pills. 154
These statutes are intended to clarify a board's authority to adopt
shareholder rights plans or overrule court decisions which had re-
stricted target implementation of rights plans.15 5 For example, Illi-
nois' statute allows a corporation to create rights plans whose terms
may be fixed by the board and may include restrictions or condi-
tions on the exercise, transfer or receipt of such rights by any suitor,
or invalidate such rights held by a suitor.'58
g, Other Statutes With Antitakeover Effects
Antigreenmail Statutes: "Greenmail" is the target's repurchase of its
own stock-invariably at a substantial premium-from an uninvited
suitor. 157 Antigreenmail statutes seek to mitigate or eliminate po-
tential abuses associated with a target's payment of greenmail.
These abuses are obvious. First, remaining target shareholders are
denied the opportunity to reap potentially sizeable premiums by
tendering to the suitor. Second, target management invariably pays
greenmail with corporate-that is, shareholder-funds. s58 Third,
target management is largely free to pay greenmail regardless of its
impact upon shareholders-at least when the specter of a coercive
tender offer exists. 15 9
149. Georgia, for example, requires that shareholders elect to be covered in the arti-
cles of incorporation. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (1990) (allowing the articles to
"set forth" a directors' duty provision); see Appendix at DDS.
150. Connecticut, for example, requires directors to consider nonshareholder inter-
ests. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1991) (requiring a director to
consider the listed factors); see Appendix at DDS.
151. Two states have enacted legislation enhancing protection for a board's decision.
See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-35-1(O-(g) (Bums 1990); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1721(c)
(Purdon Supp. 1991); Appendix at DDS.
152. Andre, supra note 105, at 575.
153. Id at 576.
154. For a discussion of poison pills, see supra note 17.
155. See, e.g., R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
Accordingly, Wisconsin enacted the Act of Sept. 17, 1987, 1987 Wis. Act 44, 1987 Wis.
Laws 44.
156. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 6.05 (1990).
157. See Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964) (finding increased sales price ap-
propriate where substantial block of stock involved; thus finding repurchase of stock
legitimate); Booth I, supra note 26, at 1662.
158. Booth I, supra note 26, at 1662.
159. Id. at 1663.
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However, greenmail can be beneficial to target shareholders. 160
For example, greenmail may help buy time for management to seek
superior bids. 16 Furthermore, amid partial bids, greenmail may ad-
vance the interests of holdout shareholders who would lose more by
transferring control than by appeasing an unwanted suitor. 162
These benefits caused one commentator to conclude that it is "im-
possible to generalize about the benefits or harms of greenmail."' 163
Six states have adopted antigreenmail statutes.', 4 Generally,
these statutes prohibit a target from purchasing ten percent or more
of its own stock from any shareholder who has held the shares for
less than two years when the price to be paid exceeds fair market
value.1 65 Most statutes provide that the restrictions do not apply if
both the board and a majority of shareholders approve the
repurchase. 16 6
Cashout Statutes: 67  Patterned after the traditional "appraisal
rights" given dissenting shareholders, two states currently have
these "heightened" appraisal statutes 168 which, following Penn-
sylvania's lead, grant remaining shareholders "appraisal rights" en-
titling holdout shareholders to receive "fair value" upon a suitor's
acquiring a threshold percentage of the target's shares. 169
Although cashout laws do not impose supermajority voting require-
ments, they explicitly provide that upon the parties disagreeing over
the fair value of target stock, such value may be judicially deter-
mined.17 0 As such, cashout laws require a suitor to consummate a
takeover at ajudicially imposed price. Because the appraisal remedy
requires outsiders to determine a "fair" price, it introduces costly
160. "The fact that greenmail can be beneficial to shareholders is consistent with
empirical evidence." Id at 1662.
161. Indeed, Professor Ribstein argues that greenmail should be permitted to the
extent it does not violate the business-judgment rule. See Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and
the Corporate Contract, 78 GEO. L.J. 71, 132 (1989).
162. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1662. Given partial and two-tiered tender offers,
"greenmail can be beneficial [to shareholders]." Id at 1663 (emphasis in original).
163. Id. at 1663. But see Gilson, Drafting an Effective Greenmail Prohibition, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 329, 329-30 (1988) (stating that "one element of virtual consensus has emerged:
greenmail ... is bad").
164. See Appendix at AGMS.
165. See id
166. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 513(e) (McKinney 1986).
167. These "cashout" statutes are also termed "appraisal statutes," "redemption
rights statutes," or "fair value statutes."
168. See S. SHAPIRO &J. STRAuss, BREATHING NEW LIFE INTO STATE TAKEOVER STAT-
uTEs 457, 482 (1987) (describing cashout statutes as "heightened" appraisal statutes).
169. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2546, 2547 (Purdon Supp. 1991). Maine and Utah
have followed Pennsylvania's mold. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp. 1990);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-76.5 (1987) (repealed 1990). Utah repealed its cashout statute
in favor of a control share acquisition statute in the wake of the Supreme Court's CTS
decision. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 121, § 5.0311], at 5-30.
170. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910.9 (Supp. 1990); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 2547.E (Purdon Supp. 1991).
risks into the bidding process-the judge's determination of "fair
value" will surely generate much litigation. 171 As risk increases,
bids will be deterred. Although cashout statutes grant shareholders
the same protection as Maryland-type fair price statutes, 72 cashout
statutes effectively require the suitor to acquire full control of the
target: the statutes' mandatory redemption procedures guarantee
all shareholders a fair price. 173
The stringent requirements of Pennsylvania's cashout statute en-
gage when a suitor acquires twenty percent of the shares of a cov-
ered Pennsylvania corporation' 74-the suitor then becomes a
"controlling person." 75 A controlling person must promptly notify
target shareholders that a control transaction has commenced, 76
and the controlling person must pay "fair value" to any shareholder
who so demands.177 Corporations may opt-out of Pennsylvania's
provision by charter amendment at any time prior to the triggering
event.178 Maine has adopted a similar statute.1 79
Director Removal Statutes: In Delaware, directors may be removed
without cause by vote of a majority of shareholders, unless the cor-
poration has a staggered board. 80 Directors on a staggered board
cannot be removed without cause before their terms expire.' 8 ' An-
titakeover statutes adopted in 1988 in Kentucky, Mississippi, and
Pennsylvania provide that even unclassified directors cannot be re-
moved before their terms expire if the corporation's charter so pro-
vides.' 8 2 New Jersey's updated law provides that directors serving
on a classified board shall not be removed without cause (whether
the board is staggered or not), unless the certificate of incorporation
provides otherwise. 8 3 Massachusetts has recently enacted a stag-
gered board law requiring shareholders to elect each year one-third
of a corporation's directors for three-year terms. 8 4
171. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1677, 1678.
172. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text; see also Boyer, supra note 106, at
596.
173. Boyer, supra note 106, at 596.
174. 'PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2543 (Purdon Supp. 1991).
175. Id.
176. Id. § 2545.
177. Id § 2546.
178. Id. § 2541.
179. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910.9 (Supp. 1990).
180. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1987).
181. Id. § 141(k)(1); see Lipman, Another Generation of Anti-Takeover Laws Beginning to
Develop, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 20, 1989, at S18, col. 3.
182. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-080 (Baldwin 1990); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 79-4-
8.08 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1726 (Purdon Supp. 1991).
183. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-6(d) (West Supp. 1991) (stating that "[s]hareholders of
a corporation whose board of directors is classified... shall not be entitled to remove
directors without cause"). Classified or staggered boards means boards where a fraction
of the board gets elected each year such that their terms expire in different years (e.g.,
1/3 of board members' three-year terms expire on any given year). See, e.g., MISS. CODE
ANN. § 79-4-8.06 (1988).
184. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 50A (West Supp. 1991).
I -
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h. Recent Developments
State legislatures are constantly considering new antitakeover
statutes.'8 5 As states gain more confidence that their enactments
will survive judicial scrutiny, such legislation will become bolder. 186
Pennsylvania and Ohio have recently enacted controversial laws
which force failed suitors to disgorge any profits from the ultimate
sale of their stock. 187 Pennsylvania's harsh law provides that any
trading profit realized by shareholders within eighteen months of
gaining control or seeking control of twenty percent or more of a
corporation shall be recoverable by the corporation.18 8
If the 1989 Pennsylvania statute ushers in a new trend in state
legislation, the shareholder dilemma may greatly amplify. Penn-
sylvania State Senator Fumo described the bill as "the fat cat protec-
tion and shareholder ripoff act of 1989."189 One Pennsylvania
newspaper described the Pennsylvania statute as "one of the
stupidest attempts at legislation ever."' 90 One commentator con-
cluded that the bill "provides an all but impenetrable corporate
sanctuary, particularly when combined with other provisions of
Pennsylvania law."' 91 Accordingly, numerous influential institu-
tional investor groups vigorously lobbied against the bill, some en-
treating Pennsylvania corporations to opt out of the statute's
185. For example, Massachusetts requires the board of public corporations be di-
vided into three classes; only one class may be elected each year. See id. Massachusetts
also enacted a unique "tin parachute" clause requiring raiders to make severance pay-
ments to terminated employees and honor collective bargaining agreements. MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 20E (West 1990); Franklin, Shifting Fight to the States on Hostile
Bid, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 25, 1989, at 24, col. 1.
186. See Garfield, Evaluating State Anti-Takeover Legislation: A Broadminded New Approach
to Corporation Law or "A Race to the Bottom"?, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 119, 129. "In-
deed, since the Supreme Court upheld a takeover statute for the first time in 1987, states
have been busily enacting increasingly potent takeover statutes." Id (footnotes
omitted).
187. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.043 (Anderson Supp. 1990); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2571-2576 (Purdon Supp. 1991); see Franklin, Tough Takeover Statute: Critics Say Penn-
sylvania's New Law Is Extreme, 203 N.Y.L.J., May 3, 1990, at 5, col. 2. Although Ohio
adopted the first "disgorgement statute," Pennsylvania's "much more intrusive" statute
overshadowed Ohio's. 42 States Currently Have Anti-Takeover Laws, ABA Group Told, 22
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1216 (August 17, 1990). Indiana is also considering a dis-
gorgement law. Id
188. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2575 (Purdon Supp. 1991). The relevant shares are
those acquired within 24 months prior to or 18 months after obtaining such status.
189. Moss, Anti-Takeover Battle: Armstrong Shareholders, Bidder File Suit Against Pa. Law,
76 A.B.A. J. 24 (July 1990).
190. Id (quoting The Philadelphia Inquirer). A recent survey indicated that roughly
25% of the public companies subject to the Pennsylvania law have opted out, including
some companies which supported the legislation. 42 States Currently Have Anti-Takeover
Laws, ABA Group Told, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1216, 1216-17 (Aug. 17, 1990).
191. See Andre, supra note 105, at 573-74 (footnotes omitted). Pennsylvania's Act
"appears to have given Pennsylvania public corporations the most extensive defensive
arsenal in the country. [It] will not only make the acquisition of a Pennsylvania public
antishareholder provisions.19 2
i. Summary
Current antitakeover provisions have received negative comments
by shareholder groups for a variety of reasons. First, to the extent
many of these statutes grant ultimate decisionmaking power to the
target corporation's board rather than its shareholders, some tender
offers will be rejected despite positive shareholder response.'9 3
Second, by conferring upon the target board authority to consider
nonshareholder interests, many of these statutes blur if not elimi-
nate the importance of seeking shareholder input. Third, these stat-
utes' "ex ante chilling effect on the frequency of hostile tender offers
may counteract" the benefits of management's stronger ex post bar-
gaining position.' 9 4 Fourth, because coercive offers today are all
but extinct, there is little justification for many of these statutes.'9 5
Furthermore, this anticoercion policy is overbroad; 9 6 business
combination statutes are generally not confined to those situations
where coercion is possible.' 9 7 Fifth, by substantially reducing the
threat of takeovers, these statutes diminish management's incentive
to maximize ongoing shareholder value.19 8 Sixth, as with fair-price
statutes, many of these statutes foster shareholder passivity.199 Fi-
nally and most fundamentally, by couching these statutes in terms of
"shareholder protection acts" (and similar proshareholder
corporation more complicated and more time consuming, but will ultimately and irrevo-
cably alter the fundamental relationship between shareholders and directors which here-
tofore had developed in the market for corporate control." Dauman, Walter & Budoff,
Developments in Mergers and Acquisitions: The Offense, in 2 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE: ON SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 9, A-12 (Practising Law Institute 1990).
192. For example, the $55 billion California Public Employees Retirement System
(CalPERS) has written "all Pennsylvania-based companies [requesting] them to opt-out
of the bill ...." Vosti, Pennsylvania Puts Ball in Investors' Court, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT
AGE, May 14, 1990, at 44.
193. Johnson & Millon II, supra note 26, at 1876-77 (noting that directors, not share-
holders, have "the central role in the takeover drama").
194. Johnson & Millon I, supra note 26, at 851; see also Johnson & Millon II, supra note
26, at 1878 (shareholders thus "lose both the opportunity to realize immediate stock
price premiums and the accountability mechanisms" that the threat of takeovers
provides).
195. Johnson & Millon II, supra note 26, at 1878.
196. See Johnson & Millon I, supra note 26, at 851.
197. Johnson & Millon II, supra note 26, at 1877.
198. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1676 (asserting that "[o]n balance . .. the New
York statute is a reprehensible protectionist law").
199. To give shareholders the assurance of an ultimate fair price, no matter
what action they take or do not take, favors the incumbent managers, be-
cause it reduces the incentive for the shareholders to take any action at all.
It is one thing to reduce the coercion of hostile tenders by allowing share-
holders to act-another thing entirely to give shareholders good reason to
wait out the battle. Encouraging shareholder passivity may well tip the bal-
ance [sought by the Williams Act] significantly, and impermissibly, in man-
agement's favor.
Boyer, supra note 106, at 593 (footnote omitted). Boyer thus stresses that fair-price stat-
utes do not give shareholders any power which might be translated into a higher pre-
mium. See id.
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jargon),20 0 these acts greatly hamper the reform process by lulling
decisionmakers into believing that the statutes do protect
shareholders.
Current state antitakeover legislation is not designed primarily to
benefit shareholders. 20 1 Indeed, many statutes do not even purport
to so endeavor. 20 2 Although arguments can be made that fair-price
statutes and cashout statutes are primarily designed to maximize
shareholder value and minimize shareholder coercion, inasmuch as
the suitor typically may avoid statutory requirements by attaining
board consent, these statutes likely implicitly and indirectly seek to
enhance the boards' negotiating position.20 3 Thus, the primary im-
pact state legislation has upon shareholders qua shareholders is the
veto power and leverage it affords management in attempting to
achieve the highest possible price for the corporation.20 4 The fact is
that these current efforts to "protect" corporations often protect
nonshareholder constituencies at the expense of shareholders. 205
The effect of these current "protection" efforts powerfully justifies
legislative intervention which seeks to enhance shareholder input on
takeover issues.
2. Case Law
State common law, embodying the fiduciary obligations concomi-
tant with the traditional legal model of the corporation, arguably
offers more protection for shareholder interests than recent an-
titakeover legislation. 20 6 Under traditional principles, directors owe
fiduciary duties to both shareholders and the corporation to act in
200. See infra notes 469-93 and accompanying text (arguing that shareholder protec-
tion as the main motivating force behind antitakeover statutes is a pretextual facade).
201. "All recent state takeover statutes share a common purpose: To discourage hos-
tile takeover attempts by creating obstacles that require approval by target managers,
thereby causing delay, uncertainty, and increased costs." Johnson, supra note 26, at 909
(footnote omitted).
202. See infra notes 469-93 and accompanying text (discussing true legislative intent
of these enactments).
203. Indeed, these statutes do not apply to friendly mergers. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. &
Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601(e), (j) (1985); see supra notes 107-21 and accompanying
text.
204. This benefit is realized only after a takeover attempt commences and manage-
ment either forces the suitor to bid higher or solicits competitive bids from alternative
suitors. Because these statutes uniformly discourage suitors from pursuing takeovers,
however, this benefit to shareholders is dubious.
205. SeeJohnson, supra note 26, at 909 (observing that "[m]any of these laws use the
rhetoric of shareholder welfare, but their primary goal is to protect nonshareholder in-
terests thought to be affected adversely by hostile takeovers").
206. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d
Cir. 1986) (applying a reasonable diligence standard); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985). The Delaware Supreme Court stated in Van Gorkom that, "[i]n carrying
out their managerial roles, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders." Id. at 872 (citing Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138,
2 A.2d 225 (1938), aff'd, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)). Van Gorkom is the seminal case holding
the best interests of both.2°7
Courts generally have held, however, that a target board breaches
its fiduciary duty only when its antitakeover tactics are motivated
"solely or primarily" to perpetuate control of a corporation. 208 Di-
rectors rarely have failed to demonstrate that they were at least par-
tially motivated by legitimate corporate concerns. 209
Most of the cases involving directors' duty to shareholders arise
from situations where management has attempted to resist unsolic-
ited tender offers by deploying antitakeover devices without prior
stockholder approval. 210 Most early decisions applied the business
judgment rule almost blindly to board-adopted defensive meas-
ures.211 In Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc.,212 however, the trial
court in dicta wrestled with whether the business judgment rule
should apply to the use of defensive tactics. 213 Similarly, the Second
Circuit, in Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,214 questioned whether
fundamental decisions affecting a corporation's ultimate destiny are
being made by shareholders or whether corporate power has in
that before directors may garner protection under the business.judgment rule, a mini-
mum level of care as evinced by their gathering and reviewing pertinent information is
required. Id.
207. See Carter, To Whom is a Corporate Director a Fiduciary, Nat'l LJ., July 6, 1987, at
21; see also Wander & LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters: Corporate Control Transactions and Today's
Business Judgment Rule, 42 Bus. LAw. 29 (1986). See generally Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932). The economic upheaval during the
Great Depression spurred Dodd to argue that corporate boards should act as trustees
for numerous constituencies. Id. at 1149; see Epstein, Societal, Manageria4 and Legal Per-
spectives on Corporate Social Responsibility-Product and Process, 30 HASINGS LJ. 1287
(1979); Note, supra note 26.
208. E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-95 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380-84 (2d Cir.
1980).
209. See Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 901, 926 (1979) (stating that "management can easily manufacture a 'legiti-
mate' corporate purpose"). But see, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255,
266-67 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding a board of director's attempt to foil a takeover by shifting
voting stock to a subsidiary and an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) not
legitimate).
210. See Note, supra note 26, at 485.
211. See, e.g., Panter, 646 F.2d at 295. But note Judge Cudahy's dissent in Panter: "I
emphatically disagree that the business judgment rule should clothe directors, battling
blindly to fend off a threat to their control, with an almost irrebuttable presumption of
sound business judgment, prevailing over everything but the elusive hobgoblins of
fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion." Id at 299 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
212. 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
213. Id. at 1259-60 & 1260 n.6. The court noted that, although its holding precluded
consideration of the issue,
[t]he right of a shareholder to sell his stock is a private transaction between a
willing seller and a willing purchaser and in no way implicates the business
judgment rule. Therefore, a board of directors' assertion of a unilateral
right, under the business judgment rule, to act as a surrogate for the share-
holder's independent right of alienation of his stock is troublesome.
Id. at 1260 n.6; see Andre, supra note 21, at 890 (noting that "because of the potential for
conflict of interest, many urge that it is inappropriate to extend the protection of the
business judgment rule to actions taken by target management in the context of an ac-
tual or threatened takeover" (footnote omitted)). Andre argues that "the business judg-
ment rule remains an unsatisfactory standard by which to judge actions taken by target
management in corporate control transactions." Id. (footnote omitted).
214. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
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some way been "wrested" away from the shareholders by the
board.215
Despite such sporadic musings, courts now generally acknowl-
edge that some variation of the business judgment rule applies to all
board responses to takeover bids.216 The business judgment rule
normally immunizes management from liability for resisting tender
offers, provided management reasonably believes there is a valid
business reason for resisting a hostile offer.217
Shielded by the business judgment rule, directors have imple-
mented numerous defensive measures to resist hostile takeover
bids, including poison pills, 2 18 stock repurchases, 219 golden
parachutes, 220 lock-up agreements, 22 1 and no-shop provisions. 222
215. Id. at 258. Judge Irving R. Kaufman noted that,
[Tihe responsibility of the court is to insure that rules designed to safeguard
the fairness of the takeover process be enforced. Our most important duty is
to protect the fundamental structure of corporate governance. While the
day-to-day affairs of a company are to be managed by its officers ... deci-
sions affecting a corporation's ultimate destiny are for the shareholders to
make in accordance with democratic procedures.
Id.
216. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,954 (Del. 1985). In
applying the business judgment rule, courts focus on the procedures followed by direc-
tors and scrutinize the bases upon which directors' takeover decisions were made. The
Delaware Supreme Court has slightly modified the business judgment rule in the take-
over context thusly:
Under the business judgment rule, directors' decisions are presumed to have
been made on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company. This presumption
and its underlying fiduciary duties are equally applicable in a takeover con-
text. When directors oppose a hostile takeover there arises 'the omnipres-
ent spectre that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather
than those of the corporation and its shareholders . . . '. This Court has
addressed that potential for conflict by placing upon the directors the bur-
den of proving that they have not acted solely or primarily out of a desire to
perpetuate themselves in office, that the threatened takeover posed a danger
to corporate policy and effectiveness, and that the defensive measures
adopted are reasonable in relation to the threat posed. The target directors
must satisfy these prerequisites by showing good faith and reasonable inves-
tigation before enjoying the presumptions afforded by the business judg-
ment rule.
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987) (citations
omitted); see also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-95 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (holding that plaintiff must demonstrate that improper mo-
tive predominated directors' decisionmaking to rebut the presumption that business
judgement was exercised).
217. See, e.g., Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 815
F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987); Panter, 646 F.2d at 294; Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652
F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.
1987); Note, supra note 26, at 493.
218. See supra note 17; see also Note, Duty to Redeem Rights Plans, supra note 17; Note,
Shareholder Rights Plans: Shields or Gavels?, 42 VAND. L. REv. 173 (1989).
219. Also known as greenmail, stock repurchases involve a target's acquisition of a
raider's shares by paying a premium over the market price. See supra notes 157-66 and
accompanying text.
220. These executive termination agreements are "contracts between corporations
Consistent with the broad latitude granted directors by the business
judgment rule, courts have upheld a variety of defensive meas-
ures. 223 Even under Delaware's modified business judgment rule, as
adopted in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 224 the Delaware
Supreme Court upheld a self-tender that excluded the hostile sec-
ond party, stating that,
[i]f a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the busi-
ness judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat
posed. This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of
the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Exam-
ples of such concerns may include.., the impact on "constituen-
cies" other than shareholders .... 22
By allowing the target board to consider a takeover's "impact on
and their executive personnel guaranteeing generous severance benefits in the event of
a corporate takeover." Note, Golden Parachutes: Common Sense from the Common Law, 51
OHIO ST. LJ. 279, 280 (1990) (footnote omitted).
221. Lock-up options and bust-up fees involve the right to purchase target stock or
assets on favorable terms. Without these favorable terms, potential friendly acquirors,
or white knights, would not likely assist targets. "A 'white knight' is a third party,
friendly to target management, which rescues the target from a hostile takeover ......
Andre, supra note 21, at 869 n.20. A target corporation board may grant a white knight
the option to purchase key corporate assets, a strategy known as the "crownjewel" de-
fense.
Although some cases cast doubt on the viability of lock-ups under certain circum-
stances, see, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1986);
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); and Rev-
lon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), courts to-
day recognize that lock-ups are a sine qua non for attracting white knights and thus are
more likely to tolerate them. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261
(Del. 1989); In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,181 (Del. Ch. 1988). But cf. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,194 (Del. Ch. 1989) (holding that the RJR Nabisco directors' decision
to enter into a merger agreement with the investment firm of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts &
Co. was made with due care).
222. White knights often demand that the target agree to a no-shop covenant, which
prevents the target from soliciting or encouraging competing bids or other assistance to
would-be acquirors. In Macmillan, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a no-shop
provision, asserting that, "[a]bsent a material advantage to the stockholders from the
terms or structure of a bid that is contingent on a no-shop clause, a successful bidder
imposing such a condition must be prepared to survive the scrutiny which that conces-
sion demands." 559 A.2d at 1286 (citation omitted); see Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc.,
567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989) (stating that, "[w]here a board has no reasonable basis
upon which to judge the adequacy of a contemplated transaction, a no-shop restriction
gives rise to the inference that the board seeks to forestall competing bids").
223. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984);
Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
224. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
225. Id. at 955. Unocal's heightened standard engages only amid potential takeovers;
the business judgment rule applies in all other contexts. See supra note 216. For exam-
ple, a target's issue of a poison pill amid a raider's mere filing a disclosure statement
required pursuant to Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d) (Form 13D) is not a re-
sponse to a potential takeover. See Doskocil Cos. v. Wilson Foods Corp., Civ. No.
10,095 (Del. Ch. 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file); see also Torchmark Corp. v.
Bixby, 708 F. Supp. 1070 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (finding that a pre-tender offer self-tender
taken as part of a preexisting open market purchase is "not taken in apprehension of a
challenged takeover"); TW Services, Inc. v SWT Acquisition Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,334, at 92,181-82 (Del. Ch. 1989) (finding that a tender offer conditioned
on merger, at bottom a mere invitation to negotiate, triggers the business judgment
rule).
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'constituencies' other than shareholders," Unocal illustrates the de-
gree to which the business judgment rule may be wielded to further
broaden directors' discretion to bypass shareholder input.226 As
such, the business judgment rule in the takeover context may allow
stakeholder interests to be furthered at the expense of
shareholders. 227
The general parameters of the business judgment rule, however,
although essential for preserving director discretion, provide only
the starting point for determining the appropriateness of board ac-
tions in a takeover context. The focus must turn in a particular case
to those specific measures, such as poison pills and state legislation,
designed to reestablish the board of directors' primacy in the share-
transfer process. With this focus, analyzing the application of the
business judgment rule to antitakeover decisions begins with judi-
cial review of the adoption and redemption of poison pills. 22 8
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,229 the Delaware Supreme
Court upheld a board's adoption of a shareholder rights plan.23 0
After Moran it has become entirely clear that adoption of a poison
pill is a routine matter that will easily survive judicial scrutiny. 231
Moran's importance, however, is that it sanctioned the authority of
226. See Unoca, 493 A.2d at 955.
227. In assessing takeover offers, directors may consider "the inadequacy of the bid,
the nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on constituencies
other than shareholders, the risk of nonconsummation, and the basic stockholder inter-
ests at stake, including the past actions of the bidder and its affiliates in other takeover
contexts." Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341-42 (Del.
1987) (citation omitted); see Comment, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 72 VA. L.
REv. 851, 869 (1986). Under Unoca4 "the board might validly take action benefitting
employees to the detriment of shareholders." Id Unocal "has the potential to widen the
gap between the shareholders' interests and the board's actions in a tender offer strug-
gle-a situation where shareholders' interests are strongly implicated." Id.; see also Note,
supra note 26, at 502 (asserting that "[t]o sustain the interests of one [constituency] is
effectively to forsake the interests of the other").
228. For a recent survey of poison pill litigation with regard to both the adoption and
redemption of poison pills, see Block & Hoff, Current Trends in Poison Pill Provisions, 203
N.Y.LJ. Mar. 8, 1990, at 5, col. 1, 7, col. 4 (asserting that "the primary battleground for
poison pill litigation in Delaware has focused on the issue of [poison pill redemption]").
229. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
230. Id at 1355. "[P]re-planning for the contingency of a hostile takeover might re-
duce the risk that, under the pressure of a takeover bid, management will fail to exercise
reasonable judgment. Therefore, in reviewing a pre-planned defensive mechanism it
seems even more appropriate to apply the business judgment rule." Id. at 1350 (citation
omitted). The Chancery Court's decision in Moran allowed directors to justify their ac-
tions based on the interests of one or more corporate constituencies. Moran v. House-
hold Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1079 (Del. Ch.), af'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) . The
Chancery Court stated that poison pills, if implemented "to protect all corporate con-
stituencies and not simply to retain control, have been consistently approved under the
business judgment rule." Id (citation omitted).
23 1. One Pennsylvania trial court held that, "adoption of a rights plan per se, passed
at a time when the company is not a target of a hostile takeover, clearly is valid and no
cause of action [by a shareholder] exists." Steiner v. Milton Roy Co., Phil. Ct. C.P., No.
8095-6832 (Nov. 9, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Pa. file). For a more detailed survey of
1991] 1459
corporate boards to unilaterally inject themselves into the tender
offer or control transaction process, thereby presumptively requir-
ing director approval as a necessary step in the change of corporate
control.
A corporate board's exercise of this power to preempt a direct
takeover bid crystallizes the issue of the board's fiduciary role. The
initial analysis of this issue derives from Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.23 2 Revlon involved a bidding war between hos-
tile and friendly parties.23 3 Under these circumstances, that is, when
the company is for sale, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
directors' duty is to maximize the economic value to the sharehold-
ers resulting from the transaction. 234 According to Revlon, meeting
this duty may require directors to act as neutral auctioneers and auc-
tion off the corporation. 23 5 Thus, the key prerequisite that must be
met before Revlon's enhanced responsibilities 23 6 apply is that the
corporation is for sale, the focus of a bidding contest or, in response
to an offer, it abandons its long term strategy. 23 7
Although the basic teaching of Revlon (and, indeed, of Unocal and
Moran) is "simply that [directors] must act in accordance with their
fundamental duties of care and loyalty," 238 Revlon caused an uproar
in corporate boardrooms. The most important question arising af-
ter Revlon was and is, when does the duty to auction attach or, con-
versely, when can the board stand fast behind its various board-
adopted and state-imposed defensive mechanisms? 23 9
relevant case law, see Lewkow & Groll, Selected Issues in Acquisition Defense, in K. BALKIN &
A. FLEISCHER, TENTH ANN. INST. ON AcQuIsmiONS AND TAKEOVERS (1988).
232. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
233. Id. at 176-79.
234. Id. at 182 (stating that when a corporation is for sale, "[t]he duty of the board
[changes] from the preservation of [the corporation], as a corporate entity to the max-
imization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholder's benefit").
235. Id.
236. In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989), the Dela-
ware Supreme Court distinguished directors' enhanced "duties" under Unocal and their
enhanced "responsibilities" under Revlon:
As we held in Revlon, when management of a target company determines
that the company is for sale, the board's responsibilities under the enhanced
Unocal standards are significantly altered. Although the board's responsibilities
under Unocal are far different, the enhanced duties of the directors in re-
sponding to a potential shift in control, recognized in Unoca4 remain un-
changed. This principle pervades Revlon, and when directors conclude that
an auction is appropriate, the standard by which their ensuing actions will be
judged continues to be the enhanced duty imposed by this Court in Unocal.
Id at 1287 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
237. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del.
1987) (finding that Newmont was not for sale). In Revlon, the directors had authorized
management to "sell" the corporation. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176; cf. Vlahakis, 'Yust Say
No" Made Easier; Lessons in Just Saying Yes, in SECURITIEs REGULATION 331, 333 (Practicing
Law Institute 1990).
238. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (citing Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985); Revlon, 506 A.2d at
180).
239. "'Revlon is merely one of an unbroken line of cases that seek to prevent the
conflicts of interest that arise in the field of mergers and acquisitions by demanding that
directors act with scrupulous concern for fairness to shareholders.'" Sutton Holding
Corp. v. Desoto, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. 2491, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,964 (Del. Ch.
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The "just say no" defense240 is a post-Revlon concept used to gen-
eralize, distill, and clarify otherwise fact-specific holdings24 1 into an
ostensibly coherent category of cases ultimately decreeing that a
board need not abandon its antitakeover arsenal when such a sur-
render would defeat shareholders' long-term interests. The propo-
nents of this defense have advanced this proposition: a director may
just say no to a hopeful suitor when doing so advances the corpora-
tion's-and thus shareholders'-best interests. 242 To the extent di-
rectors must know under what general circumstances they may just
say no, this concept may serve as a convenient litmus test. Although
much recent litigation has focused on the target directors' duty to
redeem rights plans,243 numerous (and various) cases grapple with a
board's ability to consummate corporate restructuring in an effort to
just say no to would-be raiders.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.244 is the leading case
illustrating the contours of the just say no defense as it relates to
preplanned long-term corporate restructuring. In Paramount, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that, absent Revlon's limited set of
circumstances, 245 a board of directors, though always required to act
in an informed manner, "is not under any per se duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a
takeover." 2 46
One could argue that Paramount's reach is limited by its eminently
fact-specific holding and, as such, arguably extends only to those
1991) (quoting Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286); cf. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp.,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,182 (Del. Ch. 1989).
[Tihe so called Revlon duty is not necessarily a duty to conduct an 'auction'
or to keep a 'level playing field' when the firm is for sale or, indeed, to pro-
ceed in any prescribed way; rather, it is the duty to exercise judgment (in
good faith and prudently) in an effort to maximize immediate share value.
TW Servs., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,179 (footnotes omitted); see Gilson & Kraak-
man, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAmE FOREST L. REv. 37 (1990). Gilson and Kraakman
suggest that the seeds of Revlon's malleability derive from the court's focus on that dis-
crete point at which a sale of target becomes "inevitable." Id. at 38. They also note that
"management cannot restrict shareholder choice by erecting defensive tactics or lockups
without intermediate judicial review then substituting for shareholder choice as a check
on the fairness of management's action." Id at 59.
240. For a definition and comprehensive analysis of the "just say no" defense, see
Prentice & Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy Reagan Defense'" May Target
Boards 'Just Say No"? Should They Be Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377 (1990). The
authors define the just say no defense in terms of the nagging question: "Is it ever
permissible for target management to refuse to provide an alternative, yet still oppose
the hostile tender offer?" Id, at 382.
241. See infra notes 244-70 and accompanying text.
242. See Prentice & Langmore, supra note 240, at 378-79.
243. See, e.g., Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del Ch.
1988).
244. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
245. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
246. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150 (footnote omitted).
unusual takeover contexts where the target corporation has reached
a definitive restructuring lilan and has taken all steps necessary to
consummate the plan (the proxies had already been sent to share-
holders). 247 Commentators tend to discount the fact-specific focus
of Paramount's holding. 248 The court's broad, general language and
approach 249 has added much fuel to the just say no juggernaut. 250
Additionally, Paramount illustrates that business planning not pri-
marily designed as an antitakeover scheme 251 may serve as a
preplanning defensive strategy. 252
The just say no defense may be used not only to consummate
247. The court itself emphasized Paramount's unique fact setting:
We have purposely detailed the evidence of the Time board's deliberative
approach, beginning in 1983-84, to expand itself. Time's decision in 1988
to combine with Warner was made only after what could be fairly character-
ized as an exhaustive appraisal of Time's future as a corporation.... Time's
board was convinced that Warner would provide the best "fit" for Time to
achieve its strategic objectives. The record attests to the zealousness of
Time's executives.., in seeing to the preservation of Time's "culture"....
Id. at 1151-52.
248. See, e.g., Frome, "Paramount v. Time Inc. ": Reign of the Business-Judgment Rule, 203
N.Y.L.., Mar. 22, 1990, at 55 (asserting that Paramount has "unquestionably affirmed the
power of Delaware corporate boards of directors, armed with the protection of the busi-
ness judgment rule, to reject all-cash bids" despite favorable shareholder response).
249. For example, the court said: "Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliber-
ately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly
no basis to sustain the corporate strategy." Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154 (emphasis ad-
ded). Although this is dicta in the factual setting of this case, such sweeping language
demonstrates the court's expansive approach.
250. See Kozyris, The Federal Role in Corporate Takeovers: A Framework for a Limited Second
Congressional Intervention To Protect the Free Market, 51 OHio ST. LJ. 263, 263 n.3 (1990)
(asserting that Paramount dealt "[t]he ultimate blow against any serious judicial control
over management oppositionism"). "Paramount v. Time shows how far the law has
moved from the notion that corporate boards exist to serve shareholders." Crovitz, Can
Takeover Targets Just Say No to Stockholders, Wall St.J., Mar. 7, 1990, at A19. Says Crovitz,
"[t]he new rule says stockholders don't get a chance to vote on a high bid for their
shares if the board wants another merger and has a plan that might, maybe, someday
nudge the share prices back up." Id.
251. Chancellor Allen held that Time's desire to combine with Warner was a legiti-
mate "interest" that may be protected by defensive action.
In my opinion, where the board has not elected explicitly or implicitly to
assume the special burdens recognized by Revlon, but continues to manage
the corporation for long-term profit pursuant to a preexisting business plan
that itself is not primarily a control device or scheme, the corporation has a
legally cognizable interest in achieving that plan.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at
92,283 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
252. The Delaware Chancery Court in TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp.,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) stated that it is "non-contro-
versial" that
directors, in managing the business and affairs of the corporation, may find
it prudent (and are authorized) to make decisions that are expected to pro-
mote corporate (and shareholder) long run interests, even if short run share
value can be expected to be negatively affected, and thus directors in pursuit
of long run corporate (and shareholder) value may be sensitive to the claims
of other "corporate constituencies."
Id. at 92,178 (footnote omitted).
The recent Polaroid decision also buttresses the use of long-term planning as a defen-
sive preplanning strategy. Focusing on long-term corporate goals, the Polaroid court
found Polaroid's preplanned employee stock-option plan "entirely fair" despite its
highly antitakeover timing and effect. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc., v. Polaroid Corp.,
559 A.2d 278, 290-91 (Del. Ch. 1989).
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carefully negotiated plans like that found in Paramount, but also
when: (1) the offer is coercive,253 inadequate,254 or conditioned on
merger negotiations; 255  (2) the board requires time sufficient to
consider other alternatives or to otherwise promote shareholder
value;256 (3) a raider insists that the target take decisive action, such
253. Whenever a suitor's coercive or inadequate offer poses a threat to a corporation,
courts uphold the defensive measures as "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."
See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp. (Polaroid II), 559 A.2d 278, 286-87
(Del. Ch. 1989) (finding an all-cash, all-shares offer coercive). For another case uphold-
ing directors' decisions not to sell a company based on the coerciveness of the offer, see
Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Applying Dela-
ware law, the court approved USG's decision to neither negotiate nor redeem its rights
plan amid a hostile, two-tiered offer by Desert Partners. Id at 1300; see also Ivanhoe
Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345-46 (Del. 1987) (involving de-
fenses intended to defeat coercive bids); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 958-59 (Del. 1985); c.f City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551
A.2d 787, 797-98 (Del. Ch. 1988) (finding an all-cash tender offer noncoercive, but stat-
ing that even when "an offer is noncoercive, it may represent a 'threat' to shareholder
interests in the special sense that an active negotiator with power, in effect, to refuse the
proposal may be able to extract a higher or otherwise more valuable proposal, or may be
able to arrange an alternative transaction"), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
254. If the board in good faith determines that a bid is inadequate, that alone may
justify leaving a poison pill in place. See Interco, 551 A.2d at 797. Inadequacy of price
does not per se justify keeping the pill in place: "Applying the Unocal standards, I am
unable to conclude that a board may in all instances preclude shareholder choice solely
on the basis of its own perception of the inadequacy of the offer." Amanda Acquisition
Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1014-15 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd on other
grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
Timing issues may be viewed as a subset of inadequacy. See Interco, 551 A.2d at 797
n. 11. For cases involving a combination of (1) inadequacy of a cash tender offer for all
shares, (2) likelihood of both further developments and higher shareholder value with a
retention of rights plan, and (3) no showing of a lack of independence in the board's
conduct, see BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988); MAI Basic Four,
Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,179 (Del. Ch. 1988); Nomad
Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,040 (Del. Ch. 1988).
255. See TWServs., Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334 (stating that where a tender
offer is conditioned on merger negotiations and the board has concluded that the offer
is not in the long-term interests of the company, the board need neither negotiate nor
redeem a rights plan).
256. See Polaroid II, 559 A.2d at 278. The Polaroid II court suggested that interim
defensive measures are appropriate to allow a target corporation sufficient time to ex-
plore and present alternatives to shareholders. Id at 289. The court indicated that
Shamrock's all-cash, all-shares offer would not present a "continuing threat" so as to
justify long-term defensive measures absent unusual circumstances. Id. (holding that
Polaroid had proven unusual circumstances given Polaroid's patent infringement litiga-
tion against Kodak); see also Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 682, 686-89
(Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988) (refusing to force redemption because the "auction [had] not yet
concluded" and holding that the target of a bidding contest could redeem a rights plan
for a lower bidder but leave it intact for a higher bidder). "[E]ven if the offered price is
not inadequate, it may be appropriate to maintain the rights in order to promote the
continuation of the auction." Id. at 686; see also CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores,
Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that, during the auction process,
poison pills provide directors "with a shield to fend off coercive offers, and with a gavel
to run an auction"); infra note 543. The Doskocil court also noted that "when conducting
a Revlon auction, the target board may favor one bidder over another 'if in good faith
and advisedly it believes shareholder interests would be thereby advanced.'" Doskocil
as auctioning the company upon the target's receiving a bare of-
fer 257 or upon merely negotiating with one bidder;258 or (4) resist-
ance to the offer continues to serve a valid purpose, such as
promoting shareholder value.25 9
Alternatively, a judicial declaration that use of the just say no de-
fense is invalid in a particular case may be regarded as a means of
identifying those cases where target defensive measures fail Unocal's
"reasonable in relation to threat posed" test.260 In City CapitalAsso-
ciates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc.,261 for example, the Delaware
court forced redemption of a target's poison pill, finding the threat
of injury to target shareholders from an all-cash offer "mild." 262 In
Grand Metropolitan Public Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 263 the Delaware
court stressed that the only "real" threat was to shareholder value,
which would decrease if the bid were withdrawn. 264 Courts have an-
alyzed Interco and Pillsbury as decisions coming at the conclusion of
takeover battles in which the targets attempted to use poison pills to
protect a board-approved restructuring.265 Paramount, however, ex-
plicitly rejected Pillsbury's and Interco's implication that an all-cash,
Cos. v. Griggy, supra, at 686 (citing In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., Del.
Ch. Civil Action No. 9991 (Aug. 8, 1988)).
257. See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp., 708 F. Supp. at 984. Applying Delaware law,
the court stated that Unocal and its progeny do not require a target to place itself on the
auction block. lad at 1013. In distinguishing Pillsbury, see infra notes 260-66,428-36 and
accompanying text, the court stressed that only 27% of Universal's shareholders had
tendered (as compared with Pillsbuiy's 87% tender); Universal was on an upswing, Pills-
bury a downswing; and Universal's board had made an informed decision as to the inad-
equacy of Amanda's offer by considering 12 alternative responses to the offers. Amanda
Acquisition Corp., 708 F. Supp. at 1013-14. Additional factors the court considered rele-
vant in keeping the poison pill in place were that the bid posed a threat to the sharehold-
ers who did not tender if Amanda failed to obtain financing, and that there was a threat
the offer contained false or misleading information given Amanda's complex financing.
Id Apparently, Amanda requires that the offer must pose a real threat to shareholders,
and thus the court does not suggest that a target may just say no in all circumstances.
258. See Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio) (holding that
Buckhorn's board had no duty to sell merely because of preliminary negotiations with
one potential bidder), aff'd, 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Ivanhoe Partners L.P. v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (shareholder's entering into a ten-
year standstill agreement after raising its stake in Newmont to 49.7% [from 26%o] did
not amount to a sale of the company requiring Newmont to negotiate with possible
bidder [but no bidding contest was yet underway]).
259. See, e.g., In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., 564 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch.
1989). In Holly Farms, the plaintiffTyson and its competitor, ConAgra, were bidding for
Holly Farms. The court refused to grant a preliminary injunction requiring Holly Farms
to redeem its rights plan because the pill served the valid purpose of preventing Tyson
from blocking ConAgra's economically superior offer, which would leave Holly Farm's
shareholders with only Tyson's inferior offer. Because there were no other bidders, the
shareholders would be harmed if ConAgra withdrew its offer, rendering legitimate the
unredeemed pill. Id.
260. See, e.g., Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1058 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (finding that the threat would decrease if the offer were withdrawn); City
Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988);
Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239-41 (Del. Ch. 1988).
261. 551 A.2d 787.
262. Id at 798.
263. 558 A.2d 1049.
264. See id. at 1058.
265. The Delaware Chancery Court in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989),
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all-shares offer at a reasonable price cannot constitute a "threat" to
the corporation.266 This rejection is most significant given that In-
terco and Pillsbury are the only cases where Delaware courts required
redemption of poison pills. 267
The just say no defense raises many questions and leaves most
unanswered. 268 Would the implementation of a preexisting "busi-
ness plan" which practically precluded hostile bids269 pass the tests
articulated in Unocal and Paramount? What is a "long-term business
plan" and how well defined must it be? Although Paramount did not
deal with poison-pill redemption, does its logic apply to such
cases?270 May a board reject a tender offer in favor of preserving a
corporate "culture" whose general focus is "long-term planning"?
The profound burden of reviewing appropriate courses of action
amid control transactions seems to have fallen primarily on the Del-
aware courts. 271 The fluid and ever-changing dimensions of the just
found that Interco and Pillsbury were cases where "management was presenting and seek-
ing to 'cram down' a transaction that was the functional equivalent of the very leveraged
'bust up' transaction that management was claiming presented a threat to the corpora-
tion." Id. at 93,283. Some courts suggest that the just say no defense does not apply to
cases in which the target's defensive measures amount to restructuring. See TW Servs.,
Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334 (Del. Ch. 1989); MAI
Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,179 (Del. Ch.
1988).
266. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del.
1989). The Paramount court stressed that to accept Paramount's narrow view of the Uno-
cal test "would involve the court in substituting its judgment for what is a 'better' deal
for that of a corporation's board of directors." Id.
267. See Mirvis, "Time/ Warner". Delaware Supreme Court Speaks, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 29,
1990, at 6, cols. 3-4. "The [Delaware] supreme court rejected the Interco view of Unocal
unequivocally and completely .... holding that there are more threats in the Unocal
universe than the Chancery Court had ever dreamed of." Ia- The court emphasized this
point stating that it rejected Interco and its progeny. See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153.
268. Prentice & Langmore, supra note 240, summarize the current state of the just say
no defense thusly:
A review of the case law clearly indicate[s] that these issues are still unset-
tied. The Delaware Supreme Court has given no clear answers .. . [and]
room clearly exists to "just say no," at least in certain ill-defined special cir-
cumstances. Still, matters are in an obvious state of flux. It is clear that the
final word on the 'just say no" defense has not yet been spoken.
Ia at 411.
For a glimpse at how Paramount "seems to imply the coming demise of Unocal and calls
into question the normative basis of Revlon," see Johnson & Millon, The Case Beyond
Time, 45 Bus. LAw. 2105, 2125 (1990).
269. Consider, for example, a "white squire" defense which places voting control
into friendly hands.
270. Chancellor Allen distinguished the Time bid for Warner from the use of a
poison pill in Paramount: "Thus, in my view, a decision not to redeem a poison pill,
which by definition is a control mechanism and not a device with independent business
purposes, may present distinctive considerations than those presented in this case."
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at
93,284 n.22 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
271. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 873 (noting that "the true locus of power has
shifted from the legislative branch to the Delawarejudiciary"). In his refreshing article
probing the "meaning of corporate life," Lyman Johnson asserts that "a handful of
say no defense illustrate how little control of management discre-
tion the business judgment rule and the Unocal test afford share-
holders. As the Delaware judiciary continues to grapple with elusive
takeover issues, attempting to balance conflicting corporate inter-
ests, states continue to enact antitakeover legislation that aggravate
attempts to reach such a balance. Indeed, as legislative and judicial
approval of defensive measures advance in tandem, each supporting
the other, both become increasingly more supportive of director
discretion. 272
C. Current Reform Proposals
Optimal reform must come from state or federal legislation rather
than case law. Because state takeover statutes are a recent phenom-
enon, it is not surprising that no commentators to date have pro-
-posed model state takeover statutes (or the equivalent). Given the
importance and pervasiveness of state antitakeover legislation,
merely amending the Williams Act seems inapposite.
Other than proposals to amend the Williams Act,273 most current
reform efforts stem from the pressure shareholders place on man-
agement. For example, Honeywell shareholders recently sought to
influence their corporation's antitakeover policy. 274
Some activities surrounding second-generation shareholder
rights plans offer wise paradigms. For example, Texaco, amid its
emergence from bankruptcy proceedings, on March 16, 1989, an-
nounced its new rights plan, which effectively becomes "inactive"
forty-five business days after an all-cash fully-financed "qualified"
judges are, in effect, empowered to shape (or reshape) the entire corporate landscape
and to answer the most fundamental question of all-what is the meaning of corporate
endeavor?" Id. He also notes that, "[g]iven the legislative public-law vacuum, the take-
over dilemma falls squarely into the laps of the Delaware Judiciary .... [But] judges
respond on an acute rather than a systemic basis, deciding specific cases for litigants
while resolving bedrock issues for society at large." Id at 887 (footnote omitted).
272. E.g., Block & Hoff, Current Trends in Poison Pill Provisions, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 8, 1990, at
7, col. 4 (noting that the rationale for flip-in triggers as low as 15% "has been that it is
consistent with Delaware's takeover statute" which has a 15% business-combination
trigger). For example, it was recently asserted that directors' duty statutes "seem likely
to strengthen the position of boards of directors that choose a 'just say no' defense to
hostile offers." Hart & Degener, Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes, N.Y.LJ., Apr. 12,
1990, at 1, col. 1; see Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential
for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAw. 2253, 2267 (Aug. 1990) (asserting that "the principal conse-
quence of [other constituency statutes] will be the signal they send the courts to allow
even greater discretion than that accorded by the business judgment rule" during hos-
tile control-shifting transactions).
273. See supra note 28.
274. See Gross, Shareholders' Vote Sought on Honeywell 'Poison Pill' Plan, Minneapolis Star
Tribune, Apr. 3, 1990, at ID, 7D. Gross notes that the proposal comes one year after
shareholders defeated two company-sponsored antitakeover measures. United Share-
holders Association singled out Honeywell because the company has a poor record for
responsiveness to shareholders. The instigating shareholder said in a proxy statement:
Any action that has a(s) significant an impact upon the value of my invest-
ment as do 'poison pills' should be presented to shareholders for their con-
sideration. I believe that the declaration of the plan, without shareholder
consent, was contrary to the long-term interests of all shareholders, and of-
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takeover offer.27 5 Several corporations have amended their rights
plans at the behest of institutional investors.276 For example, Day-
ton Hudson Corporation and Great Northern Nekoosa each agreed
to redeem its rights plan by 1992 or submit it to shareholder
vote.277 National Intergroup, Inc., adopted a 1989 institutional
shareholder's proposal for the corporation to amend its rights plan
so that it will expire in 1992 unless approved by shareholders. 278
The proposal also requires that the plan be submitted for share-
holder approval at three-year intervals thereafter.279 In 1986, the
Council of Institutional Investors28 ° proposed a "shareholder bill of
rights" recommending, inter alia, approval of poison pills by a ma-
jority of shareholders. 28 1 Some new generation poison pills provide
for a shareholder vote, but the vote requirement engages only for a
narrow range of offerors.2 82
One commentator suggests that the proper role of our "legal sys-
tem is to facilitate the intra-firm contracting process. ' 28 3 Professor
275. See Pitt, Tender Offers: Offensive and Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgrent Rule, in
1 HOSTILE BATrLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 7, 107 (Practising Law Institute 1990)
(stating that "[t]his 45 day window allows the board of directors 'a reasonable opportu-
nity to explore the available alternatives to maximize stockholder value' ").
The Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., at the behest of the California Public Employees'
Retirement Systems, has adopted a poison pill that mandates redemption if (1) "a bid-
der makes an all cash tender offer which remains open for at least 45 days and (2) after
completion of the offer, the bidder beneficially owns at least 80% of the company's out-
standing stock." It at 106-07.
276. A number of other corporations have been confronted with institutional inves-
tors' proposals to redeem or amend shareholders' rights plans, but have not adopted the
proposals. Most proposals come from a few large pension funds. See Lewkow & Groll,
Poison Pills and other Structural Defenses: Uses and Abuses in the Age of Saying "No ', in 2 Hos-
TILE BATrLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 219, 233-34 (Practising Law Institute 1990).
"The 19 proposals submitted in 1989 received favorable votes from an average of
39.5%o of the votes cast, up from 38.7% in 1988 and 27.4y in 1987." Id. at 233. Reso-
lutions submitted to shareholders of Avon Products and Consolidated Freightways re-
ceived more favorable votes than unfavorable votes, but did not garner a majority
because of abstentions. It at 234.
277. Id.
278. Id The National Intergroup plan also requires that any new rights plan must be
submitted for stockholder approval not later than the first annual meeting following its
adoption. Id.
279. Id
280. The Council of Institutional Investors is an organization of 36 pension funds
controlling more than $160 billion in assets. See Note, Shareholder Rights Plans, supra note
28, at 1036 n.308.
281. Id; see Vise, Bill of Rights Seeks to Boost Power of Shareholders, Wash. Post, Apr. 13,
1986, at Fl, col. 1.
282. For example, MCA, Inc.'s rights plan allows stockholder vote on certain acquisi-
tion proposals, but only if the offeror does not own more than one percent of target
stock during the year preceding the acquisition proposal. See Block & Hoff, supra note
272, at 30, col. 1.
283. Macey, supra note 26, at 490 (arguing that the only laws necessary are enabling
legislation permitting intra-firm agreements between shareholders and management for
responding to tender offers).
14671991]
Coffee advances a model of corporate directors as mediators be-
tween shareholders and stakeholders, seeking to protect their con-
tractual expectations. 28 4 Another commentator proposes adopting
"interstate stock." 28 5
Numerous bills proposing takeover reforms have been introduced
in both houses of Congress each year. Several have sought to
amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Senator Shelby's
Investor Equality Act of 1989 would have prohibited golden
parachutes, greenmail, and poison pills without shareholder ap-
proval.286 Senator Metzenbaum's bill sought to amend the tender
offer period to sixty days and to require majority shareholder ap-
proval before poison pills, golden parachutes, or greenmail pay-
ments are approved. 28 7  Senator Specter also proposed
legislation. 288 Despite these attempts, federal takeover reform ap-
pears unlikely. 28 9
The American Law Institute (ALl) also has attempted to delineate
the roles of directors and shareholders in control and tender situa-
tions.290 Section 6.01 of the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance
requires that shareholders approve any "transaction in control" to
which the corporation is a party. 291 The drafters recommend that
284. See Coffee, supra note 14. Professor Coffee argues that the failure of the implicit
contracting system to protect stakeholders has contributed to the need for state antitake-
over legislation. Id. at 450. Coffee posits the need to lessen the current barriers to more
efficient systems of managerial compensation to better align managerial and shareholder
interests. Id. at 454. He confesses that managers will likely require substantially more
compensation to be induced to manage the firm for shareholder interests. IL Such
inducement could come from bonuses contingent on maximizing takeover gains. Id at
455. This compensation system suffers from numerous problems, however. Id. at 455-
58.
285. See Kozyris, supra note 250; Kozyris, supra note 17, at 1139-42.
286. S. 1658, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). S. 1658 is similar to Senator Proxmire's
celebrated bill, S. 1323; when S. 1323 reached the Senate floor in June 1988, an amend-
ment was offered which would prohibit golden parachutes, greenmail and poison pills
without shareholder approval. For a discussion of the Proxmire bill, see supra note 12;
infra notes 525-27 and accompanying text. See Goelzer, Quinn & Walter, Recent Develop-
ments in Tender Offer Regulation, in 2 HosTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 465, 592-
93 (Practising Law Institute 1990). The Senate voted to prohibit golden parachutes
without shareholder approval but failed to table the poison pill provision, killing the bill.
See id at 593.
287. S. 1244, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); see Goelzer, Quinn & Walter, supra note
286, at 593-94.
288. See S. 1794, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); see Goelzer, Quinn & Walter, supra
note 286, at 594-95.
289. Johnson, supra note 26, at 870. In an effort to explain Congress' steadfast inac-
tion, Professor LymanJohnson asserts that Congress is "paralyzed by uncertainty," un-
able to resolve the key, highly divisive issue "on the overarching question of whether
high levels of takeover activity are, overall, good or bad for the nation." Id at 869-70.
290. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS Part VI, at 499 (Tent. Draft No. 11, Apr. 25, 1991) [hereinafter
ALl DRAFT 11].
291. Section 6.01 reads:
Role of Directors and Holders of Voting Equity Securities with Respect to
Transactions in Control Proposed to the Corporation
(a) The board of directors, in the exercise of its business judgment, may
approve, reject, or decline to consider a proposal to the corporation to en-
gage in a transaction in control.
(b) Any transaction in control of the corporation to which the corporation
is a party should require approval by the shareholders.
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section 6.01 (b) be implemented by statute, and that the definition of
"transactions in control" be implemented by judicial decision.292
Section 6.0 1(b) applies to all mergers, de facto mergers, and to con-
trol transactions such as "lock-ups" 293 but not to hostile tender of-
fers, which are covered by section 6.02.294 Section 6.02 allows the
board to consider nonshareholder interests "if to do so would not
significantly disfavor the long-term interests of the sharehold-
ers."' 295 The draft does not cover adoption of shareholder rights
plans296 or opting into state takeover legislation.
Although the ALI correctly identifies the need for remedying the
deficiencies in the current corporate governance regime,297 the Au-
thors believe the solution not only fails to achieve the goal of reduc-
ing the uncertainty directors confront in hostile tender offer
situations, 298 but actually undermines that goal in numerous ways.
First, by allowing directors to consider nonshareholder constituen-
cies,299 director uncertainty necessarily increases.300 Because the
interests of other groups may be considered "if to do so would not
Id. at 506 (cross references omitted).
292. M at 508. Under § 6.01(a), directors garner protection under the business
judgment rule if they satisfy three conditions: (1) "inform themselves to the extent they
reasonably believe to be appropriate under the circumstances ... (2) act in good faith
and without being interested ... and (3) rationally believe that their action is in the best
interests of the corporation." Id. at 513.
293. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
294. ALI DRAFr 11, supra note 290, at 510.
295. Section 6.02 reads:
Action of Directors That Has the Foreseeable Effect of Blocking Unsolicited
Tender Offers
(a) The board of directors may take an action that has the foreseeable
effect of blocking an unsolicited tender offer, if the action is a reasonable
response to the offer.
(b) In considering whether its action is a reasonable response to the offer:
(1) the board may take into account all factors relevant to the best inter-
ests of the corporation and shareholders including, among other things,
questions of legality and whether the offer, if successful, would threaten the
corporation's essential economic prospects; and
(2) the board may, in addition to the analysis under § 6.02(b)(1), have
regard for interests or groups (other than shareholders) with respect to
which the corporation has a legitimate concern if to do so would not signifi-
cantly disfavor the long-term interests of shareholders.
(c) [The plaintiff] has the burden of proof.
(d) An action that does not meet the standards of subsection (a) may be
enjoined, but directors who authorize such an action are not subject to liabil-
ity for damages if their conduct meets the standard of the business judgment
rule.
ME at 528-29 (cross references omitted).
296. See id. at 551-52 (comment(c)(10)). However, redemption of rights plans is cov-
ered under § 6.02. See id
297. For the ALI's discussion of deficiencies in the business judgment rule, see id. at
529-36 (comment(a)).
298. For the Institute's discussion of its implicit goal to reduce uncertainty, see id
299. See id. § 6.02(b)(2).
300. See infra notes 419-36 and accompanying text.
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significantly disfavor the long-term interests of the sharehold-
ers," 30 1 one need only momentarily ponder this standard before
concluding that the vast expanse of possibilities for considering
nonshareholders without materially disfavoring the shareholder's
long-term interests can only fuel director uncertainty. Second, the
significantly disfavor the long-term interests standard itself is little
improvement over the Unocal standard.30 2 Furthermore, the mean-
ing of the ALI's allowance for directors to focus on both corporate
and shareholders' long-term interests is far from apparent.
I. The Nature and Role of Shareholders in the Modern
Corporation
The phenomenon of "control" is perhaps the most important
single fact in the American corporate system. As the corporation
increasingly is recognized as an institution of primary significance
(even Mr. Justice Brandeis called it "a master instrun1ent of Amer-
ican economy"), the importance of control will grow in law as it
has grown in economic and social fact. Corporation law has never
surrounded this phenomenon. Rules have been developed with
respect to isolated aspects of it; but the rules derive chiefly from a
time when corporations were still truly private and relatively small
303
Historically, the shareholders of a corporation were joint owners
with an implied right to exclude others and a right to common en-
joyment.30 4 The corporation's managers, it followed, were agents
of the joint owners and governed by the law of agency.30 5 The
board of directors was accountable to and conducted business for
the benefit of the joint owners. Throughout, however, the joint
owners (shareholders) exercised ultimate control.306
This description continues to apply to many aspects of the mod-
em closely held corporation, but has little relevance to the publicly
held corporation. Normal incidents ofjoint ownership do not inure
to shareholders of the publicly held corporation.30 7 That is, share-
holders of a publicly held corporation are not actively involved in
managing the enterprise. Conversely, corporate managers usually
have little or no proprietary interest in the corporation.30 8
In the modern legal model of the corporation, control over an
301. See ALI DRAar 11, supra note 290, at 528.
302. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
303. Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1958).
304. See, e.g., Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 785, 78 N.E. 1090, 1093
(1906); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. New York & N. Ry., 150 N.Y. 410, 44 N.E. 1043,
1050 (1896).
305. See, e.g., Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 993 (7th Cir. 1976).
306. Burgman & Cox, Reappraising the Role of the Shareholder in the Modern Public Corpora-
tion: Weinberger's Procedural Approach to Fairness in Freezeouts, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 593, 624.
307. See A. BERLE: & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
308. See Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Pur-
poses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 69, 86-97.
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enterprise is divided between three corporate groups: (1) the share-
holders; (2) the board of directors; and (3) the officers and agents of
the corporation.3 09 Management functions are not distributed
evenly. Some duties are performed jointly by two or more of the
organs while others are performed individually. Generally, manage-
ment functions are delegated to the corporate officers by a board of
directors that is elected and whose actions are sometimes ratified by
the stockholders. In this narrow respect, then, it can be stated that
the majority of the shareholders, through the board and elections,
retain supreme authority for management.
Control by a person or group of affiliated persons holding a ma-
jority of the voting stock is atypical in the large publicly held corpo-
ration. Rarely does one person, family, or voting block own an
actual majority of issued public stock.3 1 0 More common, but still
unusual, is when one shareholder or shareholder group owns a
"controlling minority" of shares. 31' In these instances, it is quite
common for ownership and management to be intertwined because
of the overriding economic interest of the controlling
shareholder(s) .312
More tenuous shareholder control results in corporations in
which an active minority of stockholders exercise episodic control.
These episodes arise when a group of investors attracts a sufficient
amount of stock or proxies to constitute a majority at the stock-
holder meeting. While significantly more common than strict ma-
jority control, such control, by its very nature, is more difficult to
maintain on a continuing basis. Rather, the interests represented,
like insurgent groups of shareholders generally, may be pacified by
relatively minor accommodations.3 13
In the publicly held corporation, then, shareholder control exists
only on a very superficial level. For the most part, it is the corporate
officers who dictate corporate policy and exercise managerial con-
trol. Management in the publicly held corporation, therefore, typi-
cally has been allowed to perform its functions with very little
oversight from the stockholders.
This separation of ownership from control has disturbed econo-
mists and legal scholars since Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means
309. See generally R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW Ch. 3 (1986).
310. In 1986, only 17 of the top 100 shareholders in the nation owned over half of
the stock in any given corporation. Most of those owning a majority were controlled by
whole families who inherited stock in publishing and retail enterprises. See Who Owns
Corporate America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 21, 1986, at 36-43.
311. See id.
312. Id.
313. See supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text (noting that corporations some-
times "voluntarily" concede to insurgent shareholders' proposals rather than fight
them).
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published their thesis The Modern Corporation and Private Property in
1932.314 They asserted that the interest of owners and of manage-
ment diverge and often conflict.315 Although corporate owners seek
maximization of profit from their investment, corporate manage-
ment balances this goal with its own interests.
The Berle and Means thesis never has been universally accepted.
Management, it is argued, will not be retained unless it produces
efficiently- Thus, while not active in management itself, sharehold-
ers can exercise their ultimate authority to change the composition
of the board of directors.
The problem with this response to the theory of management
control lies in the power of management in many cases to choose
and endorse candidates for board of director positions. In publicly
held corporations, management controls the proxy machinery. It
chooses the nominating committee (if one exists) and the committee
(or management directly) in turn nominates members of the
board. 316 In this respect, the shareholder is given the opportunity
to vote, but is limited in the choice of whom to elect because of the
difficulty, complexity, and expense of presenting an alternate slate
of candidates.
Significant changes, however, are well underway. Fewer and
fewer shares are being held by small, passive investors and more are
being held by institutional investors, particularly public-pension
funds. The role of these funds and their managers as active share-
holders and the changes in the corporate process they are seeking
could cause substantial modification in the operation of the corpo-
rate franchise and the accountability of management.
A. Overview
When a corporation is first formed its shareholders, officers, and
directors typically are the same people. For the sake of efficiency
shareholders become directors, and thus, owners appoint and over-
see management. When the corporation later goes public the stock-
holders dilute their ownership and may submit their interests to the
control of outside sources.
As a result of this dilution, it is too easy and often incorrect to
treat the interests and objectives of stockholders collectively. For-
merly dismissed as too atomistic in their holdings to have any effect
on management,317 shareholders of the publicly held corporation
actually vary widely as to their ability to affect management policies.
Thus, the Berle and Means hypothesis that stock ownership in the
publicly held corporation is too fragmented and erratic to allow for
shareholder control of management is subject to both theoretical
314. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 307.
315. See id. at 119-25.
316. J. LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENrATES: THE REAL= OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE
BOARDS 20 (1989).
317. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 307, at 86-87 (stating that "control will
tend to be in the hands of those who select the proxy committee").
I A ftCb r-.- - If A. I A Q tf
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and empirical challenge.318 Indeed, instances of controlling share-
holders or groups of shareholders appear with some regularity in
big business and a few exercise their power with as little as five per-
cent ownership of stock.319
One of the factors that led to the stereotypical Berle and Means
grouping of stockholders in the 1930s was the relative difficulty in
identifying shareholders of publicly held corporations. This diffi-
culty was one major impetus for the passage of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,320 which requires disclosure of facts regarding
corporate securities.8 2' Under this Act the public is able to monitor
and identify investors who own at least five percent of outstanding
stock.3 22
In 1968, the Williams Act was passed as an amendment to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.323 The Williams Act requires
owners of five percent of the outstanding corporate stock of certain
corporations to file a disclosure statement with the corporation and
the SEC. 324 This requirement, however, does hot totally ameliorate
the problem of shareholder identification. For example, it is still
relatively difficult to ascertain ownership of persons holding less
than five percent of issued stock.
Nevertheless, the identity of shareholders in today's publicly held
corporations is in a state of substantial transition. A 1986 study
showed that ownership of publicly held corporate stock was distrib-
uted so that individuals (or households) held sixty-three percent,
pension plans held twenty-one percent, insurers, banks and brokers
held six percent, and mutual funds and foreigners held five percent
each.3 25 These numbers, even if accurate at the time, are certainly
different today. The individual investor that disappeared after the
October 1987 market crash is reappearing in the 1990s as a mutual-
318. See Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972); Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm,
26 J.L. & EcON. 375 (1984); Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL.
ECON. 288 (1980);Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FxN. ECON. 305 (1976).
319. Glasberg & Schwartz, Ownership and Control of Corporations, 9 ANN. REV. Soc. 311,
312-19 (1983).
320. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78l1 (1988)).
321. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (1988); see Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property: A Reappraisal, 26J.L. & EcON. 273, 279 (1984).
322. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).
323. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 781-n (1988); Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970) (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.). For an introduction to the Williams Act, see supra text accompanying
notes 34-47.
324. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988); see Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49
(1975).
325. Who Owns Corporate America, supra note 310, at 36-43.
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fund investor.3 26 Comparably, pension-funds have grown astro-
nomically. Between 1985 and 1989, for example, pension-fund as-
sets grew fifty-five percent to $1.59 trillion. 327 Various estimates
indicate that institutional investors will soon hold over two-thirds of
the shares in all publicly held corporations. 328
Today the role of shareholders is as complex as their identity.
Shareholder control of management generally consists of four ele-
ments: (1) election and removal of directors;329 (2) power to amend
the corporate charter or sometimes adopt, repeal, and amend by-
laws;3 3 0 (3) adoption of shareholder resolutions;331 and (4) power to
vote on extraordinary corporate matters. 33 2 Shareholders' voting
rights can be straight, cumulative, class-based, disproportionate, or
they can have no vote at all. Generally, however, shareholders exer-
cise those rights only when electing a board of directors. It is the
board that manages the corporation, determines policy, and ap-
points officers to execute managerial functions.
In analyzing the role of the shareholder in the publicly held cor-
poration one must first ask: "Do shareholders expect they will as-
sume responsibility for management?"33 3  The separation of
ownership from control is partially a function of economics. As the
number of stockholders in major companies can range into the mil-
lions, efficiency warrants that stockholders delegate their decision-
making authority to the board. Investors choose whether to invest
or to liquidate by gauging the competence of the management
through the market value of the investment. Therefore, sharehold-
ers generally neither have nor want access to the day-to-day deci-
sion-making activities of the board and management.
This presumed modest role of the shareholders in corporate gov-
ernance should not be underestimated. Directors and officers do
not enjoy exclusive control of the corporation to the exclusion of
the shareholder. On the contrary, different types of shareholders
326. Clements, While Brokers Suffer, A Mutual Fund Firm Thrives in Stock Surge, Wall St.
J.,July 16, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
327. White, Giant Pension Funds' Explosive Growth Concentrates on Economic Assets and
Power, Wall St. J., June 28, 1990, at C1, col. 3.
328. For example, it is estimated that pension funds alone may own as much as 50%
of all corporate equity by the year 2000. See Light, The Privatization of Equity, 67 HARv.
Bus. REV. 62, 62-63 (1989) (estimating that pension funds control 40%o of all equities);
see also America's Shareholders Break into the Boardroom, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 1989, at 75.
329. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 8.03(d), 8.08; CAL. CORP. CODE § 303
(Deering Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 141(k) (1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW §§ 703(a), 706 (McKinney 1986).
330. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 10.03; CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 902, 903;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 803 (McKinney 1986 & Supp.
1991).
33 1. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.40; CAL. CORP. CODE § 800; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 327; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626 (McKinney 1986).
332. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.03; CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c), (f); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 903(a).
333. See Andrews, Corporate Governance Eludes the Legal Mind, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 213,
216 (1983).
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wield various amounts of control consistent with their distinct mo-
tives and varying levels of stock ownership. The market also acts as
a check or monitor of management activity.
Many factors blend together to form the dynamics of the share-
holder role in the publicly held corporation. Among these factors
are the type and size of the corporation, and the extent and concen-
trations of ownership among shareholders. Generally, there are
three major types of investors: (1) the smaller individual investor,
(2) the larger shareholder or household investor, and (3) the institu-
tional investor. The next sections will explore the roles of each of
these types and their impact on the management and control of the
publicly held corporation.
B. The Role of the Small Shareholder
In most publicly held corporations the most common shareholder
historically has been the "small" shareholder, who owns a small eq-
uity interest and enjoys a negligible impact on managerial powers.
The small shareholder's recourse for any of a variety of dissatis-
factions-barring derivative suits and actions involving breach of fi-
duciary duty-is to vote with her feet. If she does not like
management, she will usually sell rather than fight.
Corporations are not democracies in the sense of one person, one
vote. Instead, they operate on the premise of one share, one vote.
Thus, the small shareholder's power to change corporate policy is
directly proportionate to her quantum of ownership. In this regard,
the voice incident to typical individual share ownership is that of
one crying out in a vast wilderness far removed from the corporate
metropolis. 3 3 4
This relative impotence is not altogether unfortunate. Most small
stockholders have no more than a monetary interest or fleeting edu-
cation in the governance of the particular corporation. They are
"free riders"-apathetic with regard to daily management affairs in
the hope of benefiting from the work and worries of large stockhold-
ers, directors, and officers.335 Their apathy, in turn, saves the com-
pany time, money, and headaches that would likely result from true
shareholder education and democracy. This system of governance
is not without its critics, however. Berle and Means first identified
the problems that arise when management is separated from owner-
ship.3 3 6 Since then, economists and legal scholars have addressed
334. See Goldschmid, The Governance of the Public Corporation: Internal Relationships,
1977-1978, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 167, 170 (D.
Schwartz ed. 1979).
335. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.1.1, at 94 (1986).
336. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 307.
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this central issue of conflict of interest.337
Nor are small shareholders encumbrances on the utility of corpo-
rate management. The wide dispersal of stock does not itself deny
shareholders the opportunity to gain control or monitor manage-
ment. Voting rights can be sold along with shares to present a
group of holders or larger investors with the opportunity to replace
incumbent management.338 Shareholders can coalesce to act to-
gether, as is commonly practiced in the context of proxy contests.
Small shareholders may also bring suit against management and
against majority shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty.33 9 The
latter action, however, is more common in the closely held corpora-
tion. The threat of these actions may add to other programs
designed to give small owners a voice in corporate governance.
In recent years the role of the small shareholder has changed in
two significant ways so as to grant them a greater influence on cor-
porate activities. First, the small investor may forsake individual
ownership for the expertise and diversified portfolio associated with
mutual funds, thereby transforming dispersed individual ownership
into concentrated institutional ownership.3 40 Second, the small
shareholder, dissatisfied with her investment, may decide to sell her
shares. Today, however, the small shareholder may find an alterna-
tive to selling in the traditional "Wall Street option;" she may sell
her shares at a premium to a tender offeror that is unfriendly to
incumbent management. The ability of small shareholders as a
group to act as the effective swing vote in the battle for corporate
control has reinstated them as a force to be satisfied (or neutralized)
by corporate management.
C. The Role of the Large Shareholder and Household Investor
An incident of ownership of a majority interest-and often of an
interest substantially less than that-is control. Control will natu-
rally be exercised in pursuit of the majority's perceived interests.
Indeed, pursuit of those interests may be judicially viewed as a
right inherent in ownership of control.3 4 1
337. See A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE § 238 (1976); M. EISENBERG, THE
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS § 11.3, at 169-70 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter EISENBERG, STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION]; Anderson, Conflicts ofInterest: Efficiency,
Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 777 (1977); Eisenberg, Legal Models
of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors and Accountants, 63
CAUF. L. REV. 375, 402-03 (1975) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Legal Models].
338. For a discussion on the requirement that voting rights be sold along with the
stock, see Andre, supra note 105.
339. See, e.g., Crosby v. Beam, 47 Ohio St. 3d 105, 108, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (1989)
(expressing a strong desire to protect minority shareholders in close corporations while
probing the boundaries between individual and derivative suits).
340. See infra text accompanying notes 345-83 (noting that shareholders increasingly
entrust their share holdings with institutions, including mutual funds). On the other
hand, when the stock market looks like a bad option generally, individual investors may
flee stock mutual funds for other investments, such as money-market funds. See Stock
Fund Sales Collapse, Marking Most Dismal Month Since 1987 Crash, Wall St.J., Aug. 31, 1990,
at C I, col. 3.
341. Burgman & Cox, supra note 306, at 628 (footnote omitted).
Shareholder Rights
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The extent and prevalence of the large shareholder and family
investor was ignored by the Berle and Means thesis in the 1930s. 3 42
These holders are not as rare as once believed and when grouped
with the institutional investor, may prove more the norm than the
exception. Since 1951, surveys from the Brookings Institution, the
New York Stock Exchange, Edwin Cox, and the SEC have reported
that fewer than ten percent of stockholders controlled more than
seventy percent of the value of outstanding common shares. 343
These figures demonstrate that the "average" small individual
stockholder has been shadowed by a more active and powerful
investor.
The predicament for the large investor who is disappointed with
management is more problematic than a similarly situated small in-
vestor. The large investor's holdings are more significant. Often a
large investor owns over five percent of the total stock issued.3 44
Liquidation is therefore less attractive because a surge in the supply
of a security on the open market may decrease its price. Accord-
ingly, the sale option for the large investor is not as viable.
A large shareholder has other options to consider. If she does not
own a majority of outstanding stock, she may launch a proxy cam-
paign or combine her efforts with other owners in a proxy cam-
paign. Such efforts, however, are extremely expensive and
speculative at best. In addition to the expense, large investors en-
gaged in a proxy battle face the problem of identifying shareholders
and convincing them to vote. They also face the risk of declining
security prices because of speculation that the corporation is exper-
iencing management difficulty.
The problems do not end after the proxy contest. If successful in
a proxy battle, the investor must deal not only with the replacement
of upper-level management, but with middle- and lower-level man-
agement who may have pursued the same unprofitable course of
business. Often the bottom line for the large private investor is the
same as that for the small investor: if satisfied with the manage-
ment, she will support them; if dissatisfied, she will sell, but maybe
over a longer period of time.
D. The Role of the Institutional Investor
Ownership of publicly held corporations by institutional investors
has ballooned in recent decades. Institutional investors control
342. See A. BEARLE & G. MEANS, supra note 307, at 112-16.
343. This figure includes institutional investors and program traders. See EISENBERG,
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 337, § 5.2, at 44-45. Edwin Cox's study in
1963 found that 20% of the holdings accounted for 77% of the stock. Id at 45.
344. See Who Owns Corporate America, supra note 310, at 36.
roughly half the market value of all existing outstanding stock.3 45 In
1989, institutional shareholders owned forty-three percent of all
publicly traded equities, with large institutional shareholders own-
ing fifty-two percent of the equity of the top fifty American corpora-
tions. 346 Indeed, American pension funds possess the largest pool
of investment capital in the world, with assets rivaling the gross na-
tional product ofJapan.347 Tripling in size since 1971, pension fund
assets exceeded $2.6 trillion in 1989.348 Pension funds currently
own approximately sixty percent of the stock of companies on the
"Standard & Poor's 500."349
Comprised of bank trust departments, insurance companies, mu-
tual and pension funds, and investment firms, institutional investors
concentrate on the largest publicly held corporations. 350 Further-
more, most of the shares of these corporations are held by a rela-
tively small percentage of institutions.351 This, of course, means
that significant corporate ownership is steadily declining to a rela-
tively few investors.
Institutional investors differ from the small investor and the large
individual investor in two respects. First, they are more likely to ex-
ercise their voting rights because they own more stock and have a
systematized method of voting. Second, because of their duties to
their beneficiaries, the size of their holdings, and the expertise of
their staffs, the institutional investors' resources enable them to in-
vestigate and monitor management.35 2 This ability, in turn, allows
them to vote effectively. Moreover, the size of their holdings dis-
courages a sell-out for fear of depressed prices.
Unfortunately, although conscientious about their voting record,
institutional investors have not always taken the active role in corpo-
rate governance one might expect.35 3 Their value often has proved
greatest to takeover bidders who may conveniently purchase a large
number of shares at inflated prices to gain control of
345. Id. at 37. In addition, most major corporations today are owned 50% or more
by institutional investors and 80% of the dollar volume on the major stock exchanges is
institutional in nature. Franco, Institutional Ownership in the U.S.: An Overview, in SHARE-
OWNER ACTIvIsM: THE EMERGING ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 285, 288 (Practis-
ing Law Institute 1987).
346. See Big Funds Pressing for Voice in Management of Companies, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23,
1990, at Al, col. 1, D5, col. 3.
347. The Power of the Pension Funds, Bus. WK., Nov. 6, 1989, at 154.
348. Id. at 155.
349. Rosenbaum & Korens, Institutional Shareholder Activism and Related Proposals for Leg-
islative and Regulatory Changes to Corporate Governance Rules, in PROXY CONTESTS, INSTiTU-
TIONAL INVESTOR INITIATIVES, MANAGEMENT RESPONSES 621, 623-24 (Practising Law
Institute 1990).
350. It is estimated that 50% or more of all stocks listed on the New York Stock
Exchange are held by institutions. Who Owns Corporate America, supra note 310, at 37.
351. M. EISENBERG, STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 337, § 5.5, at 53.
352. For a discussion of the scope, purpose, and duties of management in investment
companies see E. BRODSKY & M.P. ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIREC-
TORS §§ 17:01-:09 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
353. The corporate charters of many institutional investors have contained provi-
sions preventing them from seeking to exercise control of management. See, e.g.,
Sanger, Tame No More, Funds Seek More Say In Firms They Invest In, BARRONS, Feb. 16,
1987, at 56, col. 3.
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management.35 4
The institutional investor has a duty to its own beneficiaries rather
than its fellow stockholders.3 55 Institutional investors, therefore,
cannot ignore their fiduciary obligations to their beneficiaries. In
voting, the institutional investor is obligated to exercise its best
businessjudgment.3 56 In this respect, the increased participation of
institutional investors in the ownership of publicly held corpora-
tions serves as a countervailing force and a check on managerial
control otherwise unavailable with small shareholder ownership.3 57
Indeed, perhaps the most significant development of the second
half of the 1980s was the increasing activism of institutional share-
holders.35 8 Their size has grown tremendously359 and with that
growth their.inclination to activism has expanded.3 60  In fact, with
such large holdings the option of selling out often is not realistic;
the size of these funds may require them to take an active role in
corporate affairs.3 61 This activism can result in a variety of interac-
tions, ranging from informal contacts (or negotiated settlements),3 62
to proxy contests,3 63 to proposals for reform.36 4
Institutional shareholders have been experimenting with various
354. EISENBERG, STRuCTuRE OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 337, at 53-54. Interest-
ingly, rather than serve as a watchdog of management, institutional investors often as-
sumed a pro-management stance. Pickens Forms Shareholder Group to Focus on Corporate
Voting Issues, I Corp. Couns. Weekly No. 34, Aug. 24, 1986, at 1. Reasons for this phe-
nomenon include: (1) a desire to retain the business of the corporation in other areas,
such as banking and financial, (2) the desire to access inside information; and (3) "obedi-
ence to the mores of the financial community." EISENBERG, STRUCTURE OF THE CORPO-
RATION, supra note 337, at 57 (footnotes omitted); Heard, Pension Funds and Contests for
Corporate Control, 29 CAL. MGmT. REV. 89, 92-95 (1987).
355. EISENBERG, STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 337, at 58; Heard, supra
note 354, at 89.
356. See Monks, Will the Corporation's Real Owners Please Stand Up?, ACROSS THE BOARD
52 (Feb. 1987).
357. See Shleifer & Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94J. POL. EcON. 461
(1986).
358. See, e.g., The Revolt of the Institutional Shareholders, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May
1987, at 131.
359. See White, supra note 327, at Cl, col. 3.
360. See 1990 Almanac, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that these "'activist shareholders'
have a growing interest in monitoring management performance and influence board
decisions").
361. See, e.g., Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public Corporation, Jan.-Feb. 1990
HARV. Bus. REV. 96.
362. See, e.g., Feinberg, The Unlocking of Corporate America, PENSION WORLD, Feb. 1989,
at 14-15; Clark, Ira Millstein Turns Up the Heat, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1989, at
100.
363. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 362, at 14.
364. See, e.g., Stevenson, Pension Fund Urges SEC Proxy Review, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
1989, at Dll, col. 4; Feinberg, supra note 362, at 14.
approaches in an effort to translate their substantial stakes in corpo-
rations into power sufficient to influence corporate management.3 65
Enhanced communication with shareholders, management,36 6 and
government 67 is central to their efforts. Institutional shareholders
now seek to influence the corporate governance regime and to par-
ticipate in management "on an advisory basis."3 6 8
Institutional investors have sought changes in corporate govern-
ance rules by making shareholder proposals, soliciting against man-
agement proposals, 369 and attaining dissident concessions. 370 For
example, the California Public Employees Retirement System
(CalPERS) has sponsored Analysis Group, Inc.'s Institutional Vot-
ing Research Service, which is designed to evaluate the corporate
governance and economic performance records of major corpora-
tions.37 1 Stressing a variety of issues,372 institution-sponsored
shareholder resolutions have risen markedly, with over 100 propos-
als being sponsored in 1990. 37- Many institution-sponsored pro-
posals have garnered plurality support, including Lockheed
Corporation's opting out of Delaware's antitakeover legislation,
shareholder approval requirements for poison pills at K Mart Cor-
poration, Champion International Corporation, and National Inter-
group, and an antigreenmail proposal at Gillette.3 74 Pressed by the
growing discontent of institutional shareholders, management of
many corporations have voluntarily supported shareholder propos-
als, including mandatory redemption of poison pills at Dayton Hud-
son Corp., Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., and Aluminum
365. See Rosenbaum & Korens, Trends in Institutional Sharehoder Activism: What the Insti-
tutions are Doing Today, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, PASsIVE FmUClARIES To ACTIVIST
OWNERS 45 (Practising Law Institute 1990).
366. See id at 50. The Authors note some examples of enhanced dialogue among
shareholders and managers: (1) In 1990, CalPERS and New York State demanded
meetings with General Motors' outside directors and management; and (2) numerous
pension funds met with Exxon's chairman to discuss Exxon's recent oil spill. Id. "These
funds had threatened to begin a campaign to remove the board if it failed to meet their
demands for a stronger commitment to the environment." Id Several large pension
funds also persuaded Exxon to elect a director with an environmental background. Id.
367. Examples of lobbying efforts by institutional shareholders include: (1) actively
supporting the SEC's adoption of a "one share, one vote" rule, id. at 59; (2) CalPERS
recently proposed forty-eight changes to proxy rules, id.; and (3) institutional sharehold-
ers' aggressive fight against Pennsylvania's recent antitakeover legislation. Id. Influ-
enced by their efforts, at least twenty-two Pennsylvania corporations opted out of at least
one of the Pennsylvania Antitakeover Act's provisions. Id. at 60.
368. Id at 47.
369. For example, institutional investors solicited shareholders to defeat two man-
agement-backed proposals at Honeywell, Inc. Id at 56.
370. For example, amid a proxy battle involving Armstrong World Industries, dissi-
dent First City Diversified, "controlled by the Belzberg family, proposed five share-
holder rights resolutions that were endorsed by Institutional Shareholder Services." Id,
at 56.
371. Id. at 51.
372. Among the issues addressed by these proposals: shareholder approval of share-
holder rights plans, "golden parachute" severance agreements, and the placement of
10% or more of voting stock with any person or group; confidential voting; bylaws re-
quiring the corporation to opt out of applicable state antitakeover legislation; and a
referendum on dual class voting structure. Id
373. Id at 52. In contrast, 46 proposals were sponsored by institutions in 1987. Id.
374. See id. at 53-54.
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Corporation of America.375
Institutional shareholders increasingly seek formal involvement in
corporate governance and decisionmaking. The shareholder advi-
sory committee, a brainchild of CalPERS, may be the most interest-
ing among them. Although these committees are an' untested,
evolving concept,376 as proposed by CalPERS to Avon, the no-less-
than nine-member committee would be comprised of major, disin-
terested shareholders willing to serve a one-year term and would be
limited to providing nonbinding, advisory counsel to the board.377
CalPERS has sponsored proposals for creating shareholder advisory
committees at TRW Inc.,378 Avon Products,3 7 9 Sears,3 s0 and Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp.,3 8 among others. The value of shareholder
advisory committees becomes acutely obvious when compared to
the proxy statement alternative. CalPERS has recently advised the
SEC that
[i]n many ways, the proxy rules discourage responsible, long-term
investors from playing a meaningful role in the governance of
public corporations. The proxy rules in their present form have
evolved in and been shaped by an environment that reflects an
underlying philosophy of protecting registrants from shareholder
involvement, restricts shareholder access to the corporate proxy
statement, and imposes a high cost on shareholders who seek to
circulate their own proxy materials or to otherwise communicate
with shareholders. [T]he current rules ... are an impediment to
better corporate governance to the extent that they suffocate
shareholder input or insulate management.38 2
Still, not every publicly held company has substantial institutional
shareholders. Also, although the largest institutions are certainly a
major market force,38 3 institutions often cannot focus on the myriad
375. See id at 55.
376. See Koppes & Gillan, The Shareholder Advisory Committee, DIRECTORS & BOARDS,
Spring 1991, at 29, 30-31.
377. Id. at 31.
378. Rosenbaum & Korens, supra note 365, at 57.
379. This proposal received approval from 45.5% of the votes cast at Avon Products
in 1990. See id. at 57.
380. See Schwadel, As Sears Profit Picture Deteriorates, Shareholders Seek a Voice in Strategy,
Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1990, at A7, col. 1, 2; infra note 538.
381. See Rosenbaum & Korens, supra note 365, at 58 (noting that Occidental Petro-
leum Corp. and TRW Inc. each agreed to meet periodically with CalPERS officials to
discuss corporate policy).
382. See Monks, The Current Legal Environment and Proposals for Reform, in INSTrrTONAL
INVESTORS, PAsSIVE FIDUCIARIES TO ACTIVIST OWNERS 155, 157 (Practising Law Institute
1990) (reprinting CalPERS Submission to the SEC, dated November 3, 1989 (pages 7-
9), Requesting a Rulemaking Project in which the SEC would undertake a review of the
Proxy System).
383. For example, the top 20 pension funds account for more than 25% of all pen-
sion assets and have roughly 10% or more equity in companies such as IBM and General
Motors. See White, supra note 327.
of entities in which they hold stock. Thus, their ability to effectively
initiate change rather than merely respond to management initia-
tives remains an open issue in the 1990s.
III. Justifications for Balanced Shareholder Input
Shareholders face two fundamental obstacles in their quest to
maximize the value of their investment: (1) state and corporate
sponsored protectionist measures;38 4 and (2) directors' express au-
thority to consider nonshareholder constituencies in takeover con-
texts as articulated in state legislation38 5 and case law.3 8 6 In 1989,
tender offers, the primary means of hostile corporate takeovers,
dropped 37.4% from the previous year.3 8 7 Hostile tenders, those
where management at least initially opposed the offer, fell off 37.0%
in 1989.388 Although certainly a multiplicity of factors contributed
to this decline, corporate antitakeover measures and antitakeover
legislation are designed to have this effect. Shareholders are begin-
ning to cry out.38 9 For example, several Honeywell and First Bank
shareholders demanded that those corporations' current poison
pills be put to a shareholder vote.390
Four recurring themes interact to justify enhancing and equaliz-
ing shareholder input in control transactions. The first theme is
centered on directors' conflict of interest. Saddled with conflicting
interests, directors may lack incentive to maximize shareholders'
best interests or to seek shareholder input on corporate takeover
policy, thereby denying shareholders an opportunity to balance
their input with management and other nonshareholder constituen-
cies in a meaningful way. The second theme concerns the uncer-
tainty resulting from the combined forces of the business judgment
rule and directors' duty legislation.391 This combination allows di-
rectors to consider nonshareholder constituencies, diluting and
blurring any shareholder input that muscles its way beyond direc-
tors' conflicting interests, further denying shareholders a meaning-
ful voice in takeover matters. The third theme focuses on economic
384. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
385. For a description of this "directors' duty legislation," see Appendix at DDS and
supra notes 137-53 and accompanying text.
386. The impact of the business judgment rule and the "just say no" defense are
discussed supra notes 206-72 and accompanying text.
387. 1989 Almanac, supra note 3, at 25. The recent collapse of the "junk bond" mar-
ket may be as important a factor in the reduction of tender offers and takeover activity
generally as the recent proliferation of poison pills. See supra notes 7-11 and accompany-
ing text. In 1990, the trend continued: only 40 offers were completed, compared with
117 in 1989. 1990 Almanac, supra note 2, at 13.
388. 1989 Almanac, supra note 3, at 25. Only one contested tender offer was com-
pleted in 1990, compared with 14 in 1989. 1990 Almanac, supra note 2, at 13.
389. See Gilson I, supra note 27, at 841 (stating that "[t]he market for corporate con-
trol may be the only potentially serious force for limiting management discretion";
Woodward, How Much Indiana's Anti-Takeover Law Cost Shareholders, Wall St. J., May 5,
1988, at 32, col. 3 (citing study that found that the Indiana law cost shareholders $2.65
billion, six percent of the total value of Indiana companies).
390. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 137-53 and accompanying text; Appendix at DDS.
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efficiency. As regard takeovers, only shareholders have an unim-
peded incentive to channel assets to their most productive, efficient,
and profitable use. Unless shareholders are encouraged to have bal-
anced input with that of management, economically efficient oppor-
tunities may be lost. The fourth theme concerns shareholder
fairness, and corporate and political theory. The motivations
prompting current state antitakeover legislation demonstrate all too
clearly that shareholders lack an equal voice in the enactment of an-
titakeover legislation. Worse yet, the legislation itself tends to mini-
mize shareholder input during a takeover by granting directors
dispositive authority to hold shareholder concerns as sub-
paramount. This in turn impinges upon both notions of corporate
democracy and the corporate contract.
A. Conflict of Interest
Amid control transactions, directors theoretically are well suited
to maximize corporate profit, to deploy defensive measures re-
jecting inadequate or coercive bids, and to seek superior bids or de-
velop superior restructuring plans. Independent directors3 92
arguably afford an appropriate central nervous system for a corpora-
tion besieged by a hostile raider: independent directors presumably
will weigh dispassionately the various alternatives and arrive at an
informed, optimal solution.3 93
The "independence" of directors, however, affords only minimal
resolution of directors' inherent conflict of interest in a takeover
scenario.3 94 In adopting and unleashing takeover defensive tactics,
392. "Independent director" is at all times synonymous with "independent outside
director." Outside directors are those "who are not full-time employees of the corpora-
tion." See Business Roundtable, Statement of Position Concerning the Role of Corporate Direc-
tors, 33 Bus. LAw, 2083, 2094-98 (1978); see also ALI DRAFr 11, supra note 290, § 1.29
(defining "Significant Relationship").
393. Courts accede to this proposition by stating that review is more deferential
where approval is provided by independent directors. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (stating that evidence of good faith is "ma-
terially enhanced" by the presence of outside directors); see also Panter v. Marshall Field
& Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (stating that "[t]he
presumption of good faith the business judgment rule affords is heightened when the
majority of the board consists of independent outside directors"); Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del. 1987) (stating that "with the in-
dependent directors in the majority, proof that the board acted in good faith and upon
reasonable investigation is materially enhanced"); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del.
1986) (ruling that the presence of 10 independent directors out of 13, coupled with the
fact that they consulted with outside bankers and lawyers constitutes a "primafacie show-
ing of good faith and reasonable investigation" (emphasis in original)); Revlon, Inc., v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 n.3 (Del. 1986) (stating that
outside directors help establish good-faith decisionmaking).
394. See Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Committee-Ensuring Business Judgment
Rule Protection, 43 Bus. LAW. 665, 674 (1988); Veasey, The New Incarnation of the Business
Judgment Rule in Takeover Defenses, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 503, 508 (1986).
1991] 1483
even the most "independent" of directors will experience conflict as
regard: (1) loyalty to a management with which the board has
worked closely and from which it receives pay and prestige as a
board member; and (2) the proper constituency of the corporation,
be they shareholders, managers, or other nonshareholders.
Directors' conflict of interest as between management and share-
holders is at its zenith during a takeover context.39 5 Directors may
not view a tender offer with sufficient equanimity to assure share-
holder protection. Rather, directors may tend to favor results which
preserve both their own and management's positions.3 96 The
current process by which directors adopt poison pills provides pow-
erful evidence of this conflict of interest: directors appear minimally
receptive to shareholders yet exceedingly responsive to
management.3 97
The fuel for many hostile bids substantially derives from the per-
ception by bidders that the current board and management are
suboptimal.3 98 Facing the real possibility of losing both their jobs
395. "The risk of management entrenchment is nowhere clearer." Palmiter, Re-
shaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1351,
1412 (1989). Professor Brudney attests: "Whenever a takeover is attempted, the inde-
pendence and judgment of outside directors are put to their severest tests. In these
circumstances, the propriety of the independent directors' decision to resist a takeover,
if not also their own liability, should be least protected by the business judgment rule.
Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REv. 597,
630 n.87 (1982), quoted in Palmiter, supra, at 1422 n.10; see Andre, supra note 21, at 902.
Managers' conflict of interest exists even where board is predominantly outside and dis-
interested: "No one likes to be fired, whether he is just a director or also an officer. The
so-called outsiders moreover are often friends of the insiders." Dynamics Corp. of Am.
v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd in part, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). Further-
more, such outsiders are likely to defer to insiders as part of their routine of seeking
knowledge about the corporation. Id.; see also City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v.
Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. 1988) (asserting that "Unocal recognizes that
human nature may incline even one acting in subjective good faith to rationalize as right that
which is merely personally beneficial" (emphasis in original)); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954
(when directors oppose a hostile takeover there is an "omnipresent specter that a board
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders"); Kozyris, supra note 250, at 264. Kozyris' essay notes that antitakeover
forces have
swept under the rug the evil of management's inherent conflict-of-interests
and motive for self-perpetuation and have exacerbated the parochial fears of
local communities and employees to produce a fundamental distortion of
what is happening and what is at stake. The corporate fortifications have
become so strong now that only an extraordinarily determined, patient, and
powerful suitor dare challenge management. Even then, the battle for con-
trol is bound to be expensive, slow, and unpredictable ....
Id.
396. The "Catch 22" for shareholders is that transactions in control or tender offers
typically are the most complex facing a corporation; shareholders thus have a height-
ened need for managerial expertise as regards the evaluation and negotiation of control
transactions.
397. See McCord, supra note 28, at 492 (stating that defensive tactics primarily are
designed to discourage any offer from being made, but in the event of an offer are used
"to prevent shareholders from having a chance to accept the offer"); see also Palmiter,
supra note 395, at 1435 (noting that "the advantages of takeover defenses are available
only through corporate transactions with necessarily entrenching effects. For example,
golden parachute contracts can be purchased only from management.").
398. See Gilson I, supra note 27, at 841-42 (describing the theory of a corporate con-
trol market as a restraint on management's ability to benefit itself at the expense of
shareholders in transactions); Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman
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and their ability to determine the corporate fate upon becoming a
target, management often seeks to wield corporate governance ma-
chinery to assure continued control. Indeed, the pressure on in-
dependent directors to resist takeover threats may not differ
materially from that on management.3 99 Independent directors face
losing both their positions of "power, prestige and prominence"
and their fees and perks. 400 Some commentators argue that struc-
tural biases further compel independent directors to align cohe-
sively with management.40 1
Delaware courts have increasingly considered conflict of interest
issues as fundamental. 40 2 One recent Delaware case discerns an
" 'unbroken line of cases that seek to prevent conflicts of interest
that arise in the field of mergers and acquisitions by demanding that
directors act with scrupulous concern for fairness to sharehold-
ers.' ",403 Delaware courts require that directors interested in both
sides of a transaction or otherwise deriving a personal benefit not
generally accruing to the corporation or shareholders must prove
the "intrinsic fairness" of that transaction.40 4 This requirement at-
tests to the importance Delaware courts place on minimizing con-
flicts of interest. The Delaware Judiciary, however, has yet to apply
Cohen, 1967 DuKE L.J. 231, 236 (noting in general the circumstances conducive to a
tender offer being proposed); Palmiter, supra note 395, at 1413-15 (suggesting that hos-
tile takeovers may serve as "powerful evidence that internal governance, market, and
fiduciary constraints have failed to maximize shareholder wealth").
399. See Palmiter, supra note 395, at 1413. "For outside nonmanagement directors,
the pressures to resist takeover attempts are remarkably similar [to managers'].... In
general, their incentives are closely aligned with those of management. Moreover, some
outside directors, such as outside lawyers and investment bankers, also may lose finan-
cially significant affiliations with the company." Id (footnotes omitted).
400. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981), cited in Palmiter,
supra note 395, at 1413.
401. See Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal
Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 83, 85-91 (1985); Dent, The
Power of Directors To Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw.
U.L. REV. 96, 113 (1980); Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of
Directors, 96 HARv. L. Rav. 1894, 1901 (1983); see also Palmiter, supra note 395, at 1413
(stating that directors "external to the corporation will have incentives similar to the
ones held by management when confronted by a takeover").
402. See, e.g., infra notes 403-04; cf Andre, supra note 21, at 866.
Courts, for the most part, have not been sensitive to the inherent conflict of
interest between management and shareholders and permit management
entrenchment efforts to succeed in all but the most egregious cases. Legisla-
tive reform is therefore needed to eliminate conflicts of interest in the tender
offer process and to provide shareholders with control over the ultimate
destiny of the corporation in which the [sic] own stock.
Id (footnotes omitted).
403. Sutton Holding Corp. v. Desoto, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,964, at
95,397 (1990) (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del.
1989)).
404. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del.
1987); see also AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111
this analysis to either corporate management or "independent" di-
rectors in change-of-control transactions.
Directors' duty legislation 40 5 aggravates the fiduciary dilemma
confronting directors40 6 by allowing or requiring them to consider
nonshareholder interests when contemplating takeover decisions.
How are directors to consider these constituencies consistent with
their fiduciary duty owed shareholders?40 7 Although directors' con-
sideration of stakeholder interests during a takeover may be appro-
priate in certain circumstances, 40 8 when directors focus instead on
the shareholders' best interests, shareholders and stakeholders si-
multaneously benefit. 40 9 Thus, numerous problems emerge from a
system allowing directors to consider stakeholder interests. 410 First,
most stakeholder problems stemming from takeovers are short
term.4 11 Second, a successful tender offeror would harm itself by
(Del. Ch. 1986) (defining "entire fairness" doctrine). Under Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), in interested transactions, "the directors, once the
transaction is attacked, have the burden of establishing its 'intrinsic fairness' to a court's
careful scrutiny." Id. at 788 n.17 (citation omitted). Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983), sets out the modem formulation of the standard for intrinsic fairness:
"[D]irectors ... are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most
scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain." Id. at 710 (citation omitted). The intrinsic
fairness standard does not apply where directors prove they acted independently of any
of the bidders or management. See, e.g., In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194 (Del. Ch. 1989).
405. See Appendix at DDS. For a recent analysis of directors' duty legislation, see
Other Constituencies Statutes: Potentialfor Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253 (1990) [hereinafter
Other Constituencies].
406. See Feinberg, The Directors' New Dilemma in the Takeover Crisis: A Special Report,
INsTrrtriONAL INVESTOR, June 1987.
407. Until a takeover becomes imminent, directors may consider nonshareholder
constituencies in deploying takeover defenses as long as they also benefit the sharehold-
ers. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986). Revlon guides directors in fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders once a
takeover becomes inevitable; prior to this threshold, however, directors must serve con-
flicting constituencies. See id. (stating that a board may consider nonshareholder constit-
uencies "provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders ....
However, such concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction
among active bidders is in progress [such that the sole duty is] to sell to highest bid-
der"); see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del.
1988) (noting that the board may consider "the impact of both the bid and the potential
acquisition on other constituencies, provided that it bears some reasonable relationship
to general shareholder interests"); TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,179 (Del. Ch. 1989) (stating that "[w]hen a corporation is
in a 'Revlon mode,' legitimate concerns relating to the claims of other constituencies are
absent, and indeed, concerns about the corporation as a distinct entity become attenu-
ated"). See generally Other Constituencies, supra note 405, at 2253 (stating that a majority of
the members of the ABA Committee on Corporate Law rejected the adoption of legisla-
tion that would authorize directors to consider nonshareholder constituency interests to
deal with interested hostile takeovers).
408. See Note, supra note 26, at 478 (referring to situations involving the downward
redrafting of employee contracts and leveraged acquisitions which result in a redistribu-
tion of wealth to the shareholders).
409. Id.; see Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 27, at 1190-92; cf Other Constituencies,
supra note 405, at 2269 (suggesting that a better interpretation of directors' duties stat-
utes and related case law allows directors to take into account nonshareholder constitu-
encies, but only "to the extent that the directors are acting in the best interests, long as
well as short term, of the shareholders and the corporation").
410. For a broad, comprehensive analysis of stakeholder issues and the stakeholder
model, see Note, supra note 26, at 488-502.
411. For example, employees or suppliers are usually only temporarily displaced; that
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discarding valuable employees or suppliers; 412 arguably only subop-
timal employees, suppliers, or creditors would be affected by new
ownership.4 13 Third, requiring accountability to constituencies with
conflicting interests may ultimately harm both groups.4 14 Managers
free to consider nonshareholder interests would be less accountable
to shareholders. 4 15 Fourth, many nonshareholder constituencies
are already protected by other laws. 416  Finally, just as there is no
gauge by which courts can assess whether a director breaches her
duty to stakeholders, 41 7 the "standard" by which courts define a di-
rector's duty to shareholders during a takeover also defies contain-
ment. The undefined parameters of this standard fuel directors'
uncertainty regarding their allegiance to shareholders. 418
is, many constituencies have the capacity to find a replacement for their reliance on the
target.
412. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 27, at 1190-92.
413. See id.
414. See id. at 1192; Comment, supra note 227, at 869 (observing that "the interests of
a firm's employees may often be antagonistic to those of its shareholders"); Note, supra
note 26, at 478, 501; see also Andre, supra note 21, at 884-85 (asserting that "manage-
ment should not be asked or allowed to attempt to carry out the impossible task of
acting as fiduciaries for groups with competing interests"); Gilson,Just Say No to Whom?,
25 WaKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 126 (1990) (stating that management's concerns for non-
shareholder interests will cause shareholders to doubt management's genuine concern
for their interests).
415. In the narrowest sense, when managers are free to consider nonshareholder in-
terests in takeover scenarios rather than focusing solely on maximizing shareholder
wealth, management's accountability to shareholders is diminished to the extent their
actions serve nonshareholders' concerns. See generally, Johnson, supra note 26, at 881-84
(discussing the belief shared by many commentators that if corporate management is
permitted to consider other interests besides those of shareholders, management would
become unaccountable to the shareholders).
Former SEC chairman Davis S. Ruder argued before the American Bar Association
committee responsible for drafting the Revised Model Business Corporation Act that
director accountability to a clearly defined group (such as shareholders) is a cornerstone
of the corporate system: "If management duties to others are declared... the process
of corporate accountability will be thrown into disarray." ABA Model Act Panel Reects
Other-Constituencies Measures, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep (BNA) 1217 (Aug. 17, 1990).
416. See Andre, supra note 21, at 884 (noting that employees are protected by labor
laws); Other Constituencies, supra note 405, at 2268 (discussing how creditors, manage-
ment, employees, and unions have other means of protection). "Legislation governing
hostile takeovers should not attempt to minimize noninvestors' risks at the expense of
our free market system." Id.
417. Directors' duty legislation affords no guidance as to how directors should con-
sider nonshareholder constituencies. See Appendix at DDS; supra notes 137-53 and ac-
companying text; Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in
Takeover Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 44, 69 (1983); Note, supra note 26, at 500.
418. The Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of the Ameri-
can Bar Association understood the dangers that could flow from laws allowing directors
to consider nonshareholder interests:
The issue [thus] becomes whether [directors' duties statutes] constitute an
efficient and desirable way to provide protections for non-shareholder
groups. The Committee has concluded that permitting-much less requir-
ing--directors to consider these interests without relating such considera-
tion in an appropriate fashion to shareholder welfare (as the Delaware courts
have done) would conflict with directors' responsibility to shareholders and
B. Directors' Uncertainty
The uncertainty facing directors regarding the optimal process
for adopting and maintaining defensive measures exacerbates the
uncertainty noted above regarding the directors' proper constitu-
ency.419 The amorphous business judgment rule is the root cause
of this uncertainty.420  Specifically, the business judgment rule has
could undermine the effectiveness of the system that has made the corpora-
tion an efficient device for the creation of jobs and wealth.
The Committee believes that the better interpretation of these statutes,
and one that avoids such consequences, is that they confirm what the com-
mon law has been: directors may take into account the interests of other
constituencies but only as and to the extent that the directors are acting in the best
interests, long as well as short term, of the shareholders and the corporation ....
The confusion of directors in trying to comply with such statutes, if inter-
preted to require directors to balance the interests of various constituencies
without according primacy to shareholder interests, would be profoundly
troubling.... When directors must not only decide what their duty of loyalty
mandates, but also to whom their duty of loyalty runs (and in what propor-
tions), poorer decisions can be expected.
Other Constituencies, supra note 405, at 2268-69 (emphasis added).
419. See Comment, supra note 227, at 869. Unocal's
expansive definition of the corporate enterprise to include [nonsharehold-
ers] seemingly gives directors an almost unlimited degree of discretion.
When the interests of shareholders are the sole point of reference for assess-
ing board action, there are at least some limitations on what a board may do.
But the limitations largely disappear if the board is allowed to justify its ac-
tions by reference to [nonshareholder interests].
Id; see Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Djensive Tactics: Is There
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247, 267 n.65 (1989) (asserting that
managerial authority to consider nonshareholder interests may "render most of corpo-
rate law incoherent"); Other Constituencies, supra note 405, at 2269 (observing that "[t]he
confusion of directors in trying to comply with [directors' duties] statutes, if interpreted
to require directors to balance the interests of various constituencies without according
primacy to shareholder interests, would be profoundly troubling .... [Thus,] poorer
decisions can be expected.").
420. Even under Unocal's heightened business judgment standard directors may con-
sider nonshareholder interests. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text. Further-
more, application of the Unocal court's "new" analytical approach "represents merely a
continuation of the familiar business judgment rule." Comment, supra note 227, at 864.
The Unocal court's rhetoric "reflects the continued permissiveness of the Delaware
courts in reviewing the action of corporate officers." Id. at 872; see Easterbrook & Fis-
chel I, supra note 27, at 1192 (stating that "[a] manager responsible to two conflicting
interests is in fact answerable to neither"); Feinberg, supra note 406, at 30; Kanter, supra
note 50, at 260 (observing that "[t]he Unocal test contains several ambiguous elements
which are susceptible to contradictory interpretations, thereby impeding the realization
of consistent and uniform outcomes"); Ribstein, supra note 161, at 126 (asserting that
"[t]he pill is effective to help the board run an auction only because, in light of the
uncertainty inherent in the vague Unocal fiduciary duty approach, the bidder does not
know what the court will do"); see, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 419, at 260-72.
Gilson and Kraakman argue that poison pill uncertainty will become "yet another rhe-
torical embellishment of the business judgment rule." Id at 260. For a more compre-
hensive analysis of the business judgment rule, see supra notes 206-72 and
accompanying text.
Dissatisfaction with the business judgment rule was a strong impetus for the American
Law Institute's drafting § 6.02 of its Principles of Corporate Governance project. See
ALI DRAFr 11, supra note 290, § 6.02 (setting forth a new standard that focuses on
whether shareholders' long-term interests would be "significantly disfavored" by board
conduct).
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become so flexible as to allow directors to all but ignore sharehold-
ers without legal repercussion. 421 It is only when directors cross
that ethereal line of blatant disregard for shareholder interests that
liability attaches. 422 But where is this line?423 Because the business
judgment rule derives from case law, a look at how several court
decisions differ as to its parameters illustrates its diffuse character in
the takeover context.
Of all the ambiguity resulting from the vagueness and various
manifestations of the business judgment rule,424 the greatest uncer-
tainty directors generally face concerns when a poison pill must be
redeemed.425 In City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco,
Inc.,426 for example, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that
although directors may unleash a poison pill to gain time in a battle
for control, once the board has developed alternative proposals for
control, the pill may not be used to discriminate against other bid-
ders.427  Shortly thereafter, Delaware similarly dismantled Pills-
bury's poison pill in the wake of an attractive offer by Grand
Metropolitan, 428 identifying certain relevant factors: the fairness
and adequacy of Grand Met's offer; the lack of competitive bids dur-
ing the offer's two month life span; the substantial percentage of
Pillsbury shares tendered to Grand Met (87%); and the uncertainty
of Pillsbury's plan which was based on future theoretical conditions
and projections grounded on economic and competitive conditions
beyond Pillsbury's control.429
421. "[E]xcept in cases that implicate the duty of loyalty, the infamous business-judg-
ment rule's emphasis on the managerial-discretion strand of corporate law insulates
most managerial behavior from meaningful judicial review." Johnson, supra note 26, at
900 (footnotes omitted).
422. See supra text accompanying notes 208-09 (observing that the business judgment
rule immunizes directors unless they are motivated "solely or primarily" to perpetuate
control).
423. Only when the shareholders' equity interests are the directors' paramount con-
cern can courts determine whether a director has breached his duties; only by focusing
on the readily discernable shareholders' interests can courts restrict the conduct of di-
rectors-lest their discretion become all but boundless. Accord Comment, supra note
227, at 868-69 (asserting that if a board justifies its actions based on various non-
shareholder constituencies its duties are impalpably diffused).
424. See, e.g., ALI DRArr 11, supra note 290, § 6.02, comment (c), at 537. "ITihe
validity of actions taken by the board to block tender offers cannot be judged by either
the business judgment rule, on the one hand, or the duty of loyalty or the duty of fair
dealing, on the other." Id.
425. See, e.g., Yablon, Poison Pills and Litigation Uncertainty, 1989 DuKE L.J. 54 (arguing
that litigation uncertainty inheres in poison pill regulation).
426. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
427. Id at 799-800. The court indicated that a poison pill's only role is to give the
board time to investigate alternatives on the shareholders' behalf. Once this window of
time has elapsed, only severe threats to shareholders will justify keeping the pill intact.
Id. The court held that the raider's cash offer did not pose a sufficient threat to share-
holder interests to justify refusing to redeem the pill. Id.
428. Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
429. Id. at 1056-58. The court stressed that all previous Delaware cases validating
Manifestations of director uncertainty have culminated in the just
say no defense, which allows directors threatened by hostile over-
tures to reject offers and wield fatal antitakeover defensive measures
irrespective of short-term shareholder welfare.430 Currently, direc-
tors seeking guidance on how to maximize long-term corporate and
shareholder value can look to both the business judgment rule and
its progeny, including the just say no defense, and directors' duty
legislation. 431 Unfortunately, the combined impact of these guide-
lines obfuscate rather than clarify the directors' appropriate role
and strategy. The first permits directors to reject takeover attacks
that do not serve their constituency's best long-term interests, but
the second leaves directors puzzling over whom their proper con-
stituency might be.
Director uncertainty was the American Law Institute's key con-
cern when it drafted section 6.02 of its Corporate Governance pro-
ject.43 2 The drafters' comment to section 6.02 begins by observing
that: "Existing judicial decisions do not offer a clear or consistent
guide to directors in responding to unsolicited tender offers." 43 3
Dissatisfied with both motivational standards of review434 and Uno-
cal's "enhanced" business judgment rule, the drafters devised a new
standard of whether the board's "action is a reasonable response to
the offer." 43
3
Given current trends in Delaware case law and state legislation,
the only certainty facing directors is that they may endorse and per-
petuate antitakeover measures without shareholder input, that is,
the directors may largely ignore the shareholders' voice in deter-
mining takeover matters.43 6 But what of the director seeking to bal-
ance optimally the needs of shareholders and nonshareholders?
Such a director faces a quagmire of uncertainty unless and until she
actively seeks and encourages shareholder input for fundamental
rights plans involved hostile, coercive techniques, adding that it would be perverse to
eviscerate these established shareholder-protection principles by turning those cases
"180 degrees" and applying them against Pillsbury stockholders. Id. at 1059. Of
course, the directors did not incur liability because they ultimately accepted Grand Met's
offer. However, if Grand Met's offer had been revoked, the court determined that Pills-
bury's stock would have plunged into the "high $30's", constituting a loss of about $25
per share. Id. at 1058.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 240-72 (describing and analyzing the just say
no defense).
431. See supra notes 137-53 and accompanying text; Appendix at DDS.
432. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
433. ALI DRAFr 11, supra note 290, at 529 (comment (a)).
434. See, e.g., Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). Surveying relevant case law, the drafters commented that "[s]ome of these
courts have concluded that where directors' blocking maneuvers suggest their motive
was retention of control, the business judgment rule is inapplicable .... ALI DRAFr
11, supra note 290, at 531.
435. See ALI DRAFr 11, supra note 290, § 6.02(a), at 528.
436. "Thus, the question of whether the antitakeover device is actually promoting the
interests of shareholders reduces to one of whose investment banker is more accurate in
assessing the target's 'full' value." Kanter, supra note 50, at 238.
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decisions relating to antitakeover protectionism. 437 By failing to en-
courage shareholder input, the current legal landscape effectively
discourages directors from mitigating their uncertainty; it discour-
ages directors from seeking shareholder guidance.
As courts and legislators wax and wane over the degree of share-
holder involvement and management discretion in takeover deci-
sions, directors seeking to balance constituency interests, and thus
simultaneously to maximize both their corporation's and their econ-
omy's welfare, require a steadfast guidepost. Who better than
shareholders to inform management decisionmaking? Directors
need shareholder input lest their current suboptimal sources of gui-
dance harm not only the corporation and nonshareholders, but the
nation's economy as a whole. The issue is not shareholder
supremacy-the issue is how best to facilitate meaningful share-
holder input so that directors' judgment may be enhanced to soci-
ety's benefit.
C. Economic Efficiency
Takeovers have profound economic consequences; 438 thus, any
legislative intervention should seek to maximize economic effi-
ciency. By maximizing long-term economic efficiency, shareholders,
corporations, and nonshareholder constituencies benefit. By
thwarting a free-flowing marketplace in which assets are channeled
to and invested in their most productive uses, antitakeover devices
and antitakeover legislation disfavored by asset owners (sharehold-
ers) may pervert the incentive system that is indispensable to an effi-
cient economy. Only asset owners have the unfettered incentive to
seek out economically efficient alternatives. Directors, lacking this
incentive, while being saddled with conflicting economically ineffi-
cient prejudices,43 9 may fail to seek out optimal alternatives unless
guided by shareholders.
Several factors must be weighed in determining the overall impact
of takeovers and antitakeover legislation on the national economy:
(1) shareholders' heightened premiums;440 (2) costs associated with
437. Granted, the director may discount shareholder input. After all, shareholders
themselves suffer from a conflict of interest-an inherent short-sighted bias.
438. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
439. See supra text accompanying notes 392-418 (discussing directors' conflict of
interest).
440. The Office of the Chief Economist of the Securities and Exchange Commission
reported that target shareholders enjoyed an average gain of 53.2% upon selling their
shares. Jarrell, Two Tier and Negotiated Tender Offers, 19J. FIN. EcoN. 283 (1987); see also
Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J. L. &
ECON. 151, 152 (1985) [hereinafterJarrell, Wealth Effects]; Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and
Science, 62 HARV. Bus. REV. 109, 112 (Nov.-Dec. 1984); cf Jensen & Ruback, The Market
for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. EcON. 5 (1983) (premiums average
30% to 40% over market prices).
14911991]
shareholder coercion;441 (3) enhanced possibility of an auction mar-
ket for the target firm;44 2 (4) costs of launching tender offers;4 43 (5)
harm to nonshareholder constituencies; 444 and (6) other factors.445
Although empirical assessment of the overall effect of takeovers and
antitakeover mechanisms has proven elusive,446 in the long run, if
takeovers are allowed but thoughtfully controlled with an eye to-
ward maximizing economic efficiency, everyone involved bene-
fits. 4 4 7 Research on the wealth effects of antitakeover legislation
suggests that shareholder value is reduced. 448 A study by Wilshire
441. Today, the problem of coercion is all but nonexistent. See Johnson & Millon I,
supra note 26, at 846; accord Coffee, supra note 26, at 439 (observing that examples of
coercion are exceedingly rare; this is so because of both shareholders' self-help reme-
dies, such as "fair price" charter amendments, and competitive auction markets). But see
Booth I, supra note 26, at 1640-43 (arguing that partial bids and two-tier bids are coer-
cive and cause shareholders to earn less on tendering their shares than they otherwise
would earn). Accordingly, optimal legislation should be sensitive to potential coercion.
Because coercive tender offers are now universally regarded as not being in the share-
holders' long-term interests, see generally Booth I, supra note 26, the Model Act proposed
herein, see infra Part V, similarly acknowledges the benefit of board action narrowly
designed to minimize or eliminate coercion.
442. See infra notes 457-60 and accompanying text (observing the auction market
position).
443. See Macey, supra note 26, at 474 (arguing that the current "patchwork quilt" of
state and federal laws "is likely to increase significantly the costs of launching tender
offers; attending this, raiders will engage in fewer searches for poorly managed compa-
nies and will make fewer offers, further reducing efficiency").
444. Of course, in the short term nonshareholder constituencies may lose jobs or
other economic benefits. To some extent, the magnitude of this short-term harm is
mitigated by: (1) the existence of organized labor; and (2) subsidiaries that are spun-off
by a raider who generally may retain nonadministrative employees (certain administra-
tive employees become redundant after an efficient takeover and are accordingly wisely
relieved). See id. at 479 (stating that "[a]t worst, the workers in a particular state will be
displaced by workers in another state [thereby rendering] overall national employment
[unaffected]").
In the long term, however, reduced efficiency and lower quality, higher priced prod-
ucts harm everyone. See id. at 474 (observing that "[u]ltimately consumers are harmed
as well because the managerial entrenchment caused by state antitakeover laws leads to
lower quality products being produced at higher prices by firms isolated from the disci-
pline of the market for corporate control").
445. Some argue that takeovers reduce the incidence of bankruptcy to the extent
takeovers are a low-cost substitute for insolvencies. See id. at 474-75 (arguing that "[tihe
function so wastefully performed by bankruptcies and liquidations would be economi-
cally performed by mergers at a much earlier stage of the firm's life" (citation omitted)).
Related to this, merged entities often realize economies of scales.
446. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
pt. 6, at x (Discussion Draft No. 2 1989).
447. See Sprinkel, The Real Issue in Corporate Takeovers, Wall St.J., July 17, 1987, at 16,
col. 3 (arguing that by maximizing the wealth of American shareholders, "we create
benefits for the economy as a whole").
448. Many empirical studies measure the effects of antitakeover legislation on the
market value of relevant shares. "None of these studies supports the view that share-
holder value is enhanced." Davis, supra note 51, at 508 n.67. Most of these studies
conclude that shareholder value is actually reduced. Id. Davis notes that the most dra-
matic results were reported in a working paper on the Indiana statute by J. Gregory
Sidak and Susan Woodward who found that relevant Indiana shares declined between
4.5% and 6.13% amid enactment and subsequent adjudications of Indiana's antitake-
over legislation. Id. (citing J.G. SIDAK & S. WOODWARD, CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND THE EFFICIENT ANONYMITY OF SHAREHOLDERS 4-6 (Working Pa-
per Mar. 17, 1988).
Examining the expanded Massachusetts and Minnesota control-share acquisition acts,
one empirical study concluded that there is "substantial evidence that [these] third-gen-
eration control share acquisition acts ... have adversely affected shareholder wealth."
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Associates showed that the stock values of 140 Pennsylvania compa-
nies fell more than $1 billion amid the proposal and enactment of
the Pennsylvania antitakeover bill.44 9 Another study found that
Pennsylvania companies underperformed the "Standard & Poors
500" stock index by an average of 6.9% between October 15, 1989,
and January 2, 1990.450 Still, the impact of antitakeover legislation
on the overall economy remains uncertain. Consequently, compet-
ing theories attempting to explain the economic role of antitakeover
devices and antitakeover legislation have emerged.
Under the market-efficiency theory,451 managers shield them-
selves behind antitakeover devices without proper accountability to
shareholders, usurping for themselves undue market power while
defeating any incentive to run a more efficient corporation. Propo-
nents of this view argue that tender offers maximize an outsider's
ability to monitor target management performance. 45 2 Thus, take-
overs maximize efficiency either by allowing suboptimal directors
Note, Sword or Shield: The Impact of Third-Generation State Takeover Statutes on Shareholder
Wealth, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 958, 984 (1989). Other empirical studies cited in Davis,
supra, at 508 n.67, include: OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, SHAREHOLDER
WEALTH EFFECTS OF OHIO LEGISLATION AFFECTING TAKEOVERS (May 18, 1987) (finding a
3.2% loss over the period in which Ohio's antitakeover legislation was under considera-
tion); L. SCHUMANN, STATE REGULATION OF TAKEOVERS AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: THE
EFFECTS OF NEW YORK'S 1985 TAKEOVER STATUTES 36-40 (Bureau of Economics Staff
Report to the FTC, Mar. 1987) (finding that during consideration of New York antitake-
over legislation a 0.8% gain in share value accompanied Governor Cuomo's veto of
antitakeover legislation while a 1.0% decline accompanied his subsequent endorsement
of antitakeover legislation); NJ. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC POLICY, NEW JERSEY SHAREHOLD-
ERS PROTECTION ACT- AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION 48 (Aug. 1987) (finding that a 1.9%
decline in relevant New Jersey shares accompanied senate committee approval of New
Jersey's business combination law). Other scholars cited in Davis, supra, at 508 n.67,
have found no statistically significant relationship between the enactment of antitake-
over legislation and performance of relevant shares. Romano, supra note 26, at 181-86;
D. MARGOTrA & S. BADRINATH, EFFECTS OF THE NEW JERSEY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
LEGISLATION ON STOCK PRICES (Northeastern U. College of Bus. Admin. Working Paper
No. 87-31 rev. Aug. 1987); D. MARGOTrA & S. BADRINATH, LONGER TERM EFFECTS OF
NEW YORK'S 1985 TAKEOVER LEGISLATION (Northeastern U. College of Bus. Admin.
Working Paper No. 87-39).
449. See Vosti, Pennsylvania Puts Ball in Investors' Court, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE,
May 14, 1990, at 44.
450. See Vosti, Pennsylvania Fallout, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, July 23, 1990, at 4.
451. A corollary of this, the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH), holds that
share prices reflect information about the earnings potential of corporations. See Gilson
& Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efftciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); see also Phil-
lips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653,
678-80 (1984). In In re Time, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989), Chancellor Allen
discounted the ECMH and concluded that 'just as the Constitution does not enshrine
Mr. Herbert Spencer's social status, neither does the common law of directors' duties
elevate the theory of a single, efficient capital market to the dignity of a sacred text." Id.
at 93,277. For a collection of materials on the ECMH, see R. HAMILTON, CORPORATION
FINANCE 252-95 (2d ed. 1989).
452. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 27, at 1173; McCord, supra note 28, at
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and managers to be taken over45  or by motivating directors to run
the corporation more efficiently454--essentially, the "market"
monitors managerial performance while shareholders hold manage-
ment accountable for profit performance. 455 Furthermore, this
enhanced efficiency generates more wealth for both shareholders
and nonshareholder constituencies. 456 The bottom line of this the-
ory: directors should remain "passive" amid control-change
transactions.
A more moderate approach focuses on the use of defensive an-
titakeover weaponry such as a poison pill to facilitate an auction
market amid hostile overtures. The primary justification for a pill's
existence is its ability to facilitate superior bids by affording direc-
tors adequate time to assess competing offers and alternatives; 457
493-94 (observing that "[a]n acquirer can therefore afford to offer shareholders a pre-
mium and still be able to make a profit by introducing less venal or more capable
management").
453. See Macey, supra note 26, at 471-75. Macey supports the wealth-enhancing view
and argues that given efficient markets, takeovers are likely to occur because raiders
realize gains by reorganizing the firm and its management (rather than because assets
are undervalued). Id at 471-72. Some evidence supports the wealth-enhancing theory:
62% of top managers lose their jobs within three years of a hostile takeover (versus a
21%o rate following failed takeover attempts). Ia at 472.
454. See id. at 472. As is inevitably the case when economics is at issue, commentators
do not agree as to the nature and magnitude of the economic impact of antitakeover
devices. At one extreme, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that managers can best maxi-
mize shareholder wealth by remaining passive during a takeover battle rather than by
deploying defensive tactics. Stressing shareholder welfare, they argue the importance
of not discouraging takeovers because "the number of offers affects the efficiency with
which corporations are managed." Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 27, at 1164.
Professors RonaldJ. Gilson and Lucian A. Bebchuk augment this extreme minimalist
position by recognizing that, despite the overall beneficial impact of tender offers, some
are inadequate and must be rejected (especially when the auction market would increase
shareholder wealth). By enhancing economic efficiency, takeovers usually improve the
position of all who deal with the corporation; directors, by adequately protecting the
interests of shareholders, assure that the groups affected by the corporation's operation
are protected as well. Bebchuk, supra note 27, at 1050; Easterbrook and Fischel I, supra
note 27, at 1191. In addition, even if management is performing to its full potential, its
performance may not be as efficient as that of another group of managers. See Bebchuk,
supra note 27, at 1031; Gilson I, supra note 27, at 852-53; Gilson II, supra note 27. De-
fensive tactics, therefore, are undesirable because they deter prospective offers and frus-
trate actual offers. McCord, supra note 28, at 494.
At the other extreme, proponents of defensive tactics argue that: (1) pills force the
bidder to offer higher prices; (2) the premiums of offers accrue mostly to speculators,
not long-term investors; and (3) pills facilitate competing bids, thereby allowing share-
holders to garner higher premiums. See Lipton I, supra note 27 (arguing that the discre-
tion granted directors in the nontakeover context should be extended to takeover bids
and thus urges that stakeholder interests be considered); Lipton II, supra note 27; Lipton
III, supra note 27; Lowenstein, supra note 28. Commentators counter that a takeover
threat encourages managers to commence long-term planning (designed to increase
profitability). See McCord, supra note 28, at 494-95.
455. Professor Gilson has noted succinctly that although "[m]anagement monitors
the performance of components of the enterprise.., the performance of management
must also be monitored." Gilson I, supra note 27, at 834-35 (arguing that tender offers
foster the monitoring of managerial performance).
456. ProfessorJohnson questions this ostensibly "happy congruence" by contending
that support for the focus on "shareholders must be rooted in exogenous and broad-
based social norms" rather than within the confines of corporate law. Johnson, supra
note 26, at 885-87.
457. Thus, some form of antitakeover defenses benefit shareholders and, collaterally,
society in general. Indeed, without corporate or statutory defenses, targets will often
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thus, any reform measures should encourage corporate implemen-
tation of pills narrowly designed for such a purpose.458 The exist-
ence of an auction market can generate greater premiums for
shareholders. 459 More significantly, an auction market will maxi-
mize the likelihood of assuring the most productive match between
raider and target. This optimal "match" maximizes long-term eco-
nomic efficiency. Delaware courts appear to embrace the modified
"auction model" for corporate control.460
Although strong, the naked "market efficiency" and "auction
market" positions provide only partial resolutions to the economic
tug-of-war permeating control transactions. At bottom, one must
recognize that by granting shareholders a meaningful role in take-
over matters, economic efficiency is maximized. First, poison pills
will more likely be reasonably designed to serve legitimate corpo-
rate interests, better positioning the corporation to maximize long-
term profits. Second, corporations will steer clear of opting into
those state antitakeover statutes that tend to hinder rather than ad-
vance corporate interests. Third, directors seeking shareholder gui-
dance on the desirability of accepting a tender offer will shed their
fall to the first low bidder. See Whitehill, Institutional Ownership, in INSTITUTIONAL INVES-
TORS, PASSIVE FIDUCIARIES TO ACTIVIST OWNERS 75, 83 (Practising Law institute 1990).
Nevertheless, it is highly appropriate to enhance shareholder input on the nature and
severity of the antitakeover weaponry to be adopted in the corporate arsenal. Without
this input, there will always be a bias in favor of excessive protection.
458. See infra Part V at subdivision I (noting that by requiring shareholder approval,
the pill ultimately adopted presumptively will be designed to maximize shareholder and
corporate interests); cf. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 255-56 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (stating that "we have grave doubts about poison pills"), rev'd in
part, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
459. See Jarrell, Wealth Effects, supra note 440, at 165-72 (contending that if a target
initially resists a takeover but is later acquired, its performance is superior to targets
which are not later acquired); Lipton I, supra note 27, at 106 (noting that it cannot be
said with certainty that "shareholders are always disadvantaged by rejection [of a tender
offer]"); Oesterle, supra note 27, at 64-72 (observing the value of defensive measures);
Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73
VA. L. REV. 701, 719-26 (1987) (stating that shareholders benefit when target manage-
ment has time to search for alternate bidders and to negotiate the best price with the
initial bidder).
460. This justification for poison pills has been endorsed in Facet Enters. v. Prospect
Group, Inc., No. 9746, slip op. at 6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988) (WESTLAW, 1988 WL
46064) (recognizing the validity of the auction market); and City Capital Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), where the court held that a
board's good faith determination that a noncoercive offer is inadequate justifies leaving
a pill in place "for a period while the board exercises its good faith business judgment to
take such steps as it deems appropriate to protect and advance shareholder interests."
Id. at 798; see Johnson & Millon I, supra note 26, at 856 n.37. For the New YorkJudici-
ary's approach, see CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 441
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that "with respect to a poison pill, the teachings of Revlon re-
quire directors to enhance the bidding in an auction as best they can").
conflicts of interest in favor of accepting offers that, in their share-
holder-enhanced judgment, best serve the interests of the corpora-
tion, the shareholders and, collaterally, of society.
In sum, shareholders need not be given a primary voice in take-
over matters to maximize economic efficiency. Rather, they merely
need a voice powerful enough to inform directors of the optimal
course of conduct. In other words, shareholder input need merely
be balanced with that of management. In this way, directors can
chart the best course for their corporation to maximize gains for all
relevant parties.
D. Shareholder Fairness: Corporate and Political Theory
"[I]t seems doubtful that most informed shareholders would volun-
tarily bargain for the present round of state [antitakeover] statutes.
Thus, it is difficult to justify the current [antitakeover] statutes on
anything other than an opt-in basis." 461
1. Shareholder Democracy and the Corporate Contract
It has become quite popular to refer to the corporation as a
"nexus of contracts." 462 To some extent this term connotes a posi-
tive statement, namely, that many (or all) of the relationships that
define what we reify as the corporation are simply the product of an
explicit or implicit bargaining process. To some extent the term
connotes a norm, namely, those who interact within the ambit of the
corporation define their own relationships and corporate law should
facilitate that process by defining gap-filler or default terms when
the parties do not address an issue.
This normative formulation of the contract approach to corporate
law recognizes that not all aspects of the corporate contract are ne-
gotiated in the classic model of contract formation. Indeed, the re-
lationship between managers and investors may be the area least
likely to generate actual negotiation. The premise of this view, how-
ever, is that market forces provide an adequate alternative mecha-
nism to bargaining or negotiating. Thus, the market sets (and
sometimes discounts) the price of shares of stock offered in light of
the contractual provisions chosen by management. If the provisions
chosen are not investor friendly, the failure of capital to flow to the
firm will hinder it or cause its competitive demise. 463
A substantial debate surrounds the role of corporate law in light
of the nexus of contracts view. One of the most contested areas has
involved the extent to which corporate law should be mandatory,
461. Davis, supra note 51, at 509.
462. The term was first used in Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976). The mod-
em use of the concept may have originated in Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972).
463. For a statement of this position, see Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Con-
tract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1428-34 (1989); see also Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. ECON. 1 (1960).
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enabling, or suppletory.464 In particular, the issue has been joined
on whether and which corporate law principles should be freely vari-
able. For example, to the extent that corporate statutes provide any
principles or parameters for fiduciary duties and actions by corpo-
rate actors, including shareholders, should a given group of corpo-
rate actors be able to opt out of those principles for their corporate
enterprise?
The recent adoption of a wide variety of antitakeover legislation
runs directly contrary to portions of both the contractarian and the
regulatory views. With respect to the contractarians, these
mandatory laws do not provide for variation by agreement and at
the same time serve to decrease the market's ability to effectively
monitor corporate activities. For the regulators, the recent wave of
antitakeover statutes do not embody principles which implicitly or
explicitly enhance the fiduciary obligations of managers to their pri-
mary constituency, the shareholders. Indeed, much of this legisla-
tion minimizes the traditional relationships in favor of protecting
other constituencies or, indirectly, the managers themselves. 465
With respect to management-adopted protectionist measures,
such as shareholder rights plans, distinct but related problems arise.
Because these measures are usually adopted without shareholder
approval, they are not the product of negotiation between manage-
ment and the shareholders. In addition, there is evidence that their
adoption does not represent the type of arrangement that would hy-
pothetically result from such bargaining, given the frequent nega-
tive shareholder reaction to adoption and recent attempts to repeal
such measures. 46 6 Moreover, to the extent that share transfers his-
torically have not been within the board of directors' purview, the
ability of the board, through a shareholder rights plan, to inject it-
self into the tender offer process is seen by the regulators as an opt-
ing out from otherwise mandatory principles of corporate
governance.
Both statutory and board-adopted antitakeover measures suffer
from another significant drawback in relation to shareholder expec-
tations. The contractarian or opt-out position is strongest with re-
spect to variations from the corporate blueprint, the initial articles
of incorporation. Under this view, the market evaluates and prices
the shares representing ownership in relation to the charter and
other applicable provisions so that the initial investment reflects the
package. Even the staunchest contractarian proponents have yet to
464. See generally Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989)
(discussing the extent to which corporations should be allowed to adopt charter provi-
sions to opt out of corporate law).
465. See Appendix at DDS.
466. See supra notes 389-90 and accompanying text.
come to grips with what might be referred to as midstream changes
in the corporate contract. 467
In addition, the changes in the corporate contract imposed by leg-
islation or board action completely circumvent the shareholders'
role in the contracting process. In contrast, assuming one could ra-
tionalize shareholder-adopted charter amendments varying previ-
ously applicable principles, possibly on a shareholder democracy
theory, corporate law currently recognizes the rights of sharehold-
ers not only to attempt to defeat such measures, but also sometimes
to dissent from them and seek to be bought out of their investment
by the corporation. 468 Although this latter right may not be particu-
larly effective, it implicitly recognizes that in certain circumstances
the contract under which the shareholders bought their shares has
been substantially changed.
Legislative and board-imposed antitakeover measures do not
even allow for shareholder involvement. These measures are
adopted outside of the contracting process. The shareholders do
not participate and do not have statutory rights to have their shares
repurchased. The shareholders are thus subject to a resulting
ex post, ex parte revaluation (and likely devaluation) of their
investment.
2. Shareholders' Political Impotence
As evidenced by the character and pervasiveness of the recent
waves of antitakeover legislation, shareholders are not a favored
constituency of legislators. Yet it is precisely the legislature to
which shareholders must turn for needed protection. Shareholders
are not concentrated within any single state, which suggests that
their interests systematically will be underrepresented. 469 Because
the expected gains of nonshareholder antitakeover forces generally
exceed those of shareholders, nonshareholders have far more in-
centive to direct resources toward supporting antitakeover
legislation. 470
467. See Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1395, 1399-1404 (1989).
468. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 13.02 (right to dissent);
MINN. STAT. § 302A.471 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) (right to dissent); see also Conard,
Amendments of Model Business Corporations Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights, 33 Bus. LAW. 2587,
2587, 2594-96 (1978).
469. See Macey, supra note 26, at 488-89; see also Coffee, supra note 26, at 458 (noting
that only in Delaware are there both "proshareholder" interests groups [Coffee men-
tions the large local bar whose future earnings depend on takeovers] and weak antitake-
over constituencies [because few Delaware-chartered corporations have local plants that
could relocate]). Professor Coffee notes that: "Not surprisingly, Delaware has enacted
one of the weakest statutes of the second generation .... " Id.; cf Oesterle, supra note
80, at 880-81 (noting that although Delaware's mid-course statute is the "mildest" Busi-
ness Combination Act, pure control share acquisition provisions are less intrusive).
470. See Davis, supra note 51, at 501. Professor Davis further notes that "because the
activities of the antitakeover interests tend to be more local, these interests are more
likely to be well-organized at the state level. Labor unions and municipalities typically
have statewide associations; institutional investors do not." Id.
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In this age of pension funds and other institutional investors,471
can it be said that shareholders are politically powerless? Actually,
this powerlessness cannot be denied. Consider the Delaware Busi-
ness Combination statute:472 despite active opposition by both the
United Shareholders Association and several large pension funds,
shareholder lobbyists garnered only one legislator's vote.473 There
is more evidence to support this contention: takeover statutes are
often hastily enacted without notice to, or input from, the public.4 74
Looking beyond the stated purpose of current state antitakeover
legislation and focusing on the real policies motivating its enact-
ment475 ineluctably compels the conclusion that shareholders qua
shareholders are impotent in influencing legislators.476 What moti-
vates states to enact antitakeover legislation? Wary of raiders' ten-
dency to liquidate companies, close plants, and layoff workers, state
legislators seek to protect home-based businesses.477 More specifi-
cally, the impetus likely derives from two sources: (1) the enacting
state's desire to protect nonshareholder constituencies, including its
desire to assist managers unable or unwilling to persuade share-
holders of the value of internal defensive measures; and (2) financial
471. See supra notes 345-83 and accompanying text (noting the explosive growth,
power, and sophistication of institutional shareholders).
472. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
473. See Oesterle, supra note 80, at 881 n.19, (noting that the vote was 39-0 in the
Delaware House and 19-1-1 in the Delaware Senate); see also id at 920 (noting that proxy
fights by institutional investors "have consistently failed").
474. Romano, supra note 26, at 138; see Kozyris, supra note 250, at 263 (stating that
despite the "unprecedented" transfer of power from the shareholders to management,
antitakeover legislation is "enacted without any substantive debate").
475. "[fIor economic and political reasons, the states' chief motivation in passing
takeover laws has been to deter tender offers, not to promote shareholder welfare."
Johnson, supra note 26, at 910; see supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
476. See Macey, supra note 26, at 487-88 (asserting that "if there is one dear lesson to
be drawn from the state anti-takeover law experience, it is that the legislatures passing
these laws care [most] about maximizing political support from the interest groups lob-
bying for passage of the laws"); cf. Davis, supra note 51, at 499 (the author believes "that
many [legislators] sincerely see these statutes as necessary to protect the long-accepted
allocation of claims against [all corporate constituencies] ... from the disruptive effects
of what is perceived as market caprice").
477. SeeJohnson & Millon II, supra note 26, at 1863-66 (asserting that the deterrence
of takeovers, not "investor protection," is a state's primary motivation); cf. Macey, supra
note 26, at 476 (asserting that "managerial self-interest remains the sole explanation for
state anti-takeover legislation."); see also Garfield, supra note 186, at 126.
[A] study of takeover statutes suggests that these statutes are not employee
protective but management protective. By attempting to stop takeovers, the
statutes serve only one purpose: to entrench current management in
power. Nothing in the legislation ties the hands of current managers from
engaging in the same dislocative conduct attributed to acquirors. The legis-
lators are simply hoping that by protecting current managers, they will per-
petuate current management policies, including the current deployment of
corporate assets and jobs.
Id. Garfield notes that even directors' duty legislation provides no real protection to
nonshareholders but rather merely "fosters management entrenchment." Id at 127.
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protectionism, where states desire to retain and maximize tax-gen-
erating resources.
Although state antitakeover statutes may facially appear to protect
shareholders, 478 because target shareholders derive the most gains
from the threat and result of takeovers, antitakeover statutes often
primarily protect nonshareholder constituencies, such as employ-
ees, creditors, and the community as a whole.4 79 If the stated pur-
pose underlying "shareholder protection" legislation is a pretextual
facade, what is the true legislative intent?480 A statute amending
North Carolina's "Shareholder Protection Act" states it is designed
to protect various tax-generating constituencies, but fails even to
mention shareholders. 481 Recent Wisconsin legislation 48 2 was the
product of organized labor and other nonbusiness interests; New
York's business combination statute483 also received support from
organized labor.4 84
Most significant, over half the states have adopted provisions that
expressly allow directors to consider nonshareholder interests in re-
sponding to takeover bids. 485 For example, Minnesota's directors'
478. Coffee, supra note 26, at 108; see, e.g., 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 124, infra note 481.
479. Coffee, supra note 26, at 108; accordJohnson & Millon II, supra note 26, at 1863;
cf Macey, supra note 26, at 468 (statutes are passed "to protect the interests of individual
firms rather than the interests of the public or the shareholders").
480. Professor Gilson bluntly answers this question: "management entrenchment."
Gilson, supra note 414, at 127.
481. 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 124. For example, the preamble reads in pertinent part:
Whereas, takeovers... of corporations in North Carolina have been oc-
curring with increasing frequency; and
Whereas, such activity can be highly disruptive to communities within
North Carolina by causing, among other things, high unemployment and
erosion of the State and local economy and tax base; and
Whereas, these corporations offer employment to a large number of
North Carolina citizens who pay ... taxes ... ; and
Whereas, these corporations pay significant amounts of income taxes to
North Carolina; and
Whereas, these corporations [pay substantial property taxes, sales taxes,
and employee benefits]; and
Whereas, these corporations and their employees contribute greatly to
community projects in North Carolina; and
Whereas, North Carolina has a vital interest in providing to these corpora-
tions the benefits of the provisions of the North Carolina Shareholder Pro-
tection Act ....
Id.; see also Johnson & Millon II, supra note 26, at 1863; cf. Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 488,
1984 Minn. Laws 470. In its prelude to enacting § 80B.01-13 (Minnesota's "Corporate
Takeover Statute"), while noting that takeovers "are often inconsistent with the eco-
nomic interests of shareholders," the Minnesota Legislature stressed in eight enumer-
ated points such detrimental takeover phenomena as: lost jobs, plant closings, lost
customer and supplier relationships, and stifled entrepreneurial spirit. Id.
482. Act of Sept. 17, 1987, 1987 Wis. Act 44, 1987 Wis. Laws 44. For a discussion of
the Wisconsin Antitakeover Legislation, see Davis, supra note 51, at 493-503.
483. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986).
484. See Johnson & Millon I, supra note 26, at 853; cf. Romano, The Future of Hostile
Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 457, 462 (1988) (arguing that
antitakeover legislation seldom results from a broad coalition of labor, business, and
community leaders' desire to minimize takeover's detrimental effect on the local
economy).
485. See Appendix at DDS.
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duty statute allows a director to consider the interests of the target's
employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the
state and nation, and community and societal considerations,
among others. 48 6 As of June 1991, at least twenty-nine states had
enacted some form of these statutes. 48 7
State antitakeover legislation can be viewed in part as a response
to the needs of managers unable to adopt adequate defenses with-
out legislative assistance. Professor Romano has argued that state
takeover statutes may be adopted at the request of potential target
corporations reluctant to propose to their own shareholders the de-
fenses embodied in the statutes.488 Management of home-based
corporations may have feared that shareholders would not approve
so stringent a defensive mechanism. For example, when The Dart
Group sought to acquire one of Minnesota's premier corporations,
the Minnesota legislature promptly responded by enacting one of
the toughest antitakeover statutes in the nation.48 9 Other legisla-
tures have similarly acquiesced to the earnest pleas of home-based
corporations. 490
486. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251, subdv. 5 (West Supp. 1991).
487. See Appendix at DDS; see also Johnson and Millon I, supra note 26, at 850 (survey-
ing state directors' duty statutes as of February 1989).
488. Romano, supra note 26, at 122-34. Professor Romano noted that the Aetna Life
and Casualty Company had persuaded the Connecticut legislature to enact an antitake-
over statute despite the likelihood that Aetna's own shareholders would have rejected a
similar proposal. Id at 122-23. Romano also noted that numerous other statutes were
similarly passed, including those of Maine, Illinois, Missouri, and Pennsylvania. Id. at
137.
489. See Macey, supra note 26, at 470 (stating that "[i]n perhaps the most shameless
transfer of wealth from shareholders to incumbent management, Dayton Hudson Cor-
poration prevailed upon the Governor of Minnesota to call a special legislative session
so that a law could be passed to protect the firm from takeover by [Dart]"); Fiedler,
Dayton Hudson's Pyrrhic Victory, CORP. REP. MINN., Sept. 1987, at 59.
490. New York Senator Alfonse D'Amato notes 16 statutes that were enacted at the
behest of one corporation, including Arizona (Greyhound Corp.); Connecticut (Aetna
Life and Casualty Co.); Florida (Harcourt BraceJovanovich, Inc.); Hawaii (International
Holding Capital Corp.); Kentucky (Ashland Oil); Maryland (Martin Marietta Corp.);
Massachusetts (Gillette Co.); Minnesota (Dayton-Hudson Corp.); Missouri (Trans World
Airlines); New York (Central Broadcasting Systems); North Carolina (Burlington Indus-
tries, Inc.); Ohio (Goodyear); Oklahoma (Unocal); Pennsylvania (Scott Paper Co.);
Washington (Boeing Co.); Wisconsin (Heileman Brewing Co.). See SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, TENDER OFFER DISCLOSURE AND FAIRNESS ACT
OF 1987, ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, S. REP. No. 265, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 99, 130 (1987); see also Bandow, Are Hostile Takeovers Good for the Econ-
omy?, 63 Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 45 (1987) (arguing that state regulation of hostile takeovers
harms the free market by preventing the takeovers of inefficient firms); Fiedler, supra
note 489, at 59; Macey, supra note 26, at 470. Macey notes that the Indiana legislature
similarly acquiesced to local corporations' pleas. Id. In addition, Ohio enacted another
statute in February 1988 at the behest of Federated Department Stores. Davis, supra
note 51, at 492 n.4. Thus, at least 18 antitakeover statutes have been enacted at the
request of a single corporation.
Macey views legislation adopted in this fashion as problematic: "The possibility of
states passing such legislation at short notice upon the request of [management] means
that no shareholder is safe from having her wealth appropriated by an opportunistic
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How "protectionist" are state antitakeover statutes? Justice Pow-
ell has stated:
Inevitably there are certain adverse consequences in terms of gen-
eral public interest when corporate headquarters are moved away
from a city and State.* [The text of the footnote reads:]
* The corporate headquarters of the great national and mul-
tinational corporations tend to be located in the large cities of a
few States. When corporate headquarters are transferred out of a
city and State into one of these metropolitan centers, the State
and locality from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer sig-
nificantly. Management personnel-many of whom have pro-
vided community leadership-may move to the new corporate
headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and educa-
tional life-both in terms of leadership and financial support-
also tend to diminish when there is a move of corporate
headquarters.491
No one denies that states seek to protect their economic base of
local corporations. Some commentators, however, take this protec-
tionism theory one step further, arguing that state takeover statutes
are motivated by the enacting state's desire to gain financially at the
expense of other states: states either want domestic corporations to
remain independent under current management or seek to raise dis-
proportionately the premiums gained by resident shareholders.492
Given the current pervasiveness of takeover legislation, a state with-
out this legislation may be disadvantaged in relation to states with
takeover statutes. Thus, as a matter of either survival or strategy, all
states will likely enact some form of antitakeover legislation by dec-
ade's end.4 93
IV A Paradigm for Shareholder Involvement and Director
Decisionmaking
In attempting to balance competing interests in takeover con-
texts, legislators must resolve numerous issues and ask difficult
questions: Whose interests must be weighed? How best to allocate
incumbent management ...." Macey, supra note 26, at 473; Romano, supra note 484, at
461 n. 11 (noting at least a dozen examples of corporate-catalyzed second-generation
statutes).
491. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 & n.* (1982) (Powell,J., concurring).
492. See Booth I, supra note 26, at 1669; see also Macey, supra note 26, at 475 (stating
that "[t]he problem is that many state legislators would prefer to see a firm languish or
die at home rather than thrive in some other state").
493. Consider Joint Hearings of the House and Senate Judiciary Comm. on House Substitute
No. I to House Bill 396, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (Jan. 20, 1988) (testimony of Delaware
Secretary of State Michael E. Harkins), reprinted in C. SMrrH & C. FURLOW, GUIDE TO THE
TAKEOVER LAW OF DELAWARE. App. Q at 259 (1988):
I distributed to each of you the correspondence I have received from over
170 corporations, all of whom have paid a maximum franchise tax of
$130,000. Each [of which supports Delaware's proposed antitakeover] stat-
ute and at least a half a dozen have stated that they would look seriously at
the question of changing their Delaware incorporation.
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priorities among competing constituencies? What factors most de-
mand recognition in weighing those interests? What is the role of
states, courts, and the federal government? If the federal govern-
ment does intervene, should the legislation be on a full- or a mini-
mum-standards basis?
Although numerous tensions in corporate governance surface in
the takeover context, the pivotal tension stems from the share-
holder-manager axis:
The challenge for corporate law is to facilitate the development of
a corporate structure that allows management the discretion to
utilize its expertise on behalf of shareholders, but at the same time
guards against situations in which management might utilize that
discretion to favor itself at the expense of shareholders. 494
From this perspective, takeover legislation requires granting to
managers sufficient direction to enable them to unleash their crea-
tivity and expertise while limiting that discretion as needed to pro-
tect shareholder welfare.495
A better perspective focuses on the role of shareholders as guides
for and teammates of management. The pertinent question is: how
can directors, managers, nonshareholders, and society best harness
the value of shareholder input and guidance without compromising
meaningful director discretion? The focus is thus not shareholders'
power over management. Rather, the focus should be the sharehold-
ers' power as a meaningful team member with management. The
focus is the power of shareholders' voices to be heard above the
dissonance of both directors' conflicts of interest and suffocating
legislation styled to minimize shareholder input. One must thus
ask: by what mechanism and under what circumstances should
shareholders be afforded the right or opportunity to exert meaning-
ful input sufficient to balance their voice with that of management
and other nonshareholder constituencies?
A. Toward Balanced Policy
Optimal takeover reform should reconcile and balance several
concerns: (1) the tendency for corporate management to entrench
itself and the attendant shareholder vulnerability to this predilec-
tion;4 96 (2) the desire for shareholders to achieve maximum value
both for their ongoing stock ownership and for shares tendered in a
494. ALI Draft 11, supra note 290, at Introductory Note, 501.
495. SeeJohnson, supra note 26, at 880 (noting that "[t]hese dual strands of manage-
ment discretion and shareholder welfare are in constant tension, and each is poised on
any given issue to check, if not negate and overwhelm, the other" (footnote omitted)).
496. See supra notes 392-418 and accompanying text.
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takeover context;497 (3) the likely increased long-term economic ef-
ficiency stemming from both the threat and result of takeovers; 498
(4) the vulnerability of corporations and their constituencies to hos-
tile or destructive takeovers; 499 (5) the need for corporations freely
to tailor their own takeover defense mechanisms while retaining the
option to seek additional or substitute protection under stringent
state legislation; and (6) the need for directors to be certain their
decision to decline a takeover offer, when actually and justifiably be-
lieved to advance shareholders' best interests, is protected under
the business judgment rule.
Optimal takeover reform resulting in increased shareholder pro-
tection would serve three related goals. First, given a tender offer
for a corporation, reform should seek to maximize the likelihood
that directors would advance shareholders' best interests5°° rather
than further entrench management or protect other constituencies.
Meeting this goal requires further honing the broad concept of the
business judgment rule: a director will not be protected by the busi-
ness judgment rule and will breach her fiduciary duties to share-
holders when, by declining a tender offer, she fails to act in the
shareholders' best interests. Yet, reform must recognize both the
need for directors to have breathing space in determining whether
to accept an offer and the problems inherent in defining rigid pa-
rameters beyond which directors may not stray. Reform must give
directors guidance when their conflicting constituencies most impair
their objective judgment-during a battle for control of their
corporation.
Second, reform should seek to maximize economic efficiency by:
(1) maximizing a corporation's freedom to adopt shareholder rights
plans tailored to its unique requirements and to opt for protection
under the states' takeover legislation; (2) allowing takeovers to oc-
cur when, inter alia, management's conduct has so depressed the
price of a corporation's stock as to compel a substantial majority of
497. See supra notes 438-60 and accompanying text.
498. See id.; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
499. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
500. The term "best interests" is used in recognition that the concepts of long-term
versus short-term imply a dichotomy that does not neatly exist. In attempting to define
the phrase "the corporation and its shareholders," the Delaware court in TW Services,
Inc., v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,178 n.5 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 2, 1989), equated "shareholder long-term interests" with "multi-constituency
interests":
The knowledgeable reader will recognize that this particular phrase masks
the most fundamental issue: to what interest does the board look in resolv-
ing conflicts between interests in the corporation that may be characterized
as "shareholder longterm interests" or "corporate entity interests" or
"multi-constituency interests" on the one hand, and interests that may be
characterized as "shareholder short term interests" or "current share value
interests" on the other?
Id.
In addition, directors' duties statutes require consideration of time frame elements as
one factor in formulating an appropriate response. See Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989). Thus, the occasional use of "long
term" serves the sole function of underscoring the deemphasis of the "short term."
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shareholders to tender their shares; and (3) militating against take-
overs when, inter alia, a corporation has a promising long-term plan
underway that has not yet come to fruition.
Third, reform should seek to emphasize the significance of share-
holders' input and shareholder rights by: (1) minimizing the vulner-
ability shareholders typically and historically experience in a
takeover context by mandating that shareholders approve both
rights plans and coverage under antitakeover legislation; (2) militat-
ing against takeovers when the value of the offer to the shareholders
is demonstrably impaired; and (3) grounding a director's duty to
accept an offer largely on whether the shareholders themselves
deem an offer to be in their best interests as evinced either by their
shareholder-approved committee's advice or by their tendering
shares.
The board is well equipped to inform and persuade shareholders
when their best interests are served by approving antitakeover
measures. 501 By enhancing accountability, this communication will
help ensure that shareholder rights plans and other defensive mech-
anisms are principally and reasonably designed to advance share-
holders' best interests and only incidentally designed to entrench
management. The information provided shareholders, however,
must be evenhanded.
The board is in the best position to persuade shareholders that
voting for current management rather than tendering their shares
will maximize the value of their shares. It is argued that sharehold-
ers, overcome by greed, will far sooner accept quick profits. That
argument misses the point. What ought to be compared is the pres-
ent value of probable outcomes: if the shareholders tender their shares
in a noncoercive context despite vigorous appeals by management,
their tendering perforce suggests they concluded that the present
value of their return is maximized by tendering. The shareholders
are in the best position to weigh the competing alternatives; given
substantial, if not perfect, information from both sides, the share-
holders' vote must be afforded great weight.
Optimal reform must also recognize'that, for a board and corpo-
ration to function properly, the board must be allowed to exercise
its business judgment independent of the conduct of shareholders if
the circumstances so demand. Thus, the board should be protected
by the business judgment rule when it has compelling evidence
showing that the offer must be rejected (1) because the present
501. See supra notes 392-93 and accompanying text.
value of the corporate stock, given the probable outcome of con-
cluding a current long-term plan, exceeds the offer price, (2) be-
cause the value of the offer is substantially impaired, or (3) because
superior alternatives appear imminent.
To summarize:
1. Reform of takeover legislation should recognize that
directors are well suited to make initial decisions in a
takeover situation. The directors should also inform
and persuade shareholders on both the adoption and
redemption of shareholder rights plans and the relative
long-term value of their shares in relation to an ac-
quiror's offer.
2. Reform of takeover legislation should harness the ben-
efits of meaningful shareholder input, not by asserting
the primacy of shareholders but by recognizing the
evolving interests and aggressiveness of shareholders,
particularly institutional investors. To this end, share-
holder input in all aspects of takeover-related decisions
should be enhanced. This requires the conclusion that
a shareholder vote is neither onerous nor im-
practical.5 02
3. Reform of takeover legislation should remain flexible
enough to assure its vitality given the many inevitable
changes in corporate and case law treatment of take-
overs. As such, optimal legislation must acknowledge
the logic of well-reasoned case law without sacrificing
adaptability. 503
B. The Dynamic Environment of Takeover Reform: Uncertainties,
Constraints and Opportunities
Because optimal takeover legislation must remain flexible so as to
readily adapt to a fluid takeover landscape, and because takeover
legislation is a relatively new phenomenon with many of its contours
untried and untested, reform legislation proposed herein50 4 leaves
open the following parameters: whether reform should come from
the state or federal level; the scope of such reform; and the dynam-
ics of the shareholders' new voice.
502. Commentators have questioned the efficacy of shareholder consent by voting.
See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1474-80
(1989). The authors, however, believe that the changing pattern of shareholder growth,
with the emphasis on institutional investors, will result in a more informed and active
shareholder group generally. There is evidence to support such a conclusion. See, e.g.,
Berss, One Hand Dirties the Other, FORBES, June 25, 1990, at 63 (noting that at the behest
of Wisconsin state employee pension fund, shareholders at K Mart and Champion
adopted proposals calling for a shareholder vote on shareholder rights plans).
503. See, e.g., Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the
Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618 (1989).
504. See infra Part V.
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1. State or Federal Legislation?
Optimal takeover legislation should be adaptable to both state
and federal enactments. Ideally, reform would be suited to federal
enactment by setting minimal parameters while heightening both
uniformity and state experimentation by leaving intact all state legis-
lation into which corporations opt for protection.50 5 Consistent
with federalism, states thereby remain free to experiment by draft-
ing legislation tailored to their unique business environments. For
state enactments, proposed reform should take the form of a Model
State Takeover Act; for federal enactments, reform should enact the
neutral principles of the Williams Act.50 6 By enhancing shareholder
input, the proposed Model Act seeks a level playing field while strik-
ing that elusive balance between state and federal regulation. 50 7 Be-
cause the proposed Model Act necessarily focuses on the
theoretical, delving into the intricacies of Supremacy and Com-
merce Clause analyses based on possible extensions and infinite
permutations of its basic precepts is wisely beyond the scope of this
article.508 Facially, the proposed legislation appears easily to pass
constitutional muster.50 9
505. It is simply unrealistic to expect state legislatures, with limited staff re-
sources, short sessions and competing commitments, to undertake the kind
of comprehensive study and synthesis necessary to confront these problems
in a meaningful way. The only plausible case to make for state statutes in
this context is that of preserving the status quo. In other words, given the
strong difference of opinion on the long-term economic consequences of
hostile takeovers, it is appropriate for the states to maintain the traditional
relationships among the various constituents of the corporations within their
sovereign boundaries pending definitive federal resolution of the matter.
The ultimate solution, however, rests with Congress.
Davis, supra note 51, at 515 (footnote omitted).
506. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977) (asserting that in en-
acting the Williams Act, Congress attempted to follow a "policy of neutrality in contests
for control"). The drafters of the Williams Act took "extreme care to avoid tipping the
balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid." SENATE REPORT, supra note 41, at 3. For a discussion of the Williams Act,
see supra notes 326-47 and accompanying text. But cf. Andre, supra note 21, at 887
(arguing that rules governing takeovers should seek to facilitate rather than remain neu-
tral toward takeovers, thereby achieving what is most beneficial for the corporation,
shareholders, and the economy: "[R]eform aimed at achieving neutrality and even-
handedness would be misdirected.").
507. The challenge is accomplishing this goal "without veering toward the scylla of
stifling innovation by the state or the charybdis of balkanizing tender offer regulation."
Ferrara & Carroll, supra note 28, at 959.
508. The Authors, however, are quite confident that a federal enactment of their pro-
posed balanced reform would not disturb state legislation if such state legislation were
slightly modified to allow for federal supremacy where necessary.
509. The Supreme Court has twice ruled on the constitutionality of takeover legisla-
tion. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 456 U.S. 625 (1982) (discussed supra notes 91 and 125). In addition, one federal
court has ruled on Business Combination Statutes. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Uni-
versal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989). The
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Partially because corporate law is a quintessentially state con-
trolled creature, and partially because hostile takeovers result in
fundamental changes in corporate structure, state rather than fed-
eral legislation has predominated. The Supreme Court has noted
that " '[c]orporations are creatures of state law, and .. .except
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of direc-
tors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal
affairs of the corporation.' "510
A number of scholars have explored the possibility of federal
takeover legislation.5 11 One rationale supporting federal tender of-
fer regulation acknowledges that tender offers at bottom are stock
transactions rather than purely corporate transactions and thus pre-
empt state antitakeover legislation. 51 2 Several recurring themes
pervade the arguments of advocates of federal legislation: (1) eco-
nomic theories of federalism,513 (2) regulation of antitakeover de-
vices such as poison pills, golden parachutes, and greenmail is not a
"traditional" state function; 514 (3) even if such state regulation is
traditional, there are many examples of federal intervention into se-
curities matters "traditionally" regulated by the states;515 and (4)
simplest formulation of the current test for Supremacy and Commerce Clause analysis
of state antitakeover legislation may be:
So long as a bidder can run its tender offer by the timetable of the Williams
Act, the management and the bidder enjoy equal opportunities to communi-
cate with the shareholders, and no state official can intervene, the law should
withstand supremacy clause attack. So long as the law treats nonresidents
and residents alike, and does not conflict with the laws of other states, it
should withstand commerce clause scrutiny.
Boyer, supra note 106, at 589 (footnote omitted) (surveying the constitutionality of sec-
ond-generation state antitakeover legislation).
510. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
511. See, e.g., Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State Anti-Takeover Statutes, the Williams Act, the
Commerce Clause and Insider Trading, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 47; Shipman, The Case for Reason-
able State Regulation of Corporate Takeovers: Some Observations Concerning the Ohio Experience,
57 U. CIN. L. REv. 507 (1988); see also Romano, State Takeover Laws: Constitutional but
Dumb, Wall St. J., May 14, 1987, at 28, col. 4; California Legislature Asked to Back Federal
Preemption of State Statutes, 3 Corp. Couns. Weekly 3 (BNA) (Jan. 20, 1988).
512. Compare Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ.
663 (1974); Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus. LAW. 1101
(1974) (summarized in 31 Bus. LAw. 1105 (1976)); Schwartz, A Casefor Federal Chartering
of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAw. 1125 (1976) with Henning, Federalism and Corporate Law: The
Chaos Inherent in the Cary Proposal, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 362 (1976).
513. See Romano, supra note 484, at 465-70.
The economic theory of federalism focuses on the extent of the external-
ity, or the localness of the public good, to identify which level of govern-
ment, if any, is the appropriate one to intervene in a market. A government
should have control over an activity whose externalities fall completely
within its borders, for then the costs and benefits will accrue solely to the
citizens to which that government is accountable and the allocation of re-
sources will be efficient.
Id. at 466 (footnote omitted).
514. See Belt, Hostile Battles for Corporate Controk The Congressional Front, in 2 HosTiLE
BATrLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 399, 407 (Practising Law Institute 1990).
515. Id. (asserting that "federal regulation of corporate matters may not be neces-
sary, and if necessary, should be used most judiciously, but waving the flag and citing
state's rights is a red herring and tends to obscure that fundamental policy issue").
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state chartering is anachronistic and artificial because national cor-
porations are, in all material respects, interstate in ownership with-
out any real connection to their chosen state of incorporation. 51 6
Critics of federal legislation cite hurdles to an otherwise most desir-
able uniform federal takeover policy: (1) federalization of corporate
law may lead to piecemeal federal constitutional tender offer law;517
(2) historically, states have chartered nearly all corporations and
state law has always governed the internal affairs of a corporation, 518
therefore, federal measures should not intrude into the general do-
main of corporations; 5 19 and (3) federal legislation beyond or
amending the Williams Act must address preemption, federalism, 520
and other constitutional concerns.521
As a practical matter, federal legislation seems unlikely. 522 Be-
tween 1963 and 1987, over 200 takeover bills were introduced in
Congress. 523 Recently, several bills have been introduced in Con-
gress seeking to amend or expand the Williams Act.524 Prominent
among them, Senator Proxmire's Tender Offer Disclosure and Fair-
ness Act 525 proposed to hold tender offers open for thirty-five
rather than twenty business days. 526 Although numerous bills con-
tinue to be introduced in both houses to amend provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act relating to tender offers, none appear likely
516. Kozyris, supra note 250, at 265. Kozyris further comments that state chartering
is harmful "because it encourages a race to the bottom in search for state revenues
rather for [sic] than for best rules." Id
517. SeeJohnson & Millon II, supra note 26, at 1867.
518. See Shipman, supra note 511, at 510-11.
519. Kozyris, supra note 250, at 265.
520. Federalism stresses that states should be allowed to function as laboratories ex-
perimenting with different approaches. However, this "laboratory" argument supports
only local experimentation with local affairs, not local control over national concerns.
See Kozyris, supra note 17, at 1136 ("Balkanizing the treatment of unitary transactions
that take place over the national markets, however, does not fit within any reasonable
extension of the 'laboratory' theory.").
521. See Johnson & Millon II, supra note 26, at 1865-66 (arguing against the SEC's
claim that the Williams Act preempts state tender offer regulation).
522. See Belt, supra note 514, at 408. Belt concludes that
[ffor substantive and political reasons, it is unlikely that Congress will enact
any major legislation affecting the battle for corporate control in the first
half of the 101st Congress. However... should states continue to Balkanize
takeover laws or engage in a regulatory race to the bottom then a federal
reaction may be likely and perhaps even desireable [sic].
Id
523. Romano, supra note 484, at 470; see Romano, The Politics of the Brady Report: A
Comment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 869 (1989) (noting that "[t]he demand for additional
federal legislation to restrict hostile takeovers has been extraordinarily intense, with
over 100 bills introduced over the past four years").
524. See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
525. S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see Proxmire Introduces Tender Offer Bill,
Announces Hearings for Later This Month, Corp. Couns. 2 Weekly No. 23, at 2 (BNA) (June
10, 1987); supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
526. S. 1323, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987). Proxmire's bill also requires bidders
seeking more than 25% of a target to acquire shares through tender offers and prohibits
-. 1
to pass.5 27
2. Scope of Coverage: Dynamics of Antitakeover Mechanisms and
Antitakeover Legislation
Perhaps the greatest uncertainty facing legislators seeking to
grant shareholders a meaningful voice in takeover matters is which
of the myriad of antitakeover mechanisms should require share-
holder approval. The best that can be done may be to avoid being
either overly general or overly specific. Poison pills demarcate the
brightest line among the infinite array of possible foci: poison pills
are the most pervasive, potent and litigated antitakeover defense,
and in contrast to ESOPs and restructuring, poison pills do not
serve legitimate corporate purposes outside of takeover contexts.5 28
As such, the proposed Model Act limits coverage to "shareholder
rights plans and their equivalent."5 29 This approach affords both
needed specificity and possibilities for expansion.
Accordingly, reform should rely on a fluid, flexible definition of
poison-pill rights plans for obvious reasons: (1) the concept of a
poison pill is inherently flexible and protean; (2) certain otherwise
legitimate, nontakeover motivated corporate plans may, under cer-
tain circumstances, take on the character and function of a poison
pill53 0 and therefore should be subject to the Model Act's share-
holder approval requirements.
One potential area of controversy focuses upon the extent to
which optimal reform should recognize the importance of facilitat-
ing an auction market for corporate control-that a primary pur-
pose of a rights plan is to allow management time both to search out
alternatives most likely to maximize shareholders' long-term value
and to better assess the value of the offer, including the degree of
impairment. Arguably, a rights plan which automatically terminates
forty business days or less after a fully-financed cash "qualified"
tender offer is prima facie in the shareholders' best long-term inter-
ests and should be exempt from shareholder voting requirements.
greenmail. Id. at 4-5. The bill was tabled because of the stock market crash of October
19, 1987.
527. S. 1658, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). S. 1658 prohibits golden parachutes,
greenmail and poison pills without shareholder approval. S. 1658 is similar to S. 1323;
when S. 1323 reached the Senate floor in June 1988, an amendment was offered that
would prohibit golden parachutes, greenmail and poison pills without shareholder ap-
proval. See Goelzer, Quinn & Walter, supra note 286, at 592-93. The Senate voted to
prohibit golden parachutes without shareholder approval, but failed to table the poison
pill provision, killing the bill. See id.
528. "Unlike poison pills or golden parachutes, [ESOPs] serve a number of legiti-
mate, non-control oriented corporate purposes." Buckhorn, Inc., v. Ropak Corp., 656
F. Supp. 209, 231 (S.D. Ohio) (citing Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255,
266 (2d Cir. 1984)), af'd, 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987).
529. See infra Part V.
530. For example, when an ESOP is "placed under director or management control
during the course of a tender offer.., the same conflict of interest which arises in more
obvious defensive measures [such as poison pills] is also inherent in the creation of an
ESOP." Buckhorn, 656 F. Supp. at 231 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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This forty-day window will generally be sufficient to allow manage-
ment to assess the offer and weigh competing alternatives. In the
same vein are "chewable pills," 53 ' that is, rights plans that automati-
cally disengage upon a target's receiving a qualified all-cash, all-
shares offer remaining open for no less than forty-business days.
This type of rights plan should easily garner shareholder approval,
however, and therefore similarly deserves rendering an exemption.
To avoid the disadvantages of drafting a generally applicable stan-
dard riddled with exceptions, the Authors decided against outlining
exemptions from the shareholder voting requirement.
Determining the scope of coverage for antitakeover legislation
poses few problems. The Authors believe that shareholders should
be required to vote on the applicability of any state antitakeover leg-
islation in which shareholders may logically prefer to decide for
themselves whether to opt in or opt out. Thus, most statutes which
currently have opt out provisions would require shareholder ap-
proval. These include business-combination statutes, 532 control-
share acquisition statutes,533 fair-price statutes, 53 4 and to a lesser ex-
tent, directors' duties statutes535 and share rights plan endorsement
statutes.536 In some respects, certain provisions of disclosure stat-
utes53 7 may be repugnant to shareholders. This remains an open
question. As currently drafted, most shareholders would have little
cause to oppose antigreenmail statutes, 538 though some may. Ac-
cordingly, this also remains an open question.
3. Dynamics of Shareholder Involvement
It must be stressed that the goal of balanced reform should be to
provide shareholders and directors with mutually meaningful roles
in takeover contexts; the goal is neither shareholder primacy nor
blind, myopic maximization of shareholder well being. Thus, share-
holder involvement must initially seek to balance tensions inherent
in the shareholder-manager axis, tensions which intensify and peak
in takeover matters. Certainly, shareholders are expected to display
potent self-interest at first. Ultimately, shareholder involvement
531. Texaco, Inc.'s shareholder rights plan contains a "qualified offer" exception ap-
proved by Texaco's shareholders. A "qualified offer" is defined as a fully-financed, all-
cash, all-shares offer which remains open for at least 45 business days, which results in
the offeror owning shares representing a majority of the outstanding voting power and
where, upon commencing the offer, the offeror agrees to complete a final all-cash trans-
action at the offer price to acquire the remaining shares. See Pitt, supra note 275, at 107.
532. See Appendix at BCS.
533. See Appendix at CSAS.
534. See Appendix at FPS.
535. See Appendix at DDS.
536. See Appendix at SRPES.
537. See Appendix at DS.
538. See Appendix at AGMS.
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with management will take on the character of team members striv-
ing for the same goal: maximization of the long-term gains to the
corporation and the shareholder. As the method of shareholder in-
volvement adapts and conforms to the many varying and unique
corporate environments, shareholders' voices will become increas-
ingly meaningftil, if not indispensable.
The uncertainty legislators would face in addressing the issue of
optimal shareholder involvement has several facets, including: (1)
the nature, composition, application, and power of shareholder ad-
visory committees; and (2) the propriety of considering shareholder
tender as a relevant factor.
Shareholder Advisory Committees: A shareholder advisory committee,
if properly created, structured and implemented, offers many op-
portunities for shareholder involvement and solves most of the
problems typically associated with shareholder approval require-
ments. Although the concept of shareholder advisory committees is
very new, at least one major pension fund actively endorses the con-
cept. 53 9 Still, many questions must be answered. First, should a
shareholder advisory committee serve as a substitute for a share-
holder vote in all takeover related matters, including the adoption
and redemption of poison pills and opting into state legislation; or
should it, as the Authors believe, substitute for a shareholder vote
only when requiring a shareholder vote is impractical, such as amid
a hostile battle for control where time is of the essence and where
directors must decide quickly whether to redeem a rights plan? Sec-
ond, should a shareholder advisory committee be given dispositive
power, or should its role merely be informative and nonbinding, in-
forming the directors' business judgment? If the committee's role is
merely advisory, how much weight should directors afford the com-
mittee's input? If the committee's decision is binding on the direc-
tors, what duties would the committee have to shareholders? Third,
how would a shareholder advisory committee be selected? Should
directors select committee members for subsequent shareholder ap-
proval? Should the committee be composed of current sharehold-
ers? Long-term or institutional shareholders?
The Authors believe reliance on the input of a shareholder advi-
sory committee in lieu of a full shareholder vote should be limited to
situations where requiring a shareholder vote is impractical. Fur-
thermore, this committee's conclusion should be nonbinding on di-
rectors. However, the directors should weigh the committee's
conclusion by considering factors such as: (1) the extent to which
539. See Schwadel, supra note 380, at A7, col. 1. Francine Schwadel notes that
CalPERS "has notified Sears that it intends to propose the creation of a shareholders'
advisory committee at the annual meeting next spring. [CalPERS] suggested that a
nine-member shareholder committee give the Sears board nonbinding advice on mat-
ters such as major restructurings or acquisitions, mergers and executive compensation."
Id. at A7, col. 2.
Shareholder Rights
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the committee represents long-term shareholders; 540 (2) the degree
of deliberation supporting their conclusion and the degree to which
such deliberation approximates that typically found in collective
shareholder decisions; and (3) the nature of the committee, includ-
ing the members' expertise and conflicts of interest. The Authors
believe that an optimal shareholder advisory committee would be
comprised generally of shareholders with the largest stake in the
company; this assures that the committee will be most assiduous in
improving corporate performance. 541
Dynamics of Shareholder Tender: In assessing a board's duty to re-
deem a rights plan amid hostile overtures, recent Delaware court
decisions have considered the extent of shareholder tender a rele-
vant factor.5 42 Moreover, Delaware's antitakeover statute disen-
gages given an eighty-five percent disinterested shareholder
tender. 545 But does shareholder tender equate with shareholder
vote? The Authors believe that the tendering process may be suffi-
ciently coercive for shareholders as to militate against such a conclu-
sion. 544 Still, the percentage of shareholders who tender should be
afforded some weight. Indeed, the more shareholder tender ap-
proximates shareholder vote, the more weight shareholder tender
garners. Thus, more weight would be assigned to shareholder
tender given an all-cash, all-shares tender offer with a back-end
commitment at the same price in cash 545 than an offer without a
back-end commitment.
540. See generally Matheson & Olson, Corporate Law and the "Longterm Share-
holder" Model of Corporate Governance (unpublished manuscript, on file with The
George Washington Law Review).
541. Dent, Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wxs. L.
REV. 881,907.
542. See, e.g., Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1061 (Del.
Ch. 1988).
543. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988).
544. See Lowenstein, supra note 28, at 307 (noting that "[i]t has frequently been said
that tender offers owe their high rate of success to the fact that arbitrageurs and even
institutional investors, unlike 'real' shareholders, have an interest only in a quick sale at
a profit" (footnotes omitted)).
545. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989).
It is difficult to understand how, as a general matter, an inadequate all cash,
all shares tender offer, with a back end commitment at the same price in
cash, can be considered a continuing threat under Unocal. Certainly, an in-
adequate coercive tender offer threatens injury to the stockholders .... An
inadequate, non-coercive offer may also constitute a threat for some reason-
able period of time after it is announced .... However, where there has been
sufficient time for any alternative to be developed and presented and for the
target corporation to inform its stockholders of the benefits of retaining
their equity position, the "threat" to the stockholders of an inadequate, non-
coercive offer seems, in most circumstances, to be without substance.
Id, at 289 (citations omitted). The Polaroid court nevertheless declined to enjoin a coer-
cive management self-tender because of "unusual circumstances." See id. at 289-90;
supra note 256 (stating that Kodak patent litigation constituted the unusual
circumstances).
The proposed Model Act attempts to solve this dilemma in two
ways: first, shareholder tender becomes relevant only for those cor-
porations that have not yet instituted "Qualified Shareholder Advi-
sory Committees." In this way, corporations are encouraged to
support shareholder advisory committees. Second, shareholder
tender of less than 80% does not give rise to any presumptions,
thereby freeing directors to decide their corporation's fate largely
within current business judgment rule parameters.
V The Model Act
SUBDIVISION 1. ADOPTION OF SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
PLANS
No corporation shall adopt a shareholder rights plan or its
equivalent unless the plan has been approved by the disinterested
shareholders. Any shareholder rights plan adopted prior to the ef-
fective date of this statute is invalid unless ratified by the sharehold-
ers within two years of the effective date of this statute. After initial
adoption or ratification, a shareholder rights plan becomes invalid
unless reaffirmed by the disinterested shareholders within each sub-
sequent period of two years thereafter. The shareholders shall take
all action pursuant hereto by the affirmative vote of a majority of the
disinterested voting power of the shares entitled to vote.
SUBDIVISION 2. OPTING INTO STATE ANTITAKEOVER
LEGISLATION
No state antitakeover provision shall apply to a corporation unless
application of the provision has been adopted by the disinterested
shareholders. Any state antitakeover provision in effect prior to the
effective date of this statute ceases to apply to a corporation unless
ratified by the disinterested shareholders within two years of the ef-
fective date of this statute. After initial adoption or ratification, a
state antitakeover provision ceases to apply to a corporation unless
reaffirmed by the disinterested shareholders within each subsequent
period of two years thereafter. The shareholders shall take all ac-
tion pursuant hereto by the affirmative vote of a majority of the vot-
ing power of the disinterested shares entitled to vote.
SUBDIVISION 3. DIRECTORS' DUTIES IN CONTROL
TRANSACTIONS
A director breaches a fiduciary duty if the director either attempts
to defeat or advises the shareholders to decline a tender offer when
supporting or accepting said offer is, in the director's view, in the
shareholders' best interests. The factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether an offer is in the shareholders' best interests
include:
(1) Whether a Qualified Shareholder Advisory Committee
concludes that the tender offer should be accepted. For
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corporations without Qualified Shareholder Advisory
Committees: whether a substantial majority of the share-
holders tender their shares. Tender by 80% or more of
disinterested shareholders is presumed to constitute a
"substantial majority."
(2) Whether the board has competent and persuasive evi-
dence demonstrating any of the following:
(a) that the present value of the corporation's stock,
given the probable outcome of consummating a
current, bona fide, long-term plan demonstrably
exceeds the value of the tender offer.
(b) that the value of the offer to the shareholders is
substantially impaired. Among the factors to be
considered in assessing the magnitude of "impair-
ment" are:
(i) The nature and risk of the offeror's financ-
ing, including the degree of leverage.
(ii) The nature and character of the offeror,
including the likelihood that the offeror will
merely liquidate or "bust-up" the corporation.
(iii) The nature and character of the resulting
merged entity.
(iv) The character and timing of the offer, in-
cluding the extent to which the board reason-
ably believes the corporation may be
vulnerable to coercive acquisition tactics.
(c) that another bidder is both imminent and likely to
better advance shareholders' best interests or that
shareholders' best interests will otherwise be ad-
vanced by declining said offer.
SUBDIVISION 4 DEFINITIONS
(1) SCOPE. The following definitions apply only to this Act.
(2) CORPORATION. "Corporation" means "publicly held corpora-
tion," as defined in [relevant state statute].
(3) DISINTERESTED SHAREHOLDER. "Disinterested Shareholder"
means a shareholder that is not an "interested shareholder." In a
takeover context, "interested shareholders" include: (1) persons
who are directors or officers; (2) the offeror or "affiliates" [as de-
fined in relevant state statute]; (3) participants in employee stock
option plans in which employee participants do not have the right to
determine confidentially whether shares held subject to the plan will
be tendered in a tender or exchange offer.
(4) SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PLAN. "Shareholder rights plan" means
an action whereby a corporation authorizes and issues rights or op-
tions (or their equivalent) which include conditions that prevent or
limit the holder of a specified percentage of the outstanding shares
of the corporation from exercising those rights or which invalidate
or limit any rights or options beneficially owned by a holder of a
specified percentage of the outstanding shares of a corporation.
(5) STATE ANTITAKEOVER PROVISION. "State antitakeover provision"
means the state's business combination statute, control share acqui-
sition statute and all other statutory antitakeover provisions from
which shareholders may reasonably seek to opt out or otherwise de-
cline protection. [Additional provisions should be provided on a
state-by-state basis.]
(6) QUALIFIED SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY COMMITTEE. Qualified
Shareholder Advisory Committee means any shareholder-approved
committee composed of shareholders and designed to represent the
shareholder interests.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
CHANGE FROM FORMER LAW:
This Act complements as much of [this state's] current law as re-
lates to takeover situations. This Act is to be interpreted as aug-
menting, supporting, refining, or defining current legislation.
This Act supersedes [a state's] takeover legislation only insofar as
such state legislation covers all public corporations which have not
opted out. Subdivision 2 of this Act makes it clear that for a corpo-
ration to be protected under [the state's] takeover statutes, a major-
ity of the disinterested shareholders must approve said protection.
The protection granted by the state's takeover legislation remains
unchanged from prior law for those corporations meeting this
requirement.
THE ACT:
Under subdivision 1, a majority of disinterested shareholders
must approve a rights plan or its equivalent for the plan to be valid.
A court reviewing a particular challenged corporate action should
interpret the term "shareholder rights plan" to include all measures
having like effect.
A majority of 517o of shareholders entitled to vote is required.
The underlying rationale for the 51%o bench mark is to balance the
input of shareholders equally with that of management and the
board. The board is well equipped to inform and persuade share-
holders that their best interests are maximized by approving the
plan. This will help ensure that rights plans are principally and rea-
sonably designed to advance shareholders' best interests and only
incidentally designed to entrench the current management. How-
ever, the information provided shareholders must be even handed.
Under subdivision 2, corporations are no longer automatically
protected by the state's takeover provisions; rather, such protection
Shareholder Rights
THE GEORGE 'WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
is available only when no less than 51%7 of the disinterested share-
holders entitled to vote ratify the board's option. This affords cor-
porations more freedom to decline or accept state legislative
protection. Equally important, this provides shareholders with the
option to decline protection under the Act because, among other
reasons (1) subdivision 1 already provides adequate protection; (2)
subdivision 1 more closely fits the unique needs of the corporation,
rendering subdivision 2 either excessive or disadvantageous; (3)
such protection otherwise militates against shareholders' best inter-
ests. This modified "opt in" requirement is preferred over "opt
out" requirements to maximize corporate freedom and render
meaningful the shareholder approval requirement in subdivision 1.
Subdivision 3 mandates that directors regard shareholders' best
interests as paramount. Under factor 1 of subdivision 3, a tender
offer is presumed to be in shareholders' best interests when the
terms of the bona fide offer are so favorable that either (1) a Quali-
fied Shareholder Advisory Committee recommends acceptance of
the offer; or (2) 80% of the shareholders tender their shares irre-
spective of the Board's support. Consistent with this, a director has
a duty to seek out and weigh shareholder input before attempting to
defeat such offer.
The board is in the best position to persuade the shareholders
that, to maximize the present value of their shares, they are best
served to vote for current management rather than tender their
shares. The shareholders are in the best position to weigh the com-
peting alternatives; given perfect information from both sides, the
shareholders' vote must be afforded great weight.
Absent conclusive shareholder support, this Act recognizes that
for a board and corporation to properly function, the board must be
allowed to exercise its business judgment independent of the con-
duct of shareholders if the circumstances so demand. Thus, the
board will be protected by the business judgment rule when the
board has compelling evidence showing that the offer must be re-
jected (a) because the present value of the corporate stock, given the
probable outcome of concluding a current long-term plan, exceeds
the offer price, (b) because the value of the offer is substantially im-
paired, or (c) because the realization of superior alternatives ap-
pears imminent.
However, the evidence before the board must be compelling: it
must be both competent (e.g., reasonably certain, accurate, and rea-
sonably free of objection) and persuasive. The test is both objective
and subjective: whether a reasonable board member under the
same or similar circumstances would have rejected the offer given
the evidence before the board member irrespective of substantial
shareholder approval and whether that board member in fact so ac-
ted. The more a target's plan is based on future hypothetical value
and the more its projections stem from economic and competitive
conditions outside its control, the less persuasive the evidence.
Factor 1 is presumed to possess great weight; the weight assigned
to factor 2 depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
For purposes of factor 1, 80% of disinterested shareholders pre-
sumptively constitutes a substantial majority. Whether a showing of
less than 80% constitutes a substantial majority depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant factors for determin-
ing when a lesser showing constitutes a substantial majority or for
rebutting the 80% presumption include: (1) whether large blocks of
stock are voted or withheld; (2) whether some of the stock voted or
withheld is in "friendly" (albeit "disinterested") hands; (3) recent or
typical voting patterns of the shareholders (e.g., unusually passive
voters).
Conclusion
Both corporate-adopted takeover preemption devices and current
antitakeover legislation undermine a board's incentive to maximize
meaningful shareholder input in control transactions. This is a
costly development: (1) shareholders derive less value from their
stock ownership; (2) economic efficiency is reduced because benefi-
cial takeovers will be reduced and management may become more
lax; (3) as one state develops more stringent, protectionist legisla-
tion, others will be compelled to follow lest their corporations feel
relatively less secure; (4) corporate freedom and corporate con-
tracting is impaired; (5) director uncertainty and potential for con-
flicts of interest escalate; and (6) unfairness to shareholders
increases.
This Model Act goes far to solve these problems by requiring that
corporations grant shareholders an enhanced voice in that area of
corporate law their voice is most needed: in the corporate takeover
context where directors and management have an intrinsic conflict
of interest with shareholders. As such, the Model Act promises to
assure that management and shareholders dove-tail their sometimes
inconsistent objectives, thereby working as partners toward the mu-
tual goal of long-term corporate profitability. In this way, the ineffi-
ciencies, conflicts of interest, uncertainties, and manifestations of
unfairness that otherwise inhere in corporate-control transactions
are minimized to society's benefit.
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Appendix*
I. Summary of State Antitakeover Legislation
A. Overview
Thirty-seven states had enacted first-generation tender offer regu-
lations before the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), invalidating Illinois' antitakeover statute.
Today, roughly eighty percent of the states have antitakeover legis-
lation. Only six states have yet to enact some form of antitakeover
legislation: Alabama, California, Montana, Texas, Vermont, and
West Virginia. In addition to these six states, four states appear ac-
tively not to endorse antitakeover legislation: Alaska, Arkansas, New
Hampshire, and North Dakota. Pre-MITE disclosure statutes are
not considered further.
Steering clear of MITE's pitfalls, several general approaches have
evolved in the new generations of state antitakeover legislation.
Each expands upon the traditional terms of corporate governance to
avoid the Williams Act's preemption and Commerce Clause con-
cerns lethal to first-generation statutes. Given both the constitu-
tionality of these statutes and the recent case law developments in
Delaware, a new wave of state statutes has emerged armored with
the harshest of antitakeover weapons. This Appendix summarizes
and analyzes this legislative antitakeover landscape.
* For ease in reference, the tabular portion of this Appendix does not cite state
statutes according to the Uniform System of Citation. These tables contain all information
necessary to locate each statute. Because of space limitations, tables contained in this
Appendix use abbreviations where appropriate.
B. State Antitakeover Legislation (S)
Business Control Shareholder
Combi- Share Directors' Fair Rights Plan Anti-
nation Acquisition Duties Price Endorsement Greenmail Disclosure Parachute
Statutes Statutes Statutes Statutes Statutes Statutes Statutes Statutes
(BCS) (CSAS) (DDS) (FPS) (SRPES) (AGMS) (DS) (P)
State II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Arizona x x x x x x
Arkansas x
Colorado x
Connecticut x x x x
Delaware x
Florida x x X
Georgia x x x x
Hawaii x x x x x
Idaho x x x x x
Illinois x x x x
Indiana x x x x x x
Iowa x x x
Kansas x x
Kentucky x x x x
Louisiana x x x x
Maine x x x
Maryland x x x
Mass. x x x x x x
Michigan x x x x x
Minnesota x x x x x x
Mississippi x x x
Missouri x x x x x
Nebraska x x x
Nevada x x x
New Hampshire x
NewJersey x x x x x
New Mexico x
New York x x x x x x
N. Carolina x x x x
Ohio x x x x x x
Oklahoma x x
Oregon x x x
Pennsylvania x x x x x x
Rhode Island x x x x x
S. Carolina x x x
S. Dakota x x x x x x
Tennessee x x x x x x x
Utah x x
Virginia x x x x x
Washington x x x
Wisconsin x x x x x x x
Wyoming x x x x x
TOTALS: 28 27 29 24 25 7 19 8
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Definitions Used Throughout This Appendix
Noninterested vs. Disinterested
Noninterested shareholder means a shareholder who is not
an "interested" shareholder as defined in state statute.
Typically, "interested" shareholders are limited to the
suitor and her affiliates.
Disinterested shareholder is a term of art uniquely defined by
each statute. "Disinterested" shareholders typically ex-
clude all shareholders who are "interested," officers, and
directors.
Articles of Incorporation at all times is synonymous with "charter"
and "certificate of incorporation."
Announcement Date means the date the interested shareholder an-
nounced a tender offer.
Determination Date means the date the interested shareholder be-
came interested.
Secondary sources were used to support portions of this Appendix.
II. State Business Combination Statutes (BCS)
A. Introduction
Business Combination (or freeze-out) statutes represent the sim-
plest form of antitakeover legislation. These statutes essentially
prohibit "interested" investors who purchase more than a minimum
threshold interest (typically 10%) in a target corporation from en-
gaging in any type of business combination with the target for a
specified period of years (typically 3-5 years) after the acquisition of
such shares unless, prior to the acquisition of such shares, the share
acquisition is APPROVED by either the board or, in certain states, by
an independent committee of the board.
Business combination statutes often are closely linked to fair-
price statutes. Combined, they generally require approval of a ma-
jority of disinterested voting shares even after the specified time pe-
riod has elapsed: the acquiror must still comply with a fair-price
provision when attempting a cash-out merger.
B. Legislative Intent
On December 16, 1985, Governor Cuomo stated that New York's
newly amended Business Corporation Law is "aimed at abuses in
certain takeovers, but isn't designed to protect entrenched manage-
ment." The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 17, 1985, at 39. The statute is
directed at minimizing highly leveraged takeovers where an acquiror
pays for the takeover by liquidating the target's assets.
New Jersey's business-combination statute declares in part:
15211991]
Takeovers of public corporations financed largely through debt to
be repaid in the short-term by the sale of substantial assets of the
target corporation, in other states, have impaired local employ-
ment conditions and disrupted local commercial activity. These
takeovers prevent shareholders from realizing the full value of
their holdings through forced mergers and other coercive devices.
The threat of these takeovers also deprives shareholders of value
by forcing the adoption of short-term business strategies as well
as defensive tactics which may not be in the public interest.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:1OA-2 (West 1988) (New Jersey Shareholder
Protection Act).
The public policy for Tennessee's business combination statute
reads in relevant part:
(4) Present Tenessee laws facilitate business combinations which
left unbalanced could harm the economy of this state by weaken-
ing corporate performance ....
Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-35-202 (1990) (Public Policy).
C. Typical Terminology
Business Combinations: The term business combination is defined
broadly in the statutes to typically include mergers, consolidations,
sales of assets, and transfers of stock. Consider Delaware's
definition:
["Business combination" means]
(i) any merger or consolidation.., if the merger is caused by the
interested stockholder...;
(ii) any sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer or other
disposition ... of assets of the corporation [having] an aggre-
gate market value equal to 10% ... ;
(iii) any transaction which results in the issuance or transfer by
the corporation . . . of any stock [to interested stockholder]
except [various exceptions] ... ;
(iv) any transaction involving the corporation . . . [which in-
creases] the proportionate share of the stock of any class...
of the corporation...;
(v) any receipt by the interested stockholder of... [various] fi-
nancial benefits....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 203(c)(3) (1988).
Override Provisions: The moratorium on business combinations im-
posed by many of these statutes does not apply if: (1) the business
combination subsequently is approved by the target's board and by
a vote of at least 2/3 of the outstanding voting stock not owned by
the interested shareholder; or (2) the interested shareholder ac-
quires at least 85% of the target's voting stock as part of the transac-
tion that results in its becoming an interested shareholder.
Opt Out Provisions: Some statutes allow a corporation to "opt out"
through a charter or bylaw amendment adopted by shareholders.
Of those states that do allow a corporation to opt out, many of the
[VOL. 59:14251522
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statutes impose a time limit after which a corporation may no longer
opt out.
For example, Idaho's business combination statute does not apply
if:
1. The interested shareholder was an interested shareholder
before effective date of the Act.
2. The original articles or bylaws of the issuing public corporation
contain a provision expressly electing not to be subject to the
chapter.
3. The issuing public corporation, by action of its board of direc-
tors, adopts an amendment to its bylaws expressly electing not
to be subject to the provisions of the chapter.
4. The issuing public corporation, by action of its shareholders,
adopts an amendment to its articles of incorporation or bylaws
approved by the sharehodlers holding 2/3 of the outstanding
voting power of all noninterested shares; and such amendment
provides that it is not to be effective until eighteen months after
the effective date of this chapter.
IDAHO CODE § 30-1703 (1990).
Application: States vary widely as to which corporations are cov-
ered by the statute. Domestic Corporation means any corporation in-
corporated in that state. Some statutes cover all domestic
corporations without imposing any nexus requirements. Some stat-
utes also cover foreign corporations.
Sunset Provisions: In the past, some business combination statutes
had a limited life span as indicated by a sunset date after which the
statute became ineffective. Because business-combination statutes
are now common, sunset provisions no longer are legislated.
Disinterested Committee means a committee of disinterested direc-
tors. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1221(D) (1989).
Years of Restriction is synonymous with "freeze-out" period
Continuing Directors are those directors whose tenure does not ex-
pire prior to an interested stockholder's stock acquisition date.
D. Constitutionality
The constitutionality of Wisconsin's relatively harsh business
combination statute was upheld by courts in preliminary injuction
actions in Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877
F.2d 496 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989). The New York
and Delaware business combination statutes have also withstood
constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F.
Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988) (upholding the Delaware statute). The
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III. Control Share Acquisition Statutes (CSAS)
A. Introduction
Control Share Acquisition Statutes (CSAS) require acquirors of a
specified percentage of a target's shares to obtain shareholder ap-
proval before exercising the voting rights attributable to shares in
excess of that percentage. Typically, shareholder approval is re-
quired by disinterested shareholders. An acquiror seeking to make
a CSA has the right to request a special shareholder meeting within
a specified time period (typically fifty days) to determine her voting
rights. If authorized by bylaws or articles, the target may purchase
from an acquiror lacking voting power her shares at "fair value,"
and all shareholders (other than acquiror with full voting power)
have dissenters' rights to receive "fair value."
B. Legislative Intent
The stated purpose of most CSASs is to require approval of a
takeover by disinterested shareholders so as to mitigate the likeli-
hood of shareholder coercion.
C. Typical Terminology
Initial Threshold Percentages vary from 10% to 20%.
Shareholder Approval Percentages vary from a majority to 2/3.
Interested Shares generally include the acquiror, target officers, and
target employees who are also directors.
Control Shares are shares acquired through the direct or indirect
acquisition by any person which would bring her target voting
power within a statutorily defined threshold range.
E.g. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West 1989).
"CONTROL SHARES" means shares that, except for this chap-
ter, would have voting power with respect to shares of an issuing
public corporation that, when added to all other shares of the is-
suing public corporation owned by a person or in respect to which
that person may exercise or direct the exercise of voting power,
would entitle that person, immediately after acquisition of the
shares .... to exercise or direct the exercise of the voting power of
the issuing public corporation in the election of directors within
any of the following ranges of voting power
(1) One-fifth (1/5) or more but less than one-third (1/3) of all voting
power.
(2) One-third ('A) or more but less than a majority of all voting
power.
(3) A majority or more of all voting power.
Standard Information Statement/Acquiring Person Statement. An offeror
seeking to acquire more than a threshold percentage of voting stock
must deliver to the target a statement which includes the offeror's
identity, owned shares of target, range of voting power under which
I ef on r__ - - 1-fll- I A V.W
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the control share acquisition falls, and, if the CSA has not taken
place:
(A) a description in reasonable detail of the terms of the pro-
posed CSA; and
(B) representations of the acquiring person, together with a
statement in reasonable detail of the facts upon which they
are based, that the proposed control share acquisition, if
consummated, will not be contrary to law, and that the ac-
quiring person has the financial capacity to make the pro-
posed control share acquisition.
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-6 (West 1989).
Some statutes require that within ten days after the target's re-
ceipt of an "acquiring person statement," the target directors must
call a meeting within fifty days.
Voting Rights of acquiror generally require approval of sharehold-
ers by:
(1) each voting group entitled to vote separately on the propo-
sal by a majority of all the votes entitled to be cast by that
voting group, with the holders of the outstanding shares of
a class being entitled to vote as a separate voting group if
the proposed control share acquisition would, if fully car-
ried out, result in any [certain spedified fundamental
changes].
(2) each voting group entitled to vote separately on the propo-
sal by a majority of all the votes entitled to be cast by that
group, excluding interested shares.
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (West 1989).
Redemption
If authorized in a corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws
before a control share acquisition has occurred, control shares ac-
quired in a control share acquisition with respect to which no ac-
quiring person statement has been filed with the issuing public
corporation may, at any time during the period ending sixty days
after the last acquisition of control shares by the acquiring person,
be subject to redemption by the" corporation at the fair value
thereof pursuant to the procedures adopted by the corporation.
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-10 (West 1989).
Dissenters' Rights
Unless otherwise provided in a corporation's articles of incorpora-
tion or bylaws before a control share acquisition has occurred, in
the event control shares acquired in a control share acquisition
are accorded full voting rights and the acquiring person has ac-
quired control shares with a majority or more of all voting power,
1991] 1531
all shareholders of the issuing public corporation have dissenters'
rights as provided in this chapter.
(c) [Fair value] means a value not less than the highest price paid
per share by the acquiring person in the control share acquisition.
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-11 (West 1989).
Cashout Rights: Five states (Nevada, North Carolina, South Da-
kota, Wyoming, and Utah) have adopted CSASs that are linked to
"cashout" statutes, wherein dissenting shareholders may demand
that the controlling person purchase their shares at a judicially de-
termined fair price. These CSAS/cashout statutes are distinct from
stand-alone cashout statutes. Compare S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 47-33-
16 (1988) with 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2541-2548 (1983, rev. Oct.
1, 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 910 (1986).
Fair Value is never less than the highest price paid in CSA.
Opt Out.
RIGHT TO OPT OUT OF CHAPTER A corporation's articles of
incorporation or bylaws may provide that this chapter does not
apply to control share acquisitions of shares of the corporation.
To be effective, any such provision must have been adopted prior
to the control share acquisition. Absent such provision, control
shares of an issuing public corporation acquired in a control share
acquisition have only such voting rights as are conferred by [vot-
ing rights approval requirements].
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-6-6 (1989).
Wait Period: Twenty-five states follow Indiana's fifty day wait pe-
riod before which a board need not call a special CSA meeting. Ef-
fective 9-27-90, Arizona amended its CSAS to extend the maximum
time period in which a board must call a CSA meeting from fifty-five
days to ninety days-this is the first CSAS to extend the wait period
beyond the sixty day period of the Williams Act.
D. Constitutionality
The United States Supreme Court upheld Indiana's CSAS in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). Indiana's Con-
trol Share Acquisition Act neither conflicts with the Williams' Act
under the Supremacy Clause nor violates the Commerce Clause.
The Indiana Act provides that, without the affirmative noninterested
majority vote of each class, CSA shares lack voting rights.
1 ron r..-- ffr%.1 AOr
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IV. Directors' Duties Statutes (DDS)
A. Introduction
Directors' Duties Statutes (DDS) or "non-stockholder constitu-
ency" statutes provide directors with a legal basis for considering
nonshareholder interests in change-of-control contexts. Thus, col-
laterally, in the event of shareholder litigation, these statutes afford
directors breathing room for reasonably rejecting a takeover offer
that might be in the best interests of the shareholders.
B. Legislative Intent
Most legislatures enact these statutes to facilitate directors' con-
sideration of long-term corporate interests and societal welfare
rather than solely or primarily short-term shareholder welfare. For
example, the committee comment accompanying Ohio's 1984
amendments authorizing directors to consider nonshareholders
stated that the legislature believed that existing law permitted direc-
tors to consider nonshareholders' interests and that the amendment
was intended to "specify and clarify the breadth of the interests"
which directors could consider. Corporation Law Committee, Com-
ment, 1984 Ohio St. Bar Ass'n Rep. 540.
Indiana's general assembly has stated:
In enacting this article, the general assembly established corpo-
rate governance rules for Indiana corporations .... The general
assembly intends to reaffirm certain of these corporate govern-
ance rules to ensure that the directors of Indiana corporations, in
exercising their business judgment, are not required to approve a
proposed corporate action if the directors in good faith deter-
mine, after considering and weighing as they deem appropriate
the effects of such action on the corporation's constituents, that
such action is not in the best interests of the corporation....
Therefore, the general assembly intends:
(1) to reaffirm that this section allows directors the full discretion
to weigh [nonshareholder constituency] factors . . . and
(2) to protect both directors and the validity of corporate action
taken by them in the good faith exercise of their business judg-
ment after reasonable investigation.
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (f) (West Supp. 1990).
C. Typical Terminology
Nonshareholder interests: The statutes vary greatly in the degree of
discretion given to directors. Among the factors directors are al-
lowed to consider:
- short-term and long-term interests of the corporation
and its subsidiaries
- interests of, or effects on, current and retired employ-
ees, customers, creditors, and suppliers
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- interests of, or effects on, the local, state, and national
economies
Opt in: Georgia requires that shareholders elect to be covered by
amending articles of incorporation.
D. Constitutionality
The constitutionality of DDSs is not currently in question.
1991] 1539
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V Fair Price Statutes (FPS)
A. Introduction
Fair price statutes (FPS) require that certain business combina-
tions be approved by a supermajority vote of the target's sharehold-
ers unless a statutorily determined fair price is paid. A bidder
failing to offer a fair price to all target shareholders cannot proceed
with a business combination unless the business combination re-
ceives the approval of a supermajority (typically 66.6%) of disinter-
ested outstanding shares.
Although these statutes impose supermajority voting require-
ments for mergers, sales of assets, liquidations and recapitalizations,
they are silent on tender offers. The supermajority requirements
generally include both eighty percent outstanding share vote and 2/3
disinterested vote.
Relation to business combinations: Typically, a shareholder vote is
required for approval of a business combination by 2/3 of the out-
standing disinterested shares (some states require additional ap-
proval by 80% of all outstanding shares). Also, because FPSs are
often adopted by states in conjunction with BCSs, the supermajority
voting requirement of the FPS may not engage until after the expi-
ration of the moratorium imposed by the BCS.
B. Legislative Intent
The statute is intended to limit inadequate or coercive two-tiered
and freeze-out bids by regulating the "second-step" of two-tier
transactions.
C. Typical Terminology
Interested Shareholder generally includes ten percent beneficial own-
ers of voting stock.
Opt out provisions allowing a corporation to elect not to be gov-
erned usually require the same supermajority vote.
Fair Price Formulas, although relatively complex and varied, seek to
assure fair prices to shareholders at least as high as the highest price
paid by the interested shareholder for any shares within the past two
years. Typically, fair price formulae require a bidder to pay the
highest of: (1) the highest price paid for the company shares in a
period (e.g., 2 years) before the proposed business combination is
announced; (2) the market value per share on the date the proposed
business combination is announced or the date on which the bidder
crosses the threshold from a disinterested to an interested share-
holder; or (3) a value determined by averaging these two formulae.
FPSs may also impose procedural criteria for nonapproved tender
offers (e.g., no self-dealing transactions).
Market Value: Most states define market value as the highest clos-
ing sale price "during the 30 day period immediately preceding the
[VOL. 59:14251546
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date in question [of a share]" or "during the period beginning with
and including the determination date and for 30 days prior to such
date."
Determination date means the date on which an interested share-
holder became an interested shareholder.
D. Constitutionality
The constitutionality of FPSs is not currently in question.
1991] 1547
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VI. Share Rights Plan Endorsement Statutes (SRPES)
A. Introduction
Share rights plan endorsement statutes (SRPES) endorse a do-
mestic target's use of poison pill rights plans (PPRPs). PPRPs typi-
cally involve the grant of rights to target shareholders to purchase
target shares at a substantial discount from the market price (typi-
cally fifty percent) absent board redemption/approval.
B. Legislative Intent
To the extent there is some judicial uncertainty as to the legality
of adopting PPRPs, these statutes are intended to minimize that
uncertainty.
C. Typical Language
Most statutes contain language allowing a corporation to limit or
void the rights of acquiror: The terms of rights may include condi-
tions that "preclude or limit the exercise ... of such rights ... or
may void any rights ...
D. Constitutionality
The constitutionality of SRPESs is not currently in question.
[VOL. 59:14251554
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VII. Antigreenmail Statutes (AGMS)
A. Introduction
Antigreenmail statutes (AGMS) restrict a target's ability to pay
"greenmail" to shareholders. Greenmail is the target's purchase of
its own shares-invariably at a substantial premium-from an unin-
vited suitor. These statutes typically direct that corporations shall
not purchase any voting shares from a person who owns more than
a certain percentage of the target's voting power for more than
"market price" (typically) if the shares have been owned by such
person for less than a specified period of years, unless (1) such
purchase is approved at a meeting of shareholders by the affirmative
vote of a majority of target's voting power, excluding interested
shares or (2) the target makes an offer to all holders of shares.
B. Legislative Intent
When corporations pay out "greenmail" to raiders, only the
raider benefits: corporate assets are channeled from productive cor-
porate uses to raiders' personal gain. Not only does this harm the
corporation and its shareholders, but the frequent pay out of large
sums encourages raiders to seek out "greenmail."
C. Typical Terminology
Average Market Price means the average closing sale price during
the thirty trading days immediately preceding either (1) the
purchase of the shares in question or, (2) given a tender offer, the
earlier of the commencement of the tender offer or the making of
the announcement of the tender offer.
Market Value means either (1) the average of the highest and low-
est closing market price for relevant shares during the thirty day pe-
riod preceding the purchase and sale of the shares or, (2) given a
tender offer, the average of the highest and lowest closing price for
relevant shares during the thirty trading days preceding the com-
mencement of tender offer or the announcement of the tender offer.
D. Constitutionality


















VIII. Disclosure Statutes (DS)
A. Introduction
Disclosure statutes require bidders to disclose certain information
regarding their offer for a target. Typical statutes prescribe specific
waiting periods between disclosure and offer and grant state officials
the authority to hold hearings and the discretion to determine the
adequacy of the disclosure.
B. Legislative Intent
As to legislative intent, Indiana's statute is typical:
The general assembly finds that it is often difficult for corporate
shareholders to obtain sufficient information to make an informed
and timely decision when faced with the questions of accepting or
rejecting a takeover offer.
By enacting this chapter, it is the intent and purpose of the gen-
eral assembly to provide for full and fair disclosure of all material
information concerning takeover offers to shareholders of Indiana
corporations, so that the opportunity of each shareholder to make
an informed and well-reasoned investment decision may be se-
cured. It is also the purpose of the general assembly to protect
shareholders of Indiana corporations from being disadvantaged
by [such practices as multiple proration pools and two-step
transactions].
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vote or equal offer




vote or equal offer
by offeror to all
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C. Typical Terminology
Before a tender offer becomes effective, the offeror must file a
registration statement, usually with the state commissioner, detail-
ing prescribed information. These registration statements and their
accompanying schedules are often required to contain, inter alia, the
following information:
(1) Items sent to offeree: Copies of all prospectuses,
brochures, advertisements, circulars, letters, or other
matter used by the offeror to disclose to offerees all
information material to a decision to accept or reject
the offer;
(2) Offeror's identity: the identity and background of all
persons on whose behalf the acquisition of any equity
security of the target has been or is to be effected;
(3) Offeror's funds: the source and amount of funds or other
considerations used or to be used in acquiring any
equity security of the target;
(4) Offeror's plans: a statement of any plans which the
offeror, upon gaining control of target, would pursue,
including plans to liquidate, sell assets, effect a merger
or consolidation, or make any other major change in its
business, corporate structure, management personnel,
or policies of employment;
(5) Offeror's interest in target-shares: the number of shares of
any equity security of the target of which each offeror is
beneficial owner or has the right to acquire;
(6) Offeror's interest in target--contracts: particulars as to any
contracts, arrangements, or understandings to which
each offeror is party with respect to any equity security
of the target, including without limitation transfers of
any equity security, joint ventures, loan or option
arrangements, puts and calls, guarantees of loan,
guarantees against loss, guarantees of profits, division
of losses or profits;
(7) Offeror's interest in target-recent transactions: the approxi-
mate amount of any material interest of any director,
officer, ten percent shareholder, affiliate, partner or
associate of the offeror in any recent material transac-
tion (e.g., during the past three years) or in any
proposed material transactions with the target to which
the offeror was or is to be a party;
1991] 1561
(8) Arrangement between offeror and target. a description of any
direct or indirect arrangement or understanding be-
tween each offeror and the target with respect to future
employment of offeror or target, service by any such
person on either board and compensation paid for such
service;
(9) Annual reports: its latest annual report and proxy
materials or "substantially comparable" information;
(10) Constituency impact statement: information that discloses to
employees, creditors and other interested persons in
the state any significant impact upon them that may
result from the consummation of the tender offer;
(11) Various other requirement.s: other requirements that vary
among the states.
D. Constitutionality
Many disclosure statutes or provisions thereof have been declared
unconstitutional based on violation of the Commerce Clause, see Ed-
gar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), or the Supremacy Clause,
e.g., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
1982).
MITE held that the Illinois Business Takeover Act (the Illinios
Act) violated the Commerce Clause because the indirect burdens
that it imposed on interstate commerce were excessive in relation to
the local interest the statute purported to protect. Thus, the consti-
tutionality of first-generation disclosure statutes following the Illi-
nois Act invalidated in MITE may be in question. These first-
generation statutes generally required tender offer open periods
longer than those required of the Williams Act. Many statutes often
provided for a state hearing and review of the terms and fairness of
the transaction. Second-generation disclosure statutes which steer
clear of these MITE pitfalls have generally been upheld. See, e.g.,
Cardif Acquisitions Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984) (up-
holding Minnesota's Ch. 80B).
[VOL. 59:14251562
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(1) copies of everything to be
sent to offerees; (2) identity,
background, and description
of offeror; (3) source and
amount of funds;
(4) liquidation plans; (5) target
shares offeror owns or has
right to acquire, (6) material
terms of any contract or
arrangement regarding target's
shares.
If takeover offer is subject to 20 bus. days /
any federal law, required none
statement must consist of each
document required to be filed
with the SEC; otherwise,
offeror must file a registration
statement containing:
(1) information to be sent to
offerees & solicitation
materials; (2) identity of and
material information
concerning offeror;, (3) source
and amount of funds;
(4) liquidation plans; (5) target
shares offeror owns or has
right to acquire; (6) offeror's
contracts involving target's
shares; (7) other information.
Required Disclosure
registration statement
containing: (1) copies of
everything to be sent to
offerees; (2) identity of offeror,
(3) source and amount of
funds; (4) liquidation plans;
(5) target shares offeror owns
or has right to acquire;
(6) offeror's contracts
involving target's shares;
(7) material interests in target;
(8) employment arrangements





containing: (1) copies of
everything to be sent to
offerees; (2) identity of offeror;,
(3) source and amount of
funds; (4) liquidation plans;
(5) target shares offeror owns
or has right to acquire;
(6) offeror's contracts
involving target's shares;
(7) material interests in target;
(8) employment arrangements






the offer within 3
days of filing
(2) hold hearing
within 10 days of
suspension.;
(3) decision










Power of Cmm 'r
Hearing within
20 days of filing-
determination




date of the offer;,
(2) hold hearing




































Miss. Disclosure statement shall be
§ 75-72-101 filed on SEC's schedule 14D-1
and copies of all materials







(1) copies of all documents
required to be filed with the
SEC; (2) identity of and
material information
concerning offeror; (3) source
and amount of funds;
(4) liquidation plans; (5) target
shares offeror owns or has
right to acquire; (6) offeror's
contracts involving target's
shares; (7) solicitation




(1) copies of everything to be
sent to offerees; (2) identity of
offeror; (3) source and amount
of funds; (4) liquidation plans;
(5) shares offeror owns or has
right to acquire; (6) offeror's
contracts involving target's
shares; (7) "complete
information" on operations of
offeror, (8) government
proceedings (9) other tender
offers within past 5 years.
registration statement
containing:
(1) copies of everything to be
sent to offerees; (2) identity
and description of offeror;
(3) source and amount of
funds; (4) any plans to
materially change corporation,




with suppliers or customers;
(5) shares offeror beneficially
owns directly or indirectly.
none/15 days hold hearing
within 20 days of
filing
adjudications
























the offer within 3
days of filing;
(2) hold hearing
within 10 days of
suspension;
(3) decision





































(1) copies of all solicitation
materials; (2) identity and
description of offeror (3) title
and numbers of share sought;
consideration offered;
(4) source and amount of
funds; (5) any plans to
materially change corporate
structure, management,
personnel, or policies of
employment; (6) target shares
offeror beneficially owns
directly or indirectly; (7)
offeror's contracts involving
target's shares; (7) "complete
information" on operations of
offeror, (8) statement of
impact offeror's plans may




repealed by Ch. 21, L '83, iff.
2-28-83. See § 78-3771
(Disclosure) (requires offeror's
depositing shares; requires




(1) copies of everything to be
sent to offerees; (2) identity
and complete description of
offeror (3) source and amount
of funds; (4) plans to make
any major change; (5) target
shares offeror owns or has
right to acquire; (6) offeror's
contracts involving target's
shares; (7) government
proceedings (8) other tender
offers within past 5 years
(9) other information.
registration statement
containing: (1) copies of
everything to be sent to
offerees; (2) identity and
complete description of
offeror (3) source and amount
of funds; (4) plans to make
any material change in
corporate structure; (5) target
shares offeror owns or has
right to acquire; (6) offeror's
contracts involving target's





none/15 days order hearing





within 55 days of
filing
20 days/3 days Hold hearing






all same termsschedule hearing
within ten days of
filing; hold within









State & Cite Required Disclosure
New York registration statement
§§ 1600 containing:
to (I) copies of everything to be
1613 sent to offerees; (2) identity
and description of offeror;
(3) title and numbers of share
sought; consideration offered;
(4) source and amount of
funds; (5) any plans to
materially change corporate
structure, management,
personnel, or policies of





(7) "complete information" on
operations of offeror;
(8) statement of impact
offeror's plans may have on
residents of state; (9) Offeror's
community activities and
charitable contributions.
North Carolina registration statement
§§ 78B-1 containing:
to (1) copies of everything to be
78B-11 sent to offerees; (2) identity
and description of offeror,
(3) source and amount of
funds; (4) any plans to
materially change corporate
structure, management,
personnel, or policies of





(7) concurrent public notice
Ohio registration statement
§ 1707.041 containing-(1) copies of everything to be
sent to offerees; (2) identity
and description of offeror,
(3) source and amount of
funds; (4) any plans to
materially change corporate
structure, management,
personnel, or policies of
employment; (5) target shares
offeror beneficially owns
directly or indirectly or has a
right to acquire; (6) offeror's
contracts involving target's
shares; (7) "complete
information" on operations of
offeror. Information required
under Securities Act of 1933








Power of Comm'r Offer
schedule hearing all same terms
within 10 days of
filing; held within
20 days of filing.
not specified
hearing held
within 10 days of
suspension;
determination










(1) copies of everything to be
sent to offerees; (2) identity
and description of offeror
(3) source and amount of
funds; (4) any plans to
materially change corporate
structure, management,
personnel, or policies of
employment; (5) target shares
offeror beneficially owns
directly or indirectly or has a
right to acquire; (6) offeror's
contracts involving target's
shares; (7) "complete
information" on operations of
offeror.
registration statement
containing either copy of
federally required § 13(d)
statement or. (1) copies of
everything to be sent to
offerees; (2) identity and
description of offeror (3) title
and numbers of share sought;
consideration offered;
(4) source and amount of
funds; (5) any plans to
materially change corporate
structure, management,
personnel, or policies of
employment; (6) takeovers
during prior 3 years; (7) target
shares offeror beneficially
owns directly or indirectly;
(8) offeror's contracts
involving target's shares;







(1) copies of all solicitation
materials; (2) identity and
complete description of
offeror, (3) source and amount
of funds; (4) plans to make
any major change; (5) shares
offeror owns or has right to
acquire; (6) offeror's contracts













none/20 days not specified








































containing either (1) (1) copies
of all solicitation materials;
(2) identity and complete
description of offeror;
(3) source and amount of
funds; (4) plans to make any
major change; (5) target
shares offeror owns or has
right to acquire; (6) offeror's
contracts involving target's
shares; or (11) SEC § 13(d)
statement
registration statement
containing either, I: copies of
all documents required to be
filed with the SEC or other
federal agencies; or II:
(1) identity of and material
information concerning
offeror; (2) source and amount
of funds; (3) liquidation plans
or plans for major changes in
business; (4) shares offeror
owns or has right to acquire;
(5) offeror's contracts
involving target's shares;
(6) information to be sent to
offerees; (7) other information.




within 30 days of
filing
IX. Parachute Statutes (PS) (some examples)
1. Tin Parachute Statutes
A. Introduction
These plant closing statutes attempt to mitigate unexpected and
sudden layoffs resulting from plant closures, partial plant closures,
and relocations.
B. Legislative Intent
See, e.g., WASH. Bus. CORP. ACT. § 23B.10.010 (Supp. 1991): "Hos-
tile or unfriendly attempts to gain control" of Washington corpora-
tions can (1) cause corporate management "to dissipate a
corporation's assets in an effort to resist the takeover by selling or
distributing" assets to increase the short term gain to shareholders
and to
dissipate energies required for strategic planning, market devel-
opment, capital investment decisions, assessment of technologies,
and evaluation of competitive challenges that can damage the
long-term interests of shareholders and the economic health of
the state by reducing or eliminating the ability to finance invest-
ments in research and development, new products, facilities and
equipment, and by undermining the planning process for those
purposes.
(2) harm the state's economy by weakening corporate perform-





all same terms20 business 5 days notice
days
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C. Typical Terminology
The terminology is varied and straightforward.
D. Constitutionality
The constitutionality of these statutes is not currently in question.
E. State Legislation (some examples)
Hawaii's tin parachute statute requires Hawaii's director of labor
and industrial relations to: (1) indentifyjob opportunities for which
dislocated workers could be retrained and assisted in securing; (2)
establish programs to assist dislocated workers to obtain employ-
ment through training, assistance, and supportive services; and (3)
provide relocation assistance.
The statute requires employers to (1) provide forty-five days prior
notice of closings or relocations; (2) provide eligible employees with
unemployment compensation. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 394B (Supp.
1990).
Maine's tin parachute statute requires any employer who relocates
or terminates eligible employees to pay severance pay. See ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 625-B (1989).
Massachusetts' law entitles eligible employees after a transfer of
control to a one-time lump sum payment from the "control trans-
feree." Upon assuming control, the "control transferee" is respon-
sible for providing written notice to employees and unions of their
rights. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 183 (West 1989).
2. Golden Parachute Statutes
Arizona's statute prohibits targets from entering into or amend-
ing agreements containing provisions "that increase, directly or in-
directly, the current or future compensation of any officer or
director" of the target during any tender offer "or request or invita-
tion for tenders" of target shares. Routine increases in compensa-
tion are excepted.
See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. 10-1202 (b) (1989). Other states have
nearly identical language. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.255 subd.3
(1989).
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